Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

Crewzers was awarded blanket purchase agreements (BPAs) with the Forest Service to provide buses that transport fire crews to wildfires and other disaster areas in regional and national wilderness zones and to provide flame retardant tents to disaster areas. Both BPAs established dispatch priority lists within geographic zones. When an emergency arose, the Service would to submit an order for the highest-ranked (lowest-priced) resource available on the priority. BPAs are frameworks for future contracts and state that “If a Contractor cannot be reached or is not able to meet the time and date needed, the dispatcher may proceed with contacting the next resource on the dispatch priority list.” The Service has discretion to deviate from priority lists as needed and did not make any guarantee that it would actually place orders under the BPAs. The BPAs required Crewzers to accept orders only if “willing and able.” The Service terminated the Crewzers BPA for buses after Crewzers allegedly responded with unauthorized vehicles and attempted to bill at a higher-than-authorized rate and later terminated its BPA for tents after Crewzers allegedly provided tents that did not meet specifications or failed to deliver on time. Crewzers sought a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to damages or to reinstatement of the BPAs. The Claims Court dismissed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the BPAs were not binding contracts for purposes of invoking Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. 1491(a)) jurisdiction. View "Crewzers Fire Crew Transp., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant, a group of taxpayers in Searcy County known as the Searcy County Counsel for Ethical Government, filed a complaint alleging that Appellee, a county judge, had unlawfully sold equipment belonging to the county to Opal and Clifford Aday and requested a declaratory judgment that the judge had neglected the official duty of his office and that the sale was null and void. The complaint named the judge and Opal Aday as defendants. The district court granted summary judgment for the judge, finding that the judge complied with Ark. Code Ann. 14-16-106(c) in the sale of the equipment. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that although the summary judgment order purported to dismiss Appellant's complaint, it failed to dispose of the claim against Opal Aday, and therefore, the order was not a final, appealable order and the Court was barred from considering the appeal.View "Searcy County Counsel for Ethical Gov't v. Hinchey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, certified by the city as a minority-owned business eligible for favored treatment, sells a variety of products. The city is virtually its only customer. Early in 2005 the city began to suspect that plaintiff was a broker rather than a wholesaler, which would make it ineligible to bid for contracts as an MBE. Plaintiff had only six employees, though it claimed to have a warehouse. The city never completed its investigation, so plaintiff retains its certification. The city also believed that the company had shorted it on a shipment of aluminum sign blanks, and ultimately debarred it from dealing with the city. The company sued immediately and obtained a temporary restraining order; debarment was in effect for only eight days. The city abandoned its attempt to debar the company. The district court then ruled in favor of defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Claims by the principals in the company were frivolous, given that they continued to be employed by the company. The temporary diminution in business did not amount to destruction of the company nor did it constitute retaliation. Plaintiff did not prove breach of contract. View "Chicago United Indus. v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 1999 plaintiff pled guilty to making false statements while working on a project funded by the Federal Highway Administration (18 U.S.C. 2, 1014, and 1020). The agreement prohibited plaintiff from participating in any FHWA-funded project for a year. Plaintiff challenged Puerto Rico agencies' subsequent actions. The parties negotiated settlements; plaintiff entered into an agreement allowing it to bid on FHWA projects. Puerto Rico then enacted Law 458, which prohibits award of government contracts to any party convicted of a crime constituting fraud, embezzlement, or misappropriation of public funds and requires rescission of any contract with a party convicted of a specified offense. The statute states that it does not apply retroactively. One agency cancelled plaintiff's successful bids, another withdrew its consent to the settlement. The district court rejected claims of violation of the federal Contracts Clause and breaches of contract under Puerto Rico law. The First Circuit affirmed with respect to the constitutional claim. Any breach of the settlement agreements did not violate the Contracts Clause, even if committed in an attempt to unlawfully enforce Law 458 retroactively; defendants have not impaired plaintiff's ability to obtain a remedy for a demonstrated breach. Given the stage of the litigation, the district court should have retained the breach of contract claims. View "Redondo Constr. Corp. v. Izquierdo" on Justia Law