Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Employment Law
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The Village of Bement, Piatt County, has a five-year contract, under which E.R.H. Enterprises operates and maintains the Village’s potable water facility and parts of its water delivery infrastructure. The Department of Labor issued a subpoena to E.R.H.’s attorney seeing employment records as part of an investigation under the Prevailing Wage Act, 820 ILCS 130/0.01. E.R.H. asserted that it was exempt from the Act as a public utility. The trial court ruled in favor of the Department and ordered E.R.H. to provide the requested documents, noting that the company was not regulated by the Illinois Commerce Commission. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding that E.R.H. is simply an outside contractor. View "People v. IL Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

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In 1998 Prazen retired as superintendent of the City of Peru electrical department. He had more than 27 years of service and purchased five years of age-enhancement credit. Prazen had an unincorporated electrical business, which was incorporated just before he retired. Before he retired, the City entered into an agreement with his corporation for operation of the City’s electrical department, including management and supervision. First year compensation under the contract was about $7,000 higher than Prazen’s prior annual salary. The relationship lasted until 2009, when the corporation was dissolved. In 2010, the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund notified Prazen that, after participating in the early retirement incentive plan, he had violated the statutory prohibitions (40 ILCS 5/7-141.1(g)) against returning to work. The Fund recalculated his years of service as 27 and claimed he should repay $307,100 as a statutory forfeiture. The circuit court agreed. The appellate court reversed and the Illinois Supreme Court agreed. The work done between 1999 and 2009 was done by a separate corporate entity and was not precluded by statute. If the legislature had wanted to specifically prohibit this, it could have said so. The statute does not show intent to prohibit outsourcing to a retired employee’s corporation and the legislature did not grant the Trustees of the Fund authority to find that a corporation was a “guise.” The court noted that, earlier in the period under consideration, the Board had expressed the view that what the arrangement was pView "Prazen v. Shoop" on Justia Law

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Petitioners Professional Fire Fighters of Wolfeboro, IAFF Local 3708, president of the union and several firefighters appealed a superior court order that dismissed their suit against Respondent Town of Wolfeboro. The suit arose from the parties' negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Union had ever been certified by the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) as a bargaining unit. In July 2010, the parties met and agreed on ground rules governing the conduct of their future negotiations, including that "[a]fter October 1, 2010, either party [could] request mediation of the outstanding issues." Shortly thereafter, however, the negotiations broke down. At an August 2010 meeting, the Town's Board of Selectmen voted to rescind its recognition of the Union. The petitioners filed a verified petition for an ex parte temporary restraining order against the Town and requested temporary and permanent injunctive relief. After a hearing, the trial court granted the petitioners' requested temporary restraining order, and scheduled the matter for further hearing. The Town moved to dismiss the entire proceeding. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Town's motion and vacated its temporary restraining order. The petitioners unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the portion of RSA 31:3 which grants municipalities the right to recognize unions and enter into collective bargaining agreements was superseded by the enactment of the PELRA, and, therefore, the Town had no authority to recognize the non-PELRB-certified Union. Accordingly, the agreement, as well as the subsequent agreements, were ultra vires contracts and wholly void. The Court affirmed the superior court's decision to dismiss Petitioners' case.View "Professional Fire Fighters of Wolfeboro, IAFF Local 3708 v. Town of Wolfeboro" on Justia Law

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Monte Sano Research Corporation ("MSRC"), Steven L. Thornton, and Steven B. Teague appealed a preliminary injunction entered against them in an action brought by Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc.; Digital Fusion, Inc. ("DFI"), and Digital Fusion Solutions, Inc. ("DFSI") alleging breach of the duty of loyalty, breach of contract, tortious interference with business and contractual relationships, and civil conspiracy. Additionally, Kratos sought injunctive relief. Thornton and Teague were employees of DFI, which also engaged in government subcontract work; they became employees of Kratos when Kratos Defense merged with DFI in 2008. In February 2009, Thornton and Teague met with Doyle McBride, a NASA consultant who had never been employed by Kratos, to discuss starting a new company to perform government contract work. Several months later, MSRC was incorporated, with McBride and Teague each owning 50 percent. Thornton had no legal interest in MSRC at its formation. McBride acquired office space, issued stock, filed tax returns, obtained business licenses, registered to engage in government contracting, attended meetings, and talked with prime contractors on MSRC's behalf. In June 2011, Thornton's supervisor at Kratos learned that several employees under Teague's supervision had resigned in a short period. Following an investigation, Kratos terminated Teague's employment on June 23, 2011; Thornton resigned four days later. Teague and Thornton then went to work for MSRC. Thornton subsequently purchased MSRC from McBride and became its CEO and president. Subsequently Kratos filed a complaint against MSRC, Thornton, and Teague alleging specifically that Thornton and Teague, while employed by Kratos, assisted in the creation of MSRC, solicited Kratos employees, wrongfully diverted business opportunities, and misappropriated confidential and proprietary information. Kratos also alleged that MSRC wrongfully diverted business opportunities and misappropriated confidential and proprietary information. Kratos applied for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and for a preliminary injunction on June 29, 2011. On appeal, MSRC, Thornton, and Teague argued that the preliminary injunction should be dissolved. MSRC, Thornton, and Teague raised several issues on appeal; however, because the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's order was overbroad and that it failed to comply with Rule 65, Ala. R. Civ. P., the Court did not reach any of their other issues.View "Monte Sano Research Corp. v. Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

