Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Job Corps program, a national residential training and employment program administered by the Department of Labor, was reformed by the 1998 Workforce Investment Act, which authorized the Secretary of Labor to enter into agreements with government agencies or private organizations to operate “Job Corps centers,” 29 U.S.C. 2887. Adams is the incumbent contractor for the Gadsden and the Shriver Job Corps Centers. When the contracts expired, Adams was disqualified from renewal because of the small business limitation imposed by the Department on the bids. Adams cannot does not qualify as a small business. The limit is $35.5 million in annual receipts, 13 C.F.R. 121.201. After unsuccessful bid protests, the Claims Court and the Federal Circuit upheld the administrative actions against challenges that they were arbitrary.View "Adams & Assocs., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Planned Parenthood under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, alleging that Planned Parenthood knowingly and falsely overbilled state and federal governments for contraceptives supplied to low-income individuals. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint on the alternative ground that the complaint did not state plausible claims for relief. Even assuming that the third amended complaint sufficiently alleged falsity, it did not satisfy Rule 8(a), which requires a plausible claim that Planned Parenthood knowingly made false claims, with the statutory scienter. Because plaintiff's own complaint attachments defeated the plausibility of his allegations, and because he had already amended his complaint several times, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying him further leave to amend. The district court also correctly concluded that plaintiff's claims under state law were time-barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood" on Justia Law

Mitchell began working as a Social Security Administration lawyer in 1998. The Department of Justice appointed her as a Special Assistant United States Attorney in 2006, a one-year appointment during which she remained an employee of and was paid by, the SSA. The Department extended that appointment, so that she served more than two years in the Special Assistant position. Effective December 21, 2008, the Department hired Mitchell as an AUSA in the same office. The Department’s form 50-B cited 28 U.S.C. 542, which authorizes AUSA appointments generally. The form stated that the appointment was not to exceed 18 months, was “temporary” and “subject to” successful completion of a pending background investigation. The background check concluded in July 2009. In August 2009, the Department provided Mitchell another form 50-B, citing 28 U.S.C. 542, but stating that Mitchell was subject to a two-year trial period beginning August 2, 2009, during which she could be removed without cause or appeal. The Department fired Mitchell days before that period was to end, without notice or opportunity to respond. The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Mitchell was not an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. 7511(a). The Federal Circuit reversed, reasoning that Mitchell had “completed 2 years of current continuous service in the same or similar positions in an Executive agency under other than a temporary appointment limited to 2 years or less,” considering the time during which the background check was performed.View "Mitchell v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd." on Justia Law

Martin began working for California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in 2000, and Sphar began working for CDCR in 2002. They were dismissed in 2004 and challenged their dismissals. In October 2008, an administrative law judge found that the dismissals had been unjustified and revoked them. The ALJ’s decision provided that a hearing would be set if the parties were “unable to agree as to salary, benefits and interest due under Government Code section 19584.The two were reinstated to employment. CDCR sought a writ of mandate to overturn the decision to include merit salary adjustments and physical fitness incentive pay (PFIP), and claimed that the offset to backpay for money earned from other employers should have included overtime pay. The CDCR also challenged the Board’s decision that Sphar would be compensated at salary range “K,” for which he had not qualified at the time of his dismissal. The superior court ordered that the offset include overtime pay, but denied the remainder of the petition. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that section 19584 authorized the inclusion of merit salary adjustments and PFIP in the award, authorized Sphar to be compensated at salary range “K,” and required the inclusion of overtime pay in the offset. View "Dept. of Corrs. & Rehab. v. State Pers. Bd." on Justia Law

Service Employees International Union, Local 1021, AFL-CIO (SEIU) alleged that the Sonoma County Community Development Commission lacked legal authority to contract with a private corporation to conduct housing inspection services that had formerly been performed by public employees. The Commission argued that Health and Safety Code sections 34144 and 341452 expressly authorized it to enter into a contract with a private entity for necessary services, such as housing inspection. Section 34145 authorizes it to “hire, employ, or contract for staff, contractors, and consultants.” The trial court dismissed SEIU’s lawsuit. The appeals court affirmed, noting that the Commission’s powers, duties and scope of authority are not delegated but are fixed and circumscribed by statute. The statute does not include the limitations argued by SEIU. View "Serv. Emps. Int'l Union v. Cnty. of Sonoma" on Justia Law

Salem, under contract, coordinated Marine Corps Community Services (MCCS) shipments around the country. Estes, a federal motor carrier, handled some shipments under its common carrier tariff, without a written contract. The Salem-MCCS contract provided that Salem would pay carriers directly and invoice MCCS. Salem agreed not to represent itself as a representative of MCCS. All bills of lading indicated that “third party freight charges” were to be billed to “Marine Corps Exchange C/O Salem Logistics.” Delivery receipts specified that charges should be billed to the “Marine Corps Exchange” and were signed by a representative of the MCCS or MCX delivery location. MCCS paid Salem for some of the shipments; Salem never paid Estes. After becoming aware that Salem was not paying carriers, MCCS began paying carriers directly, for shipments for which it had not yet paid Salem. Estes sued Salem and the government, seeking to recover $147,645.33. The Claims Court dismissed, finding that there was no privity of contract between Estes and the government and rejecting a claim under 49 U.S.C. 13706, which governs the liability of consignees for shipping charges incurred by a common carrier. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the bills of lading were sufficient to establish privity. View "Estes Express Lines v. United States" on Justia Law

