Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

Dougherty, the Business Officer for Operations for the Philadelphia School District, was accountable for the Office of Capital Programs (OCP), which developed projects for School Reform Commission (SRC) approval. Dougherty reported to Nunery, who reported to Superintendent Ackerman. Ackerman directed OCP to install security cameras in “persistently dangerous” schools. Due to a short time frame, OCP could not use its bidding process and was required to select a pre-qualified contractor. Dougherty identified SDT as such a contractor, prepared a proposal, and submitted a resolution to Nunery. Under District policy, the Superintendent must approve the resolution before it is presented to the SRC. Dougherty did not receive a response from Nunery or Ackerman, nor was the resolution presented to the SRC. Ackerman allegedly rejected the SDT proposal for lack of minority participation, and directed that IBS, a minority-owned firm, be awarded the contract. IBS was not pre-qualified. SRC ratified the plan. Conflicts arose. Dougherty met with reporters, resulting in articles accusing Ackerman of violating state guidelines, and contacted the FBI, state representatives, and the U.S. Department of Education. Ackerman placed Dougherty on leave pending an investigation, which concluded that there was no unlawful motive in the contract award, but that Dougherty violated the Code of Ethics confidentiality section. SRC terminated Dougherty. In his suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violations of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, the district court denied motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Dougherty v. Philadelphia Sch.Dist." on Justia Law

The Jackson County Board of Education petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to enter an order dismissing the complaint of D.C. Pruett Contracting Company, Inc. on the ground of sovereign immunity. Pruett Contracting submitted a proposal for renovations to the Pisgah High School gymnasium. The Jackson County superintendent of education executed a purchase order authorizing Pruett Contracting to make certain renovations to the gymnasium, totaling $231,309. Pruett Contracting then began renovating the gymnasium. The Superintendent later received a letter from the State of Alabama Building Commission stating that "all work on the renovation of the Pisgah High School gymnasium [was] to stop immediately" because the project had not been submitted to or approved by the Building Commission. The Board instructed Pruett Contracting to cease all work on the gymnasium. Pruett Contracting submitted an invoice to the Board for the work that had been performed prior to the letter. Months later, because it had not received payment for its work, Pruett Contracting sued the Board, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment and seeking recovery of damages on theories of quantum meruit, work and labor done, open account, and account stated. The Board moved the court to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it was entitled to sovereign immunity as to the claims alleged by Pruett Contracting and that the court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. Pruett Contracting responded, arguing that this case involved a protected property interest, that immunity was thus precluded, and that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. The Supreme Court concluded the Board established that it was entitled to sovereign immunity and that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this action; therefore, the action had to be dismissed. Because the Board demonstrated a clear legal right to an order directing the Circuit Court to dismiss Pruett Contracting's complaint, the Supreme Court granted the Board's petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the Circuit Court to dismiss Pruett Contracting's complaint. View "D.C. Pruett Contracting Company, Inc. v. Jackson County Board of Education" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from complaints filed by appellants Advanced Disposal Services Middle Georgia, LLC and Lowndes County, seeking injunctions prohibiting appellee Deep South Sanitation, LLC from providing solid waste collection and disposal services in the unincorporated areas of Lowndes County in violation of a newly enacted Lowndes County ordinance. The trial court denied appellants' requests for injunctive relief, and they appealed. The trial court determined that injunctive relief could not be granted in favor of appellants because enforcement of the Ordinance would violate Deep South's due process rights by interfering with its right to conduct business in the same manner as before enactment of the Ordinance. Because Deep South's substantive due process defense involved neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right, the Supreme Court applied a rational relationship test to determine whether enforcement of the Ordinance against Deep South would violate due process. Applying this test, the Court concluded the trial court erred by holding that enforcement of the Ordinance against Deep South would violate its due process rights. Furthermore, the Court found the trial court erred that the County's enforcement of the Ordinance through an injunction would have violated Deep South's substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Advanced Disposal Services Middle Georgia, LLC v. Deep South Sanitation, LLC" on Justia Law

Los Alamitos Unified School District (the District) filed an action to validate its lease-leaseback agreement with a contractor performing improvements on the track and athletic field of the District's high school. Another contractor, Howard Contracting, Inc. (Howard), filed an answer, claiming the lease-leaseback agreement was unconstitutional, illegal, and invalid because the District did not obtain competitive bids for the project. The primary issue presented by this appeal was legal: did Education Code section 17406 exempt school districts from obtaining competitive bids when entering into what are known as "lease-leaseback" agreements to improve school property? After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the answer was yes. "More than 40 years ago, the California Attorney General concluded the language of the statute is plain, unambiguous, and explicit, and does not impose bid requirements on school districts. We agree, and nothing has occurred in the interim that would change our conclusion." View "Los Alamitos Unified etc. v. Howard Contracting" on Justia Law

