Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

Triple A, a Michigan corporation, has offices in Dearborn, Michigan, the Congo (previously known as Zaire), and Sierra Leone. In 1993, Zaire ordered military equipment worth $14,070,000 from Triple A. A South Korean manufacturer shipped the equipment to Zaire at Triple A’s request. For 17 years, Triple A sought payment from Zaire and then the Congo without success. In 2010, Triple A sued the Congo for breach of contract. The district court dismissed the case, citing lack of jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1602. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the language of the Act, under which federal courts have jurisdiction “in any case in which the action is based upon” the following: [1] a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or [2] upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or [3] upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States. View "Triple A Int'l, Inc. v. Democratic Republic of the Congo" on Justia Law

The Canal Authority appealed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Interior, Bureau, San Luis, and Wetlands, in a suit to establish priority water rights under Central Valley Project (CVP) water service contracts. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding that all claims arising before February 11, 2004 were time-barred and that Canal Authority was not entitled to priority water allocation under the CVP contracts. The court affirmed the district court's decision on the alternative basis that California Water Code 11460 did not require the Bureau to provide CVP contractors priority water rights, because contracts between the Canal Authority and Bureau contained provisions that specifically address allocation of water during shortage periods. View "Tehama-Colusa Canal Auth. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior" on Justia Law

ACT brought this suit against PCI and First National, alleging claims of breach of contract, quantum meruit, and recovery on a payment bond under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. 3131(b). Because United States ex rel. Celanese Coatings Co. v. Gullard was clearly irreconcilable with intervening higher authority, the court overruled it and held that the Miller Act's statute of limitations was a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional rule. Because nothing on the face of ACT's complaint indicated that it did not work on the project or rent equipment to PCI within one year of the date it filed the complaint, the complaint could not have been dismissed if the district court had treated the Miller Act's statute of limitations as a claim-processing rule. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Air Control Tech. v. Pre Con Indus." on Justia Law

X Tech filed suit against Geotest, alleging breach of an exclusive teaming agreement to submit a teamed bid on a USAF solicitation for testing equipment by teaming with another partner, Raytheon, on a competing bid. The jury found that Geotest breached an agreement with X Tech to "exclusively team to jointly pursue" the USAF solicitation and the district court entered judgment in favor of X Tech. The court concluded that the district court properly disposed of the parties' motions for directed verdict; concluded that the evidence proffered at trial was sufficient to support the jury's findings; affirmed the judgment of the district court and remanded to allow the district court to adjudge and award appellate attorney's fees; and denied X Tech's opposed motion to file a supplemental reply brief and Geotest's motion to file a supplemental brief as moot. View "X Technologies, Inc. v. Marvin Test Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

General Dynamics entered into fixed-price contracts, fixed-price incentive contracts, cost-plus-fixed fee contracts, cost-plus-award-fee contracts, and time-and-materials contracts with the Department of Defense. Many require compliance with Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), which provide uniformity in how contractors measure, assign, and allocate costs to government contracts, including guidance for determining and measuring the components of pension cost, CAS 412-20(a). The Defense Contract Management Agency notified General Dynamics in 2006 that its use of a blended rate using partial-year valuations did not comply with CAS 412. The Contracting Officer issued notice of noncompliance in 2007. General Dynamics then submitted a compliant retirement plan, but, in 2008, again submitted a plan using the blended rate for the base year. The CO issued a second determination of noncompliance. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals denied General Dynamics’ appeal, determining that use of partial-year asset data reflected short-term fluctuations that could and did introduce distortion prohibited by CAS 412-50(b)(4) and that substitution of a midyear value and a blended rate in place of the 8 percent long-term estimate rate constituted “actuarial assumptions” because they were “estimate[s] of future conditions affecting pension cost” and were encompassed by the prohibitions of CAS 412-50(b)(4). The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Panetta" on Justia Law

