Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

Yorktown Systems Group Inc. and Threat Tec LLC, both defense contractors, entered into a mentor-protégé relationship under the Small Business Administration’s program to jointly pursue government contracts. They formed a joint venture (JV) and were awarded a $165 million contract with the U.S. Army. The JV agreement allocated specific work shares to each company. However, the relationship soured, and Threat Tec attempted to terminate Yorktown’s subcontract, effectively cutting Yorktown out of its share of the contract.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama granted Yorktown a preliminary injunction, preventing Threat Tec from terminating the subcontract and depriving Yorktown of its rights under the JV agreement. The court found that Yorktown had shown a substantial likelihood of success on its breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims and faced irreparable harm. The court noted that Threat Tec’s CEO had made false statements and lacked candor, leading to the belief that Threat Tec’s motives were unethical.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court found no clear error in the district court’s factfindings and concluded that the district court acted within its discretion. The court held that Threat Tec, as the managing member of the JV, owed fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to Yorktown and likely breached those duties by attempting to cut Yorktown out of its contractually specified workshare. The court also agreed that Yorktown faced irreparable harm, including potential damage to its business reputation and the loss of highly skilled employees, which could not be remedied by monetary damages alone. View "Yorktown Systems Group Inc. v. Threat TEC LLC" on Justia Law

For pressing projects, the government can issue “Undefinitized Contract Actions” (UCAs) to allow contractors to begin work before the parties have reached a final agreement on contract terms, like price. The Air Force entered into two UCAs with Lockheed for upgrades to F-16 aircraft. Both UCAs include “definitization” clauses that provide that if the parties are unable to reach agreements on price by a certain time, the Contracting Officer (CO) may determine a reasonable price. After years of negotiations, the Air Force and Lockheed were unable to agree on the price terms. The CO assigned to each UCA unilaterally definitized a price of about $1 billion.The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), acting under the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), dismissed appeals for lack of jurisdiction because Lockheed failed to submit a certified contractor claim to the COs requesting a final decision on its claims as required under the CDA. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting Lockheed’s argument that the COs’ unilateral definitizations qualified as government claims under the CDA, which a contractor can directly appeal to the ASBCA without having to submit its own claim to the COs. The COs’ definitizations of the contract prices were not demands or assertions by the government seeking relief against Lockheed. View "Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. v. Secretary of the Air Force" on Justia Law

Raytheon has cost-reimbursement government contracts. Raytheon’s Government Relations Department engaged in information gathering, internal discussions on lobbying strategies, attending meals with contractors and Congresspeople or staff, meeting with internal Raytheon customers, attending political fundraisers, administering Raytheon’s Political Action Committee, interfacing with the legislative branch, responding to requests from Congressional staffers, and similar activities. Raytheon instructed employees to record all compensated time spent on lobbying activities. Accounting personnel withdrew costs associated with that time from Raytheon’s incurred-cost submissions. Raytheon’s employees considered time worked outside of regular hours part of their regular work duties, yet Raytheon’s policy instructed them not to report “[t]ime spent on lobby activity after the scheduled working day.” Raytheon’s Corporate Development Department worked with Raytheon’s business units, including internal investment, research and development, intellectual property licensing, partnerships, or acquisitions. Corporate Development had rules establishing when employees begin recording their time on acquisitions and divestitures.In 2007-2008, Raytheon charged the government for roughly half of the salary costs of its Government Relations and Corporate Development Departments. The Defense Contract Audit Agency audited both departments, determined that Raytheon’s incurred-cost submissions for those departments included unallowable costs, and demanded reimbursement and penalties. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals ruled in favor of Raytheon. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Board erred in interpreting Raytheon’s corporate practices and policies, which are inconsistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulation and led Raytheon to charge the government for unallowable costs. View "Secretary of Defense v. Raytheon Co." on Justia Law

