Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

Gaylord created “The Column,” sculptures representing soldiers that are the centerpiece of the Korean War Veterans' Memorial on the National Mall. The Postal Service issued a stamp commemorating the 50th anniversary of the armistice, with a photograph of The Column, licensed from a photographer. USPS issued roughly 86.8 million of the stamps, sold retail goods with the image, and licensed the image to retailers, without seeking Gaylord's permission. In 2006, Gaylord sued under 28 U.S.C. 1498(b) for copyright infringement. The Federal Circuit held that Gaylord owned the copyright and that USPS was liable for infringement, but remanded for determination of damages. The Court of Federal Claims rejected a claim for a 10 percent royalty on about $30.2 million in revenue allegedly generated by the infringing use, as well as a claim for prejudgment interest, finding that neither 28 U.S.C. 1498(b), which waives sovereign immunity for copyright infringement, nor the copyright infringement statute, 17 U.S.C. 504, authorizes a royalty-based award for copyright infringement and that the proper measure of damages was the reasonable value of a license, between $1,500 and $5,000. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for determination of market value of the infringing use and award of prejudgment interest. View "Gaylord v. United States" on Justia Law

A doctor filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, against Brigham and Women's Hospital, Massachusetts General Hospital and doctors, claiming violation of the Act by including false statements in a grant application, concerning neurodegenerative illness associated with aging, submitted to the National Institute on Aging in the National Institutes of Health, an agency of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and that defendants, knowing of the falsity, failed to take corrective action. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The First Circuit vacated. The district court abused its discretion by excluding or failing to consider certain expert testimony and erred by failing to consider statements of the parties and experts as required by the summary judgment standard. The dispute was not about which scientific protocol produces results that fall within an acceptable range of "accuracy" or whether re-measurements, the basis for preliminary scientific conclusions, were "accurate" insofar as they fall within a range of results accepted by qualified experts, but whether there was intentional falsification. View "Jones v. Brigham & Women's Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their complaint challenging a number of agreements entered into by the City of New York with respect to labor conditions on certain City construction projects. Plaintiffs argued that the agreements regulated the labor market and were therefore preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151-169. The court found the project labor agreements in this case materially indistinguishable from agreements the Supreme Court found permissible under the market participation exception to preemption in Building and Construction Trades Council of Metropolitan District v. Associated Builders and Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island Inc. Because the City acted as a market participant and not a regulator in entering the agreements, its actions fell outside the scope of NLRA preemption. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "The Building Industry Electric Contractors Assoc., et al. v. City of New York et al." on Justia Law

The center provided care for children of low-income parents and sought license renewal in 2005. The application remained pending for 15 months. During that period, the state agency, ODJFS, reduced its capacity from 88 to 38 children. The agency responsible for funding under Title XX, which provides government assistance for child care, 42 U.S.C. 1397, discontinued public assistance for its services, based on a proposed adjudication, which would reject the renewal application based on alleged improper use of physical discipline and failure to adequately ensure that employees did not have disqualifying criminal convictions. While the matter was pending, the center experienced difficulty with third-party contracts, including liability insurance and workers compensation renewal certification, and went out of business. The center sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, claiming tortious interference with business relationships, based on racial animus. After the center also filed in the Ohio Court of Claims, the district court dismissed the claims against ODJFS. The center continued to amend its federal pleadings, including addition of an antitrust claim, but the claims were ultimately dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that any unwaived claims were barred by the Local Government Antitrust Act. View "Wee Care Child Ctr., Inc. v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

In 2004, the Army awarded Parsons the prime contract for work in Iraq. The contract incorporated Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), for reimbursement of sub-contractor costs. Parsons entered into a subcontract with Odell for health care facilities and medical equipment. After the Army terminated task orders for convenience, Odell attempted to collect reimbursement above the amount determined by the Defense Contract Audit Agency as its provisional indirect cost. Settlement for termination of the prime contract did not address the issue. Following an audit, Parsons submitted Odell’s revised invoice to the termination contract officer, who stated that it would not settle directly with Odell under FAR 49.108-8 because it was not in the best interest of the government. Parsons submitted a sponsored Certified Claim under the Contract Disputes Act on behalf of Odell to the Procurement Contracting Officer, who denied the claim. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeal held that the request was routine and, under 48 C.F.R. (FAR) 2.101, needed to be in dispute to constitute a claim over which it had jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Parsons made no argument that its request was in dispute. The record did not indicate that the PCO ever received a proper request for payment.View "Parsons Global Servs., Inc. v. McHugh" on Justia Law

