Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 1978, Hages acquired a ranch in Nevada occupying approximately 7,000 acres of private land and approximately 752,000 acres of federal lands under grazing permits. Their predecessors had acquired water rights now located on federal lands, 43 U.S.C. 661. Hages had disputes with the government concerning release of non-indigenous elk onto federal land for which Hages had grazing permits, unauthorized grazing by Hages’ cattle, and fence and ditch maintenance. After a series of incidents, in 1991, Hages filed suit alleging takings under 43 U.S.C. 1752(g), and breach of contract. After almost 20 years, the Claims Court awarded compensation for regulatory taking of water rights; physical taking of water rights; and range improvements. The court awarded pre-judgment interest for the takings, but not for the range improvements. The Federal Circuit vacated in part. The regulatory takings claim and 43 U.S.C. 1752 claim are not ripe. To the extent the claim for physical taking relies on fences constructed 1981-1982, it is untimely. To the extent the physical takings claim relies on fences constructed 1988-1990, there is no evidence that water was taken that Hages could have put to beneficial use. Hages are not entitled to pre-judgment interest for range improvements because Hages failed to identify a cognizable property interest. View "Hage v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2008, Rocha was appointed to an excepted service position at the State Department. By letter (July, 2010), the Department informed Rocha that his appointment would soon expire and that the agency would not convert his appointment into a career or career-conditional position. An administrative judge concluded that the board had no jurisdiction over Rocha’s appeal because he was serving under an excepted service appointment in the Federal Career Intern Program. Rocha was informed by the administrative judge that the decision would become final on December 15, 2010. The initial decision was served upon Rocha by email; he had consented to electronic filing. On June 3, 2011, Rocha filed a petition with the board, which informed Rocha that his petition was untimely and that it would consider the merits only if he established good cause for untimely filing. In response, Rocha asserted that he never received notification that his case had been dismissed. On December 22, the board dismissed, noting that its regulations require an e-filer to monitor case activity at e-Appeal Online to ensure receipt of all documents. Rocha presented no evidence of circumstances beyond his control that affected his ability to comply with time limits. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Rocha v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether the renewal of forty-one water supply contracts by the United States Bureau of Reclamation violated section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and illegally threatened the existence of the delta smelt. The contracts at issue fell into two groups: (1) users who obtained water from the Delta-Mendota Canal (DMC contracts), and (2) parties who claimed to hold water rights senior to those held by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation with regard to a Central Valley Project and who previously entered into settlement contracts with the Bureau (settlement contractors). The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the DMC contracts and that Plaintiffs' claims against the settlement contractors failed because the contracts were not discretionary and were thus exempted from section 7(a)(2) compliance. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing with regard to the contracts and that section 7(a)(2) of the ESA did not apply to the settlement contracts. View "Natural Res. Defense Council v. Salazar" on Justia Law

When Defendant Ralph Merrill sold millions of rounds of ammunition to the United States Army, he concealed that the ammunition was manufactured by a Communist Chinese military company because his contract with the Army prohibited the delivery of that kind of ammunition. Defendant had the ammunition repackaged which made it unsafe for later use. Defendant was convicted for conspiracy to commit false statements, major fraud, and wire fraud against the United States and for major fraud and wire fraud. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court misinterpreted the regulation that prohibited the Department of Defense from acquiring munitions manufactured by a Communist Chinese military company, that the regulation did not apply to the ammunition he sold, and that he did not defraud the government because he did not misrepresent a material fact when he lied about the origin of the ammunition. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded Defendant's arguments failed because his interpretation of the applicable statutes was flawed and, "more fundamentally, is irrelevant to his misconduct." Because all of Defendant's arguments failed, the Court affirmed his convictions. View "United States v. Merrill" on Justia Law

In 1983, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101-10270, authorized the Department of Energy to contract with nuclear facilities for disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste. The Standard Contract provided that rights and duties may be assignable with transfer of SNF title. Plaintiff entered into the Standard Contract in 1983 and sold its operation and SNF to ENVY in 2002, including assignment of the Standard Contract, except one payment obligation. Plaintiff transferred claims related to DOE defaults. As a result of DOE’s breach, ENVY built on-site dry-storage facilities. The Claims Court consolidated ENVY’s suit with plaintiff’s suit. The government admitted breach; the Claims Court awarded ENVY $34,895,467 (undisputed damages) and certain disputed damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. Plaintiff validly assigned pre-existing claims; while partial assignment of rights and duties under the contract was not valid, the government waived objection. The assignment encompassed claims against the government. Legal and lobbying fees to secure Vermont approval for mitigation were foreseeable, but other expenses were not recoverable. ENVY failed to prove costs of disposing of contaminated material discovered due to the breach and its characterization of spent fuel moved to dry storage. ENVY is not entitled to recover cost of capital for funding mitigation, or Resource Code 19 payroll loader overhead costs, but may recover capital suspense loader overhead costs,.View "VT Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

