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The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment dismissal of all claims in the Second Amended Complaint against defendants in an action stemming from construction projects with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The court held that MES's claims failed to articulate any support for its accusations that Safeco breached its contractual obligations or engaged in bad faith or tortious conduct. The court noted that the claim that Safeco acted inappropriately by attending the cure meetings was particularly frivolous. In this case, MES failed to identify any good faith basis, in law or on the basis of the agreements at issue, for its assertion that Safeco had no right to take steps to meet its obligations under the surety bonds. The court sua sponte awarded Safeco double costs. View "M.E.S., Inc. v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America" on Justia Law

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The Vermont Agency of Transportation (VTrans) appealed the Transportation Board’s order granting judgment to W.M. Schultz Construction, Inc. in this contract dispute. Schultz entered into a contract with VTrans in December 2013 to replace four bridges destroyed by Tropical Storm Irene. Three bridges were completed without incident. This dispute centered on the fourth bridge, referred to as “Bridge #19.” The Bridge #19 project involved the construction of a single-span steel-girder bridge over the White River in Rochester, Vermont. The west abutment was to be placed on a deep pile foundation and the east abutment (Abutment #2) was to be placed on ledge. The work was to begin in April 2014 and be completed in a single construction season. The Board concluded that Schultz encountered “differing site conditions” in carrying out its bridge-construction project and that it was entitled to an equitable adjustment for costs it incurred as a result. VTrans appealed, arguing the Board misread the contract materials and otherwise erred in granting judgment to Schultz. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "W.M. Schultz Construction, Inc. v. Vermont Agency of Transportation" on Justia Law

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JRI contracted with the City of Los Angeles Department of Airports (LAWA), to provide LAWA specialized airport firefighting trucks. Each sued the other for breach of the contract. LAWA further alleged JRI violated the California False Claims Act (CFCA), Government Code section 12650, asserting that when JRI submitted it[s] invoices for progress payments and final payments, JRI knew that it was not in compliance with the contract and sought to defraud the government entity LAWA into making payments and that JRI fraudulently induced LAWA to enter into the contract. LAWA was awarded $1 in contract damages. LAWA’s CFCA claim was rejected by the jury, as were JRI’s claims against LAWA. The court awarded LAWA costs as a prevailing party on the contract claims but awarded JRI attorney fees on the CFCA claim, finding the claim frivolous and harassing. The court of appeal affirmed JRI “prevail[ed] in the action” under the relevant CFCA fee provision (section 12652(g)(9)(B);) regardless of its failure to prevail in the action as a whole. View "John Russo Industrial Sheetmetal, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles Department of Airports" on Justia Law

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K-Con and the Army entered into two contracts for pre-engineered metal buildings. K-Con claims that the Army subsequently delayed issuance of a notice to proceed for two years, resulting in $116,336.56 in increases in costs and labor. According to K-Con, this delay was due solely to the government’s decision to add to each contract the performance and payment bonds set forth in Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.228-15. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals held that bonding requirements were included in the contracts by operation of law when they were awarded, pursuant to the Christian doctrine. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The two contracts are construction contracts and, under the Christian doctrine, the standard bond requirements in construction contracts were incorporated into K-Con’s contracts by operation of law. If the contracts had been issued using the standard construction contract form, there would have been no issue, but these contracts issued using the standard commercial items contract form. There were, however, many indications that the contracts were for construction, not commercial items. The statement of work included many construction-related tasks, including developing and submitting construction plans, obtaining construction permits, and cleaning up construction areas. The statement of work also required compliance with FAR regulations relevant only to construction contracts. View "K-Con, Inc. v. Secretary of the Army" on Justia Law

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Killian Construction Company ("Killian") and Christian Mills petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss the underlying action and to enter an order dismissing the action, based on improper venue. The City of Foley, Alabama, contracted with Killian to construct the Foley Sports Tourism Complex ("the sports complex"). Killian was a Missouri corporation whose principal place of business was located in Springfield, Missouri. Killian entered into a subcontract for part of the work on the sports complex with Edward Woerner, owner of Southern Turf Nurseries, Inc. Woerner was a resident of Baldwin County, Alabama. Woerner claimed Killian failed to pay him the full amount due for the work performed under the subcontract and sued Killian at the Baldwin County Circuit Court. The Alabama Supreme Court determined a forum-selection clause in the subcontract obligated the parties to litigate in a federal or state court in Missouri. Woerner did not establish that venue in Missouri would have been seriously inconvenient for the trial of the underlying action. Mills could enforce an outbound forum-selection clause because he was an employee of Killian directly involved in the sports complex project and the claims against him were related to the contract claims against Killian. Therefore, the Supreme Court found Killian and Mills were entitled to the writ of mandamus and granted relief. View "Ex parte Killian Construction Company and Christian Mills." on Justia Law