In 2005, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) awarded Supreme a contract to provide food to U.S. forces in Afghanistan. During negotiations concerning deliveries to forward operating bases, Supreme submitted inflated cost proposals. Supreme threatened to withhold payments to subcontractors (potentially cutting off supplies to troops), The parties executed a Modification, including Supreme’s proposed rates, subject to verification. The Defense Contract Audit Agency concluded that Supreme’s documentation was not adequate and questioned more than $375 million of claimed costs. The contracting officer, in 2011, determined that DLA had overpaid Supreme by $567,267,940. DLA withheld $540 million from Supreme’s monthly payments. Supreme submitted unsuccessful “reverse image” claims. In 2014, Supreme pled guilty to fraud and entered into a civil settlement in a False Claims Act suit. During the investigations, with Supreme’s contract expiring, the parties entered into two extensions. In 2015, based on Supreme’s guilty plea, DLA demanded the return of all money paid under the contract. In 2020, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals concluded that Supreme’s contract claims against the government were barred by Supreme’s prior material breach.The Federal Circuit affirmed. The government did not waive its prior material breach defense. While DLA had some notice of Supreme’s fraudulent behavior in 2009, it had no “known right” until Supreme’s guilty plea, after which DLA never extended Supreme’s contract. Supreme cannot treat the bridge contracts as separate only to evade the government’s affirmative defenses. The parties treated the original contract and the extensions as inextricably intertwined; DLA’s prior material breach defense applies to those contracts. View "Supreme Foodservice GmbH v. Director of the Defense Logistics Agency" on Justia Law

Boeing entered into contracts with the Air Force that require Boeing to deliver technical data with “unlimited rights,” meaning that the government has the right to “use, modify, reproduce, perform, display, release, or disclose [the] technical data in whole or in part, in any manner, and for any purpose whatsoever, and to have or authorize others to do so.” Notwithstanding the government’s unlimited rights, Boeing retains ownership of any technical data it delivers under the contracts.Boeing marked each submission to the Air Force with a legend that purports to describe Boeing’s rights in the data with respect to third parties. The government rejected Boeing’s technical data, finding that Boeing’s legend is a nonconforming marking because it is not in the format authorized by the contracts under the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, Subsection 7013(f). Boeing argued that Subsection 7013(f) is inapplicable to legends that only restrict the rights of third parties. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals agreed with the government.The Federal Circuit vacated. Subsection 7013(f) applies only in situations when a contractor seeks to assert restrictions on the government’s rights. The court remanded for resolution of an unresolved factual dispute remains between the parties regarding whether Boeing’s proprietary legend, in fact, restricts the government’s rights. View "Boeing Co. v. Secretary of the Air Force" on Justia Law

The Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure Cloud procurement is directed to the long-term provision of enterprise-wide cloud computing services to the Defense Department. Its solicitation contemplated a 10-year indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract with a single provider. The JEDI solicitation included “gate” provisions that prospective bidders would be required to satisfy, including that the contractor must have at least three existing physical commercial cloud offering data centers within the U.S., separated by at least 150 miles, providing certain offerings that were “FedRAMP Moderate Authorized” at the time of proposal (a reference to a security level). Oracle did not satisfy the FedRAMP Moderate Authorized requirement and filed a pre-bid protest.The Government Accountability Office, Claims Court, and Federal Circuit rejected the protest. Even if Defense violated 10 U.S.C. 2304a by structuring the procurement on a single-award basis, the FedRAMP requirement would have been included in a multiple-award solicitation, so Oracle was not prejudiced by the single-award decision. The FedRAMP requirement “constituted a specification,” not a qualification requirement; the agency structured the procurement as a full and open competition. Satisfying the gate criteria was merely the first step in ensuring that the Department’s time was not wasted on offerors who could not meet its minimum needs. The contracting officer properly exercised her discretion in finding that the individual and organizational conflicts complained of by Oracle did not affect the integrity of the procurement. View "Oracle America Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Agility was awarded a contract for support of staging area operations (PCO Contract). Under the Contract, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) could issue individual task orders to Agility. Funds obligated under the contract were sourced from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). The CPA controlled the DFI, which consisted of Iraqi money. The Contract provided that “[n]o funds, appropriated or other, of any Coalition country are or will be obligated under this contract” and recognize[d] that a transfer of authority from the CPA to the interim Iraqi Governing Council (IIG) would occur in June 2004. The contracting parties were the CPA and Agility. The Contract expressly preserved the right of the United States to assert claims against Agility. A Contract amendment provided that any claim Agility had after the transfer to IIG could not be brought before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals but could only be brought in an Iraqi court. The U.S. Army was designated as the administrator of the PCO contract.In 2010, following an audit of the PCO Contract, the Army contracting officer sent demand letters for overpayments allegedly made under 12 task orders. The Claims Court upheld the offsets, holding that the United States (rather than Iraq) was owed the alleged overpayment and the United States was authorized to offset the alleged overpayment. The Federal Circuit in part and vacated in part. The Claims Court did not evaluate the merits of the offset determination nor the procedures required by law. View "Agility Public Warehousing Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Navy began a program to design and build littoral combat ships (LCS) and issued a request for proposals. During the initial phase of the LCS procurement, FastShip met with and discussed a potential hull design with government contractors subject to non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements. FastShip was not awarded a contract. FastShip filed an unsuccessful administrative claim, alleging patent infringement. The Claims Court found that the FastShip patents were valid and directly infringed by the government. The Federal Circuit affirmed.The Claims Court awarded FastShip attorney’s fees and expenses ($6,178,288.29); 28 U.S.C. 1498(a), which provides for a fee award to smaller entities that have prevailed on infringement claims, unless the government can show that its position was “substantially justified.” The court concluded that the government’s pre-litigation conduct and litigation positions were not “as a whole” substantially justified. It unreasonable for a government contractor to gather information from FastShip but not to include it as part of the team that was awarded the contract and the Navy took an exceedingly long time to act on FastShip’s administrative claim and did not provide sufficient analysis in denying the claim. The court found the government’s litigation positions unreasonable, including its arguments with respect to one document and its reliance on the testimony of its expert to prove obviousness despite his “extraordinary skill.” The Federal Circuit vacated. Reliance on this pre-litigation conduct in the fee analysis was an error. View "FastShip, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1942-1943, the Government contracted with the Oil Companies to purchase aviation gasoline, vital to the war effort, permitting a profit margin “between 6% and 7%.” The manufacture of avgas from crude oil uses a 98% purity sulfuric acid as a catalyst in alkylation, a process that dilutes the sulfuric acid such that it turns it into “spent alkylation acid,” which may be used to catalyze the alkylation process again following purification; produce non-avgas petroleum by-products; or be disposed of. If spent alkylation acid is used to produce other petroleum by-products, it becomes "acidic sludge," a secondary waste with a lesser percentage of acid content that can be used to manufacture fertilizer, burned, or disposed of. Unable to reprocess the increased amount of spent alkylation acid given the prioritization of production, the Companies dumped spent alkylation acid and acid sludge in California: 12 percent of the waste was spent alkylation acid, and 82.5% was acid sludge. In 1991, the Government and California sued the Companies under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601, for costs of cleaning up the disposal site. The Companies countersued. After years of litigation, the Claims Court granted the Companies partial summary judgment to prevent discovery into insurance settlements; denied the Government’s motion for leave to assert counterclaims in fraud; held that the Government was liable for clean-up costs for nonbenzol waste--$99,509,847.32, including accrued interest. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Claims Court failed to allocate between recoverable and nonrecoverable costs, wrongfully admitted stipulations to calculate damages, and wrongly refused to allow proof of double recovery by insurance settlements. View "Shell Oil Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Court of Federal Claims enjoined the U.S. Army from proceeding with, or awarding, a contract to Airbus Helicopter, finding that Army Execution Order 109-14, which implemented the Army’s Aviation Restructure Initiative designating the UH-72A Lakota helicopter as the Army’s “Institutional Training Helicopter,” was a procurement decision in violation of the Competition in Contracting Act and the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The court also found the Sole Source Justification and Approval (J&A) was arbitrary and capricious. The Federal Circuit reversed and vacated the injunction, holding that Execution Order 109-14 was not a procurement decision subject to Tucker Act review because it did not begin “the process for determining a need for property or services.” The Order simply formalized the Army’s decision designating the UH-72A Lakota as the Army’s training helicopter. The Sole Source J&A was not arbitrary and capricious, and it was an abuse of discretion to supplement the administrative record. The J&A sufficiently supports the Army’s decision to award a sole-source follow-on contract because it is likely that award to any other source would result in substantial duplication of cost to the government that is not expected to be recovered through competition, or unacceptable delays in fulfilling the agency’s requirements.” View "AgustaWestland North America v. United States" on Justia Law