Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

A sub-subcontractor, Diamond Services Corporation, entered into a contract with Harbor Dredging, a subcontractor, to perform dredging work in the Houston Ship Channel. The prime contract for the project was awarded to RLB Contracting by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and RLB obtained a surety bond from Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America. During the project, unexpected site conditions, including the presence of tires, caused delays and increased costs. Diamond continued working based on an alleged agreement that it would be compensated through a measured-mile calculation in a request for equitable adjustment (REA) submitted by RLB to the Corps. However, RLB later settled the REA for $6,000,000 without directly involving Diamond in the negotiations and issued a joint check to Harbor and Diamond for $950,000.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed some of Diamond's claims, including those for unjust enrichment and express contractual claims against RLB, but allowed Diamond's quantum meruit claim to proceed. The court also denied Travelers' motion to dismiss Diamond's Miller Act claims but required Diamond to amend its complaint to include proper Miller Act notice, which Diamond failed to do timely. Subsequently, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of RLB and Harbor, dismissing Diamond's remaining claims and striking Diamond's untimely second amended complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment against Diamond's quantum meruit claims, holding that the express sub-subcontract covered the damages Diamond sought and that Diamond failed to provide evidence of the reasonable value of the work performed. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Diamond's Miller Act claim, as the damages sought were not recoverable under the Act. The court dismissed Diamond's appeal regarding the tug-expenses claim due to untimeliness. View "Diamond Services v. RLB Contracting" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting the government's motion to dismiss this lawsuit alleging improper termination and breach of contract for failure to state a claim on the grounds that the claims were time-barred, holding that there was no basis to disturb the district court's decision.This matter arose out of a contract for between J-Way Southern and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) for dredging water waters in Menemsha Harbor, Martha's Vineyard. After USACE terminated the contract J-Way filed suit, alleging improper termination and breach of contract. The district court granted USACE's motion to dismiss, concluding that J-Way's claims were time-barred. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction over this maritime contract dispute; and (2) the district court properly denied the government's motion to dismiss. View "J-Way Southern, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

Curtin Maritime Corp. (Curtin) filed suit against its competitor, Pacific Dredge and Construction, LLC (Pacific), asserting one cause of action for violation of the Unfair Competition Law. The parties operated dredging vessels, and competed for contracts awarded by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). In its complaint, Curtin alleged Pacific was ineligible for two contracts it was awarded over Curtin because its vessel was not “entirely” built in the United States, a violation of the federal Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (commonly referred to as the Jones Act), and Pacific defrauded the Coast Guard in its successful application for certification that the vessel was U.S.-built. These allegations served as the sole basis for Curtin’s UCL claim. In response to the complaint, Pacific brought a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 to strike Curtin’s claim, asserting it arose from protected speech and that Curtin could not show a probability of prevailing on the merits of its claim. The trial court agreed with Pacific that the claim arose from protected activity, but concluded Curtin had met its burden at this early stage of litigation to show the claim had minimal merit and denied the motion. Pacific appealed the ruling, contending the trial court erred because the claim was preempted by the Jones Act. After Pacific filed its notice of appeal, Curtin dismissed the underlying lawsuit and moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. Pacific opposed the motion, asserting the appeal was viable since reversal of the trial court’s order would provide Pacific the opportunity to seek attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute. The Court of Appeal agreed with Pacific that the appeal was not moot, and dismissal of the appeal was not appropriate. Further, the Court concluded Curtin did not show a probability of prevailing on the merits of its claim. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s order denying Pacific’s motion to strike, and directed the trial court to reinstate the case and issue an order granting the anti-SLAPP motion and striking Curtin’s claim. View "Curtin Maritime Corp. v. Pacific Dredge etc." on Justia Law

The Virgin Islands is a U.S. territory that can set and receive proceeds from duties, Virgin Islands Port Authority (VIPA) is authorized to “determine, fix, alter, charge, and collect reasonable rates, fees, rentals, ship’s dues and other charges.” Since 1968, VIPA has set wharfage and tonnage fees for Virgin Islands ports. Customs collected those fees from 1969-2011, deducting its costs. The remaining funds were transferred to VIPA. In 1994, the Virgin Islands and Customs agreed to “the methodology for determining the costs chargeable to [the Virgin Islands] . . . for operating various [Customs] activities.” The agreement cited 48 U.S.C. 1469c, which provides: To the extent practicable, services, facilities, and equipment of agencies and instrumentalities of the United States Government may be made available, on a reimbursable basis, to the governments of the territories and possessions of the United States. Customs increased collection costs, which outpaced the collection of the disputed fees starting in 2004, leaving VIPA without any proceeds. After failed efforts to resolve the issue, VIPA notified Customs in February 2011, that VIPA would start to collect the fees in March 2011. VIPA sued Customs to recover approximately $ 10 million in disputed fees that Customs collected from February 2008 to March 1, 2011. The Federal Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of Customs. Customs had authority to collect the disputed fees during the time at issue under the 1994 agreement, in combination with 48 U.S.C. 1469c. View "Virgin Islands Port Authority v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2000 the Port Authority signed a 30-year lease for the largest marine terminal at Port Elizabeth (445 acres including structures and berthing) with Maher, which handles cargo. The Lease requires “Basic Rental,” (in 2012, $50,413 per acre, totaling $22,433,612) plus “Container Throughput Rental,” based on the type and volume of cargo at Maher’s terminal. For eight years, Maher was exempted from Throughput Rental. Since 2008 the first 356,000 containers are exempted; for containers 356,001 to 980,000, Maher paid $19.00 per container in 2012; and for each additional container, Maher paid $14.25. Maher must handle a minimum amount of cargo to maintain the Lease and pay an annual guaranteed minimum Throughput Rental. Maher paid $12.5 million in Throughput Rental in 2010, and expected the 2012 amount to be $14 million. Maher claims the Port Authority profits from the Lease and uses the revenue to fund harbor improvements and projects unrelated to services provided to Maher or vessels. In 2012 Maher sued, alleging violations of the Constitution’s Tonnage Clause; the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. 5(b); and the Water Resources Development Act, 33 U.S.C. 2236. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal, agreeing that Maher lacked standing to bring its Tonnage Clause and RHA claims because it was not a protected vessel and did not adequately plead that fees imposed on vessels were not for services rendered. Maher’s WRDA claim failed because Maher had not shown that the Authority imposed fees on vessels or cargo and because the WRDA did not prohibit use of Lease revenue to finance harbor improvements. View "Maher Terminals LLC v. Port Auth. of NY" on Justia Law

The Village commenced this action against the Corps to require it to honor commitments made to the Village and other North Carolina towns when developing its plan to widen, deepen, and realign portions of the Cape Fear River navigation channel. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with the district court's holding that the Corps' failure to implement "commitments" made to the Village during development of the plans for the project was not final agency action subject to judicial review. The court also concluded that the alleged contracts on which the Village relied for its contract claims were not maritime contracts that justified the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Village of Bald Head Island v. U. S. Army Corps" on Justia Law