In February, 2002, the Navy awarded GM&W a contract for floor coating at a military base. GM&W subcontracted with FloorPro, which completed the work on February 27, 2002 and billed GM&W. On March 8, the Navy informed GM&W that the work was completed satisfactorily. On April 17, FloorPro informed the Navy’s contracting officer that it had not been paid. GM&W had claims pending and was not sure whether funds that the Navy directly deposited would be available to FloorPro. In April 2002, the Navy and GM&W entered into contract modification providing for mailing to FloorPro of a check payable to GM&W and Floor-Pro. The Navy paid GM&W directly by electronic transfer and informed FloorPro that its recourse was to sue GM&W. In December 2002, FloorPro submitted a claim to the Navy’s contracting officer. On March 27, 2003, FloorPro filed at the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, which awarded $37,500. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that under the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 7101, ASBCA has no jurisdiction over a claim by a subcontractor. In 2009, FloorPro filed in the Court of Claims, which ruled in favor of FloorPro. The Federal Circuit vacated, ordering dismissal under the six-year limitations period of 28 U.S.C. 2501. View "FloorPro, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The State of Illinois, facing a significant and unprecedented fiscal deficit, brokered a series of compensation agreements with the exclusive bargaining representative for 40,000 state employees. The parties trimmed several hundred million dollars in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 by deferring general wage increases and instituting a voluntary furlough program. Despite these measures, the fiscal year 2012 budget did not contain sufficient appropriations for deferred wage increases due employees of 14 state agencies. The state froze the pay of those employees, repudiating agreements with the union. The district court dismissed a suit that alleged violations of the Contracts Clause and the Equal Protection Clause and state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the Contracts Clause claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The court noted that the state’s actions did not bar a breach of contract suit. There was a rational relationship between those actions and a legitimate governmental purpose, precluding an equal protection claim. View "Council 31 of the Am. Fed. of St., Cty. & Mun. Employees v. Quinn" on Justia Law

A doctor filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, against Brigham and Women's Hospital, Massachusetts General Hospital and doctors, claiming violation of the Act by including false statements in a grant application, concerning neurodegenerative illness associated with aging, submitted to the National Institute on Aging in the National Institutes of Health, an agency of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and that defendants, knowing of the falsity, failed to take corrective action. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The First Circuit vacated. The district court abused its discretion by excluding or failing to consider certain expert testimony and erred by failing to consider statements of the parties and experts as required by the summary judgment standard. The dispute was not about which scientific protocol produces results that fall within an acceptable range of "accuracy" or whether re-measurements, the basis for preliminary scientific conclusions, were "accurate" insofar as they fall within a range of results accepted by qualified experts, but whether there was intentional falsification. View "Jones v. Brigham & Women's Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a "Stipulation Agreement Regarding Damages," approved by the EEOC, to resolve her Title VII pregnancy discrimination claim against the U.S. Postal Service. She later filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging breached of that Agreement. The court held that it did not have jurisdiction because the Agreement was a consent decree, not a contract. In the federal system, when the United States is the defendant, whether the issue is enforcement of a court decree by the issuing forum or enforcement of a settlement contract in a separate suit determines which court can hear the case. The Federal Circuit reversed, stating that the "dispute is yet another example of the wastefulness of litigation over where to litigate." Consent decrees and settlement agreements are not necessarily mutually exclusive; a settlement agreement, even one embodied in a decree, is a contract within the meaning of the Tucker Act. View "VanDesande v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2010, the court of claims awarded owners $3,043,051, plus interest, for the temporary taking of a blanket easement over five parcels in the Otay Mesa area of San Diego County, California, limiting the government's liability to the period April, 1999 to October, 2008. The taking was the result of Border Patrol activities outside the boundaries of an easement that had been purchased by the government for those purposes, and included creating new roads, constructing a permanent tented structure, and installing under-ground motion-detecting sensors. The Federal Circuit affirmed the limitation of liability to five parcels and the stated time period, but reversed the calculation of damages. The claims court erred in concluding that the taking was temporary rather than a permanent physical taking. The government stipulated that its easement was "perpetual" and has not removed its equipment. View "Otay Mesa Prop. v. United States" on Justia Law