In 1983, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101-10270, authorizing the Department of Energy to enter into contracts with nuclear facilities for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). Congress mandated that, under the Standard Contract, DOE dispose of SNF and HLW beginning not later than January 31, 1998. In 1983, DOE entered into a Standard Contract with Consolidated Edison under which DOE agreed to accept SNF stored at the Indian Point facility. Following DOE’s breach, the Claims Court awarded two categories of damages: wet storage costs for continued operation of its Unit 1 spent fuel pool and regulatory fees paid to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Federal Circuit reversed the awards, affirmed denial of damages for the cost of financing mitigation activities, but reversed denial of damages for indirect overhead costs associated with mitigation. The company had chosen to prioritize removal of Unit 2 SNF and Unit 1 material would not have been removed by the time at issue; the company did not establish that the breach caused an increase in fees to the NRC. View "Consol. Edison Co. of NY, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Two U.S. Army Reserve officers, deployed to Iraq in 2003 to work for the Coalition Provisional Authority, were convicted of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C.371, for participating in a bid-rigging scheme that involved directing millions of dollars in contracts to companies owned by an American businessman. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish participation in the conspiracy; to denial of a motion to suppress; and to denial of immunity for a co-conspirator. View "United States v. Whiteford" on Justia Law

Petitioner served 26 years in the U.S. Army. Following his discharge, he began working in a civil service position as a maintenance management specialist for the Department of the Navy. His appointment was subject to completion of a one-year probationary period. Petitioner had no previous federal civilian service. Before expiration of the probationary period, the agency notified petitioner that he would be terminated from his position for unacceptable performance. He sought to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board. The administrative judge found that petitioner had no statutory right of appeal to the Board and that, as a probationary employee, petitioner's rights before the Board were limited to those defined by OPM regulations allowing appeal only if the termination was based on partisan political reasons or was the result of discrimination based on marital status, 5 C.F.R. 315.806(b). The Board rejected petitioner's claim that his military service should count toward completion of the one-year period of continuous service needed to qualify for Board review. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that petitioner did not qualify as an employee within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(1)(A). View "Wilder v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

The city accepted a proposal to develop city-owned property. The developer formed companies to develop and own the affordable housing portion of the project. The city gave the developer an option to purchase the property under certain conditions. The developer failed to meet a condition that it obtain a demolition permit by a specific date. The city terminated the agreement. The developer alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601, and state laws, claiming that the city knew or should have known that the condition was impossible to meet and actually terminated the agreement because the project would accommodate handicapped tenants. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The facts alleged do not plausibly support findings: that the city designed the agreement to fail by including a condition it should have known that plaintiffs, sophisticated developers, could not meet; that the city did not want to house the handicapped; or that termination caused handicapped individuals to suffer disproportionately more than others. View "HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a "Stipulation Agreement Regarding Damages," approved by the EEOC, to resolve her Title VII pregnancy discrimination claim against the U.S. Postal Service. She later filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging breached of that Agreement. The court held that it did not have jurisdiction because the Agreement was a consent decree, not a contract. In the federal system, when the United States is the defendant, whether the issue is enforcement of a court decree by the issuing forum or enforcement of a settlement contract in a separate suit determines which court can hear the case. The Federal Circuit reversed, stating that the "dispute is yet another example of the wastefulness of litigation over where to litigate." Consent decrees and settlement agreements are not necessarily mutually exclusive; a settlement agreement, even one embodied in a decree, is a contract within the meaning of the Tucker Act. View "VanDesande v. United States" on Justia Law