After a hearing, the Department of Children and Families substantiated allegations that Plaintiff, an elementary school teacher, emotionally abused one of his students and recommended that Plaintiff’s name be placed on the Department’s central registry of child abuse and neglect. The trial court affirmed, ruling that the ultimate finding of the administrative hearing officer was supported by substantial evidence. The Appellate Court reversed and ordered the Department to remove Plaintiff’s name from the central registry. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Appellate Court (1) failed properly to credit the factual findings and legal conclusions of the administrative hearing officer; and (2) improperly concluded that the definition of “abused” found in Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-120(3) was void for vagueness as applied to the facts of this case. View "Frank v. Dep’t of Children & Families" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Agency of Transportation advertised for bids to reconstruct a half-mile section of North Main Street in downtown Barre. Luck Brothers submitted the low bid and was awarded the contract for the project, which it started in the summer of 2011. In June 2012, Luck Brothers submitted a claim to the Agency seeking approximately $855,000 in additional compensation beyond the bid amount based on alleged differing site conditions from those assumed in the contract. One year later, Luck Brothers submitted a supplemental claim, making the total claim approximately $1.1 million. Less than three months after submitting its $855,000 claim, Luck Brothers filed a complaint against the Agency in superior court seeking, among other things, declaratory relief and compensatory damages. Specifically, the complaint alleged breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of an implied warranty on the part of the Agency, and sought penalties under the Prompt Pay Act. Luck Brothers appealed the superior court’s decision to grant the Agency’s motion to dismiss Luck Brothers’ lawsuit on grounds that the company failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before pursuing a remedy in the superior court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision, but clarified the standard of review in appeals to the Vermont Transportation Board from Agency determinations under the claims process for construction contracts. View "Luck Brothers v. Agency of Transportation" on Justia Law

Under the Workforce Investment Act, 29 U.S.C. 2887(a)(2)(A), the Department of Labor administers the Job Corps program, providing education, training, and support services to help at-risk youth obtain employment. There are 125 Job Corps Centers, including Blue Ridge in Marion, Virginia, which Res-Care has operated since 1998. In 2011, DOL published a Request for Information from potential bidders on an upcoming procurement for the operation of Blue Ridge. Res-Care’s contract was to expire in 2013. The Request encouraged firms that qualify as small businesses to respond with a “capabilities statement.” One large and four small businesses submitted statements. Res-Care, a large business, did not submit. The contracting officer found that, based on the responses, DOL would likely receive bids from at least two responsible small businesses at fair market prices, as required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation, 38 C.F.R. 19.502-2(b), and recommended conducting the selection as a small business set-aside. DOL issued a presolicitation notice indicating that the next Blue Ridge contract, with a value of $25 million, would be solicited as a “100% Set-Aside for Small Business.” Res-Care filed a bid protest alleging that DOL violated WIA by setting aside the Blue Ridge contract for small businesses, based on the “competitive basis” provision in section 2887. The Claims Court and Federal Circuit upheld the DOL determination.View "Res-Care, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

A state agency issued a request for proposals for legal services. A law firm delivered its proposal after the submission deadline, but the procurement officer accepted the proposal and forwarded it to the evaluation committee. After the agency issued a notice of intent to award that law firm the contract, a second law firm protested, alleging that the evaluation committee made scoring errors and that consideration of the late-filed proposal was barred by a relevant regulation and the request for proposals. The procurement officer sustained the protest, rescinded the original award, and awarded the second law firm the contract. The first law firm then protested, claiming: (1) the second law firm’s protest should not have been considered because it was filed after the protest deadline; (2) the first law firm’s proposal was properly accepted because the delay in submission was immaterial; and (3) the second law firm’s proposal was nonresponsive because that firm lacked a certificate of authority to transact business in Alaska. The procurement officer rejected that protest and the first law firm filed an administrative appeal. The administrative agency denied the appeal, and the first law firm appealed the agency decision to the superior court, which affirmed the administrative agency ruling. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the administrative agency acted reasonably in accepting the second law firm’s late-filed protest and deeming that firm’s proposal responsive notwithstanding its lack of a certificate of authority. Furthermore, the Court concluded the agency’s interpretation that its regulation barred acceptance of the first firm’s late-filed proposal is reasonable and consistent with statute. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court’s decision upholding the final agency decision. View "Davis Wright Tremaine LLP v. Alaska, Dept. of Administration" on Justia Law