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John Morgan submitted a public records request to the Mississippi State Hospital (“MSH”) after it had awarded a contract for insurance plan administration to XLK International, LLC (XLK). Morgan, whose bid for the insurance plan administration contract had been unsuccessful, demanded access to all documents XLK had submitted in response to the state hospital’s request for proposal (RFP). XLK sought and obtained a protective order from the chancery court. The chancery court allowed Morgan to intervene and held a hearing on his Motion to Set Aside Protective Order. The chancery court ruled that the documents XLK had submitted in response to MSH’s RFP were not subject to disclosure under the Mississippi Public Records Act, with the exception of the contract between MSH and XLK. Because the chancery court correctly applied the Mississippi Public Records Act, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed its judgment. View "Morgan v. XLK International, LLC" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was the relative priority of statutes and regulations governing the procurement process for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims concluding that section 502 of the Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-461, 120 Stat. 30403, 3431-35 (VBA), requires the VA to consider awarding contracts for prescription eyewear based on competition restricted to veteran-owned small businesses before procuring this eyewear from any other source, including any nonprofit agency for the blind or significantly disabled designated as such under that Javits-Wagner-O’Day Act, 41 U.S.C. 8504. After considering the plain language of the VBA, as well as the legislative history and Congress’s intention in enacting it, the Federal Circuit held (1) the Claims Court properly exercised subject-matter jurisdiction over this action; and (2) the Claims Court did not err in its substantive legal analysis, and the VA is required to undertake the “rule of two” analysis as required under the VBA - even when goods and services are on the list. View "PDS Consultants, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Conduent State & Local Solutions, Inc. (Conduent) appealed a superior court order denying Conduent’s request for a declaration that defendant New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT) exceeded its statutory authority, and, therefore, violated the separation of powers doctrine, by procuring from defendant Cubic Transportation Systems, Inc. (Cubic) a new system to support DOT’s electronic collection of tolls, using the “best value” method for evaluating competing bids. On appeal, Conduent argued the DOT had no statutory authority to procure the new system because procurement authority was given to the New Hampshire Department of Administrative Services (DAS). Alternatively, Conduent claimed that even if the DOT had statutory authority to procure the new system, it lacked authority to use the “best value” method for evaluating competing bids. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed denial of the declaration. View "Conduent State & Local Solutions, Inc. v. New Hampshire Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

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After the Army awarded a contract for computer hardware to Appellees, including Dell, Blue Tech, and Red River, 21 unsuccessful bidders filed protests, claiming the Army’s evaluations were unreasonable because the proposal deficiencies the Army considered disqualifying were minor or “clerical errors and misunderstandings” resulting from Solicitation ambiguities that could have been resolved through clarifications. The Army instituted a corrective action to reopen procurement and conduct additional discussions with offerors. Appellees challenged the decision. The Court of Federal Claims granted Appellees judgment on the administrative record and enjoined the Army from proceeding with its corrective action. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Claims Court did not apply the proper legal standard and the Army’s corrective action was reasonable under the correct standard. The Claims Court applied a “more exacting [standard] than the APA’s ‘rational basis’ review threshold for procurement protests, and impermissibly restrict[ed] the great deference the Tucker Act requires courts to afford agency procurement officials” by its use of a “narrowly targeted” standard. The Army’s proposed corrective action to reopen procurement and allow proposals to be revised is rationally related to the procurement’s defects, i.e., failure to conduct discussions and spreadsheet ambiguities. View "Dell Federal Systems, L.P. v. United States" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of the Commissioner of Transportation (Defendant) on Plaintiff’s complaint alleging, inter alia, that Defendant negligently authorized Hallberg Contracting Company to deposit construction materials on Plaintiff’s property. With Defendant’s consent, Hallberg, a subcontractor on a highway reconstruction project, entered into an oral contract with a third party to use the property for stockpiling construction materials related to a highway reconstruction project. Hallberg deposited thirty-two truckloads of material on the property. The trial court found that Defendant negligently authorized Hallberg to dispose of the construction materials on the property but that Plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages. The court then awarded $29,855 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court’s award of damages was not clearly erroneous; (2) the trial court’s finding that Plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages was supported by sufficient evidence in the record; and (3) the trial court properly did not award Plaintiff damages for lost profits. View "Sun Val, LLC v. Commissioner of Transportation" on Justia Law