Defendants-Appellants David Banks, Kendrick Barnes, Demetrius Harper, Clinton Stewart, Gary Walker, and David Zirpolo were convicted following a jury trial on multiple counts of mail fraud and wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud. Defendants contacted numerous staffing agencies to “assist in providing temporary services. Witnesses from multiple staffing companies testified that a Defendant (or someone acting as Defendants’ agent) approached them and expressed the desire for "payrolling" services. The staffing-company witnesses testified that they were induced into believing that Defendants’ companies were either doing business with major law-enforcement agencies or were on the verge of selling a specialized software to these agencies. These witnesses testified that Defendants (or Defendants’ agents) assured them that this alleged law-enforcement business would enable Defendants’ companies to pay the staffing companies’ invoices, and, critically, that they relied on these representations in choosing to do business with Defendants. Trial testimony from representatives of the law-enforcement agencies with whom Defendants claimed to be doing business revealed the falsity of Defendants’ representations to the staffing companies. When questioned about their failure to pay the staffing companies’ invoices, Defendants gave false assurances that payment would be forthcoming, and they continued to imply that they were doing business with large government law enforcement agencies. In the end, forty-two different staffing companies were left with outstanding invoices totaling in excess of $5,000,000, which could not be submitted to the government agencies, which had no business relationship with Defendants’ companies. Defendants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 87 to 135 months. Defendants argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit: (1) their right to a speedy trial was violated when the district court granted multiple continuances of the trial date (at Defendants’ request); (2) the district court compelled co-Defendant Barnes to testify in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and failed to give a proper curative instruction; (3) the district court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of two witnesses Defendants sought to call at trial; and (4) the cumulative effect of the district court’s otherwise harmless errors prejudiced them and required reversal. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Banks" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First and Fourteenth Amendment violations concerning the rescission of a bid award for a potential, but unexecuted, insurance brokerage contract with the Puerto Rico government. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim where he had no constitutionally protected property interest in the initial bid award; reversed the grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's First Amendment claim for political discrimination where there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff's political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse action; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Garcia-Gonzalez v. Puig-Morales" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Bessemer Water Service (BWS) and Lake Cyrus Development Company, Inc. (LCDC) over a contract referred to as the "1998 water agreement." In "Bessemer I," the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had exceeded its discretion in holding that the 1998 water agreement was a valid binding contract and in awarding LCDC $224,979.83 because the agreement was entered into violation of section 39-2-2 and was therefore void. On appeal, the Attorney General intervened and filed a complain seeking to recover payments BWS made to LCDC under the 1988 water agreement. The trial court ultimately entered a judgment in favor of the Attorney General (for the benefit of BWS). LCDC thereafter filed a postjudgment motion requesting the trial court alter, amend or vacate its judgment, or in the alternative, order a new trial. The trial court denied LCDC's motion; that denial was brought before the Supreme Court in this case. After review, the Supreme Court held the trial court's denial of LCDC's motion should have been reversed. The case was then remanded for further proceedings. View "Lake Cyrus Development Company, Inc. v. Bessemer Water Service " on Justia Law

EMS appealed the district court's order denying its motion to remand its suit against the City to the state court from which it was removed. The court concluded that removal was improper because none of the claims in EMS's state court civil action satisfied either the federal question or diversity requirements of original jurisdiction; the district court's prior jurisdiction over the claims asserted in City v. CLECO, which were now dismissed, did not vest the district court with jurisdiction over EMS's claims; regardless of how factually intertwined with EMS's suit, the district court's retention of jurisdiction over the post-settlement matters could not substitute for original jurisdiction for the purpose of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1367 or removal under section 1441, given that EMS's claims were not asserted in the same proceeding as the claims in City v. CLECO; and, if Baccus v. Parrish retained any precedential value, it was distinguishable and inapposite in this instance. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.View "Energy Mgmt. Servs. v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Agency of Transportation advertised for bids to reconstruct a half-mile section of North Main Street in downtown Barre. Luck Brothers submitted the low bid and was awarded the contract for the project, which it started in the summer of 2011. In June 2012, Luck Brothers submitted a claim to the Agency seeking approximately $855,000 in additional compensation beyond the bid amount based on alleged differing site conditions from those assumed in the contract. One year later, Luck Brothers submitted a supplemental claim, making the total claim approximately $1.1 million. Less than three months after submitting its $855,000 claim, Luck Brothers filed a complaint against the Agency in superior court seeking, among other things, declaratory relief and compensatory damages. Specifically, the complaint alleged breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of an implied warranty on the part of the Agency, and sought penalties under the Prompt Pay Act. Luck Brothers appealed the superior court’s decision to grant the Agency’s motion to dismiss Luck Brothers’ lawsuit on grounds that the company failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before pursuing a remedy in the superior court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision, but clarified the standard of review in appeals to the Vermont Transportation Board from Agency determinations under the claims process for construction contracts. View "Luck Brothers v. Agency of Transportation" on Justia Law

In this case, the trial and intermediate courts determined that a general contractor was not a statutory employer relative to an employee of its subcontractor. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the tension between such rulings and the Supreme Court’s longstanding jurisprudence that conventional subcontract scenarios serve as paradigm instances in which the statutory-employment concept applies. Appellant Worthington Associates, Inc., was hired as the general contractor for an addition to a Levittown church. Worthington, in turn, entered into a standard-form subcontract with Patton Construction, Inc., of which Appellee Earl Patton was the sole shareholder and an employee, to perform carpentry. While working at the construction site, Mr. Patton fell and sustained injuries to his back. Subsequently, the Pattons commenced a civil action against Worthington contending that the company failed to maintain safe conditions at the jobsite. Worthington moved for summary judgment on the basis that it was Mr. Patton’s statutory employer and, accordingly, was immune from suit. After the motion was denied, trial proceeded during which Worthington reasserted its claim to immunity in unsuccessful motions for a nonsuit and a directed verdict. "Having set up an errant dichotomy for the jurors, the [trial] court proceeded to instruct them concerning the differences between independent contractors and employees at common law. In doing so, the trial court compounded the underlying conceptual difficulties it had engendered, because [the Supreme] Court has long held that, for the salient purposes under Sections 203 and 302(b) of the WCA, the term 'independent contractor' carries a narrower meaning than it does at common law." The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Pattons in the amount of $1.5 million in the aggregate. Post-trial motions were denied, and Worthington appealed. A Superior Court panel affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Mr. Patton’s relationship with the owner here was undeniably a derivative one, arising per a conventional subcontract with a general contractor (Worthington). "[U]nder longstanding precedent, neither Patton Construction, Inc., nor Mr. Patton was an 'independent contractor' relative to Worthington." View "Patton v. Worthington Associates" on Justia Law