In 2005, Curtis McGhee and another individual brought claims against the City alleging violations of civil rights sounding in malicious prosecution. The City sought coverage under insurance policies issued by CIC and Columbia. On appeal, the City and McGhee challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment to CIC and Columbia, on CIC's and Columbia's declaratory judgment claims concerning coverage under the various insurance policies. The court concluded that the district court correctly refused to consider and correctly denied additional discovery of extrinsic evidence. The court also concluded that the alleged malicious prosecution and resulting personal injuries occurred when the underlying charges were filed against McGhee in 1977. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment that the following policies did not afford coverage to the City for the malicious prosecution claims: the two excess liability policies issued by CIC; four of the special excess liability policies issued by Columbia; and the commercial umbrella liability policy issued by Columbia. As to the 1977-78 special excess liability policy issued by Columbia, the court reversed the district court's judgment regarding the applicability of the reasonable expectations doctrine. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Chicago Ins. Co., et al v. City of Council Bluffs, et al" on Justia Law

In 1983, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act established a plan for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) generated by nuclear power plants, 42 U.S.C. 10101–10270. The Act made utilities responsible for SNF storage until the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) accepts the material. The Secretary of Energy entered into contracts with nuclear utilities to accept SNF in return for payment of fees. The Act provided that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission “shall not issue or renew a license” to any nuclear utility unless the utility has entered into a contract with DOE or DOE certifies ongoing negotiations. Nuclear utilities, including the owner of the Entergy nuclear power stations, entered into contracts and began making payments, which have continued. By 1994, DOE knew it would be unable to accept SNF by the Act’s January 31, 1998 deadline. In 1995, DOE issued a “Final Interpretation” that took the position that it did not have an unconditional obligation to begin performance on that date. Entergy sued, asserting that DOE’s partial breach caused it to incur additional costs for SNF storage. The claims court struck an unavoidable delay defense, based on a prior decision rejecting DOE’s argument that its failure was “unavoidable” under the contract. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Entergy Nuclear Fitzpatrick, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Sharp, a federal supply contractor, submitted a termination compensation claim to the Department of the Army contracting officer, and later brought a Contracts Dispute Act claim before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, claiming that, because the Army failed to exercise the entirety of the last option year under a delivery order, Sharp was entitled to premature discontinuance fees under its General Services Administration schedule contract. The ASBCA dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the Federal Acquisition Regulation, does not permit ordering agency contracting officers to decide disputes pertaining to schedule contracts. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Under FAR 8.406-6, only the GSA contracting office may resolve disputes that, in whole or in part, involve interpretation of disputed schedule contract provisions. View "Sharp Elec. Corp. v. McHugh" on Justia Law

In 2001, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement awarded Northrop a contract for lease and support of Oakley network monitoring software for one base year and three option years at about $900,000 per year. To obtain Oakley’s software, Northrop was required to pay $2,899,710, so Northrup assigned its payment rights to ESCgov for $3,296,093. ESCgov assigned its rights to Citizens, but the government was not notified. In 2005, ICE decided not to exercise the first option. Northrop sent the contracting officer a “Contract Disputes Act Claim for not Exercising Option,” citing the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 601. The letter did not mention the two assignments. The CO denied Northrop’s claim. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed, holding that Northrop had not supplied the CO “adequate notice” because it failed to reference potential application of the Anti-Assignment Act and Severin doctrine. While the matter was pending, Northrop filed a second claim, including documents on the financing arrangements. The CO determined that Northrop’s second claim was the same claim and declined to issue a final decision. The Claims Court again held that it lacked jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed, finding that the first letter constituted a valid claim. View "Northrop Grumman Computing Sys., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Department of Defense issued a solicitation seeking offers for a multiple award, indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract for information technology services. The agency described the services as “Net-Centric Integrated Enterprise Information Technology Services,” including help desk, server, network, and applications support services. The solicitation instructed bidders to submit separate bids for the Basic Contract, Task Order 1, and Task Order 2. Every bidder, including Comint, submitted separate bids. The Department then limited the initial award to the Basic Contract and amended the solicitation. Comint acknowledged the amendment. The Source Selection Evaluation Board evaluated each proposal according to factors in the solicitation, the most important of which was “Quality/Capability.” The Board rated Comint’s proposal as “marginal,” concluding that Comint had a “moderate to high associated risk of unsuccessful performance.” The district court rejected Comint’s challenge of the award to another bidder; Comint lacked standing to challenge the solicitation or award because the agency had not erred in rejecting Comint’s bid on technical grounds. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that Comint failed to preserve its right to challenge the solicitation by failing to raise objections before award and that Comint has not demonstrated standing to protest the agency’s failure to award it a contract. View "Comint Sys. Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law