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Monte Sano Research Corporation (MSRC), Steven L. Thornton, and Steven B. Teague appealed a preliminary injunction entered against them in an action brought by Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc., a California-based aerospace and defense contractor, Digital Fusion, Inc. (DFI), an Alabama-based holding company, and Digital Fusion Solutions, Inc. (DFSI), a Florida corporation and a subsidiary of DFI (referred to collectively as Kratos), alleging breach of the duty of loyalty, breach of contract, tortious interference with business and contractual relationships, and civil conspiracy. Additionally, Kratos sought injunctive relief. MSRC was formed in 2009 to procure government subcontract work at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville. Thornton and Teague were employees of DFI, which also engaged in government subcontract work; they became employees of Kratos when Kratos Defense merged with DFI in 2008. Kratos terminated Teagues employment on June 23, 2011. Thornton resigned from Kratos four days later. A dispute arose between the parties which implicated the employment contracts for Thornton and Teague when they sought subsequent work. Upon review of this case, the Supreme Court found that because the provisions of Rule 65(d)(2) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure were not complied with and because there was no evidence of an irreparable injury or the lack of an adequate remedy at law, the trial court erred in issuing the preliminary injunction. The Court reversed the trial courts order entering the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the trial court with directions that it dissolve the injunction it issued September 10, 2011. View "Monte Sano Research Corp. v. Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

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In this consolidated appeal, the court construed the payment obligations of municipalities participating in G.L.c. 41, section 108L, (Quinn Bill), a local statute establishing a career incentive pay program for police officers. The underlying case arose when the Commonwealth, facing budgetary constraints, substantially cut reimbursements. Plaintiffs subsequently contended that clauses in the collective bargaining agreements (CBA) impermissibly conflict with the statute, which they viewed as requiring the city to pay 100% of benefits irrespective of reimbursement. The court held that the CBAs did not conflict with the statute and were valid. Section 108L required only that municipalities pay one-half the amounts specified in the payment provision, plus any amount actually received from the Commonwealth. Municipalities could agree to pay more, but the statute did not require it. Therefore, the cases were remanded to the county court, where the single justice was directed to issue a declaration stating that, with respect to section 108L, the CBAs between the city and the various police unions were valid and enforceable.View "Adams v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-Appellant Dr. John Noak was dismissed as the medical director for Prison Health Services, Inc. (PHS). He appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) on claims of breach of an implied covenant of good faith, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and intentional interference with contract. A 2004 investigation into how Plaintiff treated a female inmate at an IDOC facility lead to IDOC demanding that PHS replace Plaintiff as medical director. Finding no error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of IDOC. View "Noak v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

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This case stemmed from a lawsuit filed in 2007 by the Retired Employees Association of Orange County, Inc. against the County of Orange contesting the validity of certain changes the county had made to health benefits for retired employees. At the request of the Ninth Circuit, the court addressed the following question: "Whether, as a matter of California law, a California county and its employees can form an implied contract that confers vested rights to health benefits on retired county employees." In response, the court concluded that, under California law, a vested right to health benefits for retired county employees could be implied under certain circumstances from a county ordinance or resolution. Whether those circumstances existed in this case was beyond the scope of the question posed to the court by the Ninth Circuit.View "Retired Employees Assoc. v. Co. of Orange" on Justia Law

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Two unions filed grievances against the Sioux Falls School District, alleging that that the District violated the parties' labor agreements when the District provided 2.5 percent wage increases for the 2008-2009 school year. The District and the Department of Labor denied both grievances as untimely. The circuit court judge concluded that the grievances were timely, and reversed and remanded the matter to the Department to determine the correct percentage wage increase. On remand, the Department concluded that the union members were entitled to a three percent wage increase. The circuit court affirmed. The District appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the union's grievances were timely; and (2) the union members were entitled to a three percent salary increase, and the District violated the terms of the agreements by implementing a percentage wage increase other than the percentage change in the per student allocation referenced in S.D. Codified Laws 13-13-10.1(4). View "AFSCME Local 1025 v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

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Twenty three former tribal employees sued the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma for breach of employment contracts. The contracts contained a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Tribal law requires that waiver of sovereign immunity must be consented to by the Business Committee of the Tribe by resolution. The trial judge, on motion for reconsideration, granted the Tribe's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. On appeal, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the Tribe expressly and unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity with respect to Plaintiffs' employment contracts. Upon review of the contracts and the applicable tribal resolutions and legal standards, the Supreme Court held that waiver of sovereign immunity was neither expressed nor consented to in the Business Committee's resolutions that authorized the Chief to sign the employment contracts. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.View "Dilliner v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma " on Justia Law