Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 1983, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101–10270, to provide for government collection and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The NWPA authorized the Department of Energy to contract for disposal. In return for payment of fees into the Nuclear Waste Fund, the Standard Contract provided that the DOE would begin to dispose of SNF and HLW not later than January 31, 1998. Because collection and disposal did not begin, courts held that the DOE had breached the Standard Contract with the nuclear energy industry. The trial court found breach of plaintiff's contract, but granted summary judgment in favor of the government regarding the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and set damages for the breach at $10,014,114 plus the cost of borrowed funds for financing construction of a dry fuel storage project. On reconsideration, the trial court reduced damages to $9,735,634 and denied the cost of borrowed funds. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to borrowed fund, but and reversed denial of overhead costs. View "System Fuels, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Two laws were challenged under the Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. 8301, which requires that only materials mined, produced, or manufactured in the U.S. be employed for "public use" or used in construction, alteration, or repair of "any public building or public work. A 1985 Puerto Rican law required that local construction projects financed with federal or Commonwealth funds use only construction materials manufactured in Puerto Rico, with limited exceptions relating to price, quality, and available quantity, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, 927-927h (Law 109). Cement is deemed "manufactured in Puerto Rico" only if composed entirely of raw materials from Puerto Rico. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10, 167e (Law 132), enacted in 2001, imposes labeling requirements on cement and required that foreign-manufactured cement carry a special label warning against its use in government-financed construction projects unless one of the exceptions contained in the BAA and Law 109 applies. The district court held that the local laws were preempted. The First Circuit upheld Law 109 as a permissible action taken by Puerto Rico as a market participant, but invalidated provisions of Law 132 that discriminate against sellers of foreign cement, leaving the remainder of the law intact. View "Antilles Cement Corp. v. Fortuno" on Justia Law

This case concerned a contract between the parties where defendant was hired to dredge a portion of the Houston Ship Channel and to construct containment levees and other structures at a disposal facility for dredge material. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of its motion for partial dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and motion for partial summary judgment. Defendant also appealed the district court's grant of the government's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court held that the government's suit to collect the money owed by defendant was timely because it was filed within six years of the contracting officer's decision; because defendant had failed to show its set-off claim "beyond peradventure," the court affirmed the district court's denial of its motion for partial summary judgment on this claim; and the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the government's claim for repayment it had overpaid defendant and the district court properly granted judgment in the government's favor on that claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Renda Marine, Incorporated" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Michael Maestas, Thomas May, Juanito Marquez and Jahmaal Gregory were all officers in a private security force that protects Los Alamos National Laboratory. They contended that their employer, Day & Zimmerman, LLC and SOC, LLC, (collectively, SOC) improperly classified them as exempt employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA). The district court found that Plaintiffs were exempt executive employees and granted summary judgment to SOC. The parties disagreed over which of Plaintiffs' job duties was "primary." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that such a dispute presented a question of fact rather than an issue of law. Furthermore, the Court held that an employee who supervises subordinates while also conducting front-line law enforcement work performs a non-managerial task. Because there remained a genuine dispute as to whether three of the Plaintiffs had this task as their primary duty, summary judgment was proper only against Plaintiff Thomas May and improper as to the others. Accordingly, the Court partly reversed, partly affirmed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Maestas v. Day & Zimmerman, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010 the Department of Defense began the process of procuring digital planetariums for use in teaching astronomy. Before posting its intention to sole-source the contract, the Department communicated with its existing vendor to inquire about terms. The Department posted notice of intent to award a sole-source contract to that vendor, stating that if any party challenged the award, it should file a statement, detailing its capability to fulfill the order. The Department approved a Justification and Authorization as required for a sole-source procurement, indicating that curriculum standards and lessons for the vendor's components are already in place. In response to a statement by another bidder, the Department had its existing vendor provide additional specifications to add to the notice. After the contract was awarded to the existing vendor, plaintiff complained to a congressman, then filed suit. The Court of Federal Claims held that plaintiff could not demonstrate prejudice, a prerequisite for standing, because it did not have a substantial chance of winning the contract, having failed to submit a statement of capability. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff was not an interested party. View "Digitalis Educ. Solutions, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2000 the Tribe received funding under the Hazardous Fuels Reduction program, created by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to gradually reintroduce the beneficial aspects of fire into ecosystems such as densely-wooded forests. After obtaining BIA approval, the Tribe began HFR work in December 2000, and began invoicing BIA in 2001. Reports of diversions of funds prompted an inspection. Inspectors concluded that the invoices overstated the work done and that some of the work actually increased the risk of fire. A second inspection led to the conclusion that the defendants were submitting false invoices. After further investigation and failed settlement negotiations, the government filed a False Claims Act suit, 31 U.S.C. 3729-33, in 2007. After a nine-day trial, the defendants prevailed; they moved for attorney's fees under Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A), or sanctions under Rule 37(c)(2). The district court denied both motions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging its discomfort with apparent "government overreaching." The government’s position throughout trial was substantially justified, so the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the EAJA motion. View "United States v. Pecore" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the DoD for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the DoD violated various in-sourcing procedures adopted pursuant to federal law. The district court dismissed, concluding exclusive jurisdiction lay in the Court of Federal Claims. Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of its complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiff's complaint constituted an action by an interested party alleging a violation of a statute or regulation in connection with a procurement. Accordingly, the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(b), conferred exclusive jurisdiction over this action with the Court of Federal Claims and the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., did not waive sovereign immunity as to plaintiff's claims. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint and the judgment was affirmed. View "Rothe Development, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, et al." on Justia Law

In a national emergency, the Department of Defense can augment its own capabilities with aircraft drawn from the "Civil Reserve Air Fleet," composed of aircraft owned by commercial carriers but committed voluntarily for use during emergencies. The Fleet is divided into teams of airlines. The Department awards mobilization value points; the more points a member has, the more non-emergency Department air transportation the member can bid on. Points are transferrable within teams. Members of defendant's team have a contract with a one-year term and a separate three-year agreement concerning distribution of business among members. Plaintiff's suit is based on a 2006 three-year agreement in the form of a letter. A change from what members of the team had been doing ultimately led to plaintiff's withdrawal from the team. Plaintiff subsequently went into bankruptcy. Plaintiff won a jury verdict of almost $66 million. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the "agreement" did not include crucial terms and was so indefinite as to be unenforceable. The court also criticized the regression analysis on which the award was calculated. A promissory estoppel claim, while not preempted, failed on the facts. View "ATA Airlines, Inc. v. FedEx Corp." on Justia Law

Claimant appealed from a judgment of the district court ordering the forfeiture to plaintiff United States, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 401(a), of certain communication-jamming devices, to wit, the defendant-in-rem Jammers, owned by claimant and a company of which he was the majority shareholder and CEO. On appeal, claimant contended that the district court erred in dismissing his claim, arguing principally that the stipulation he signed was void on the grounds that it was signed under duress and without consideration. The court held that, as a matter of New York law, no consideration for claimant's agreement to the release was needed; and thus, if consideration was absent, its absence did not make the stipulation invalid. The court also held that claimant's assertions did not meet any part of the test of duress. The court further held that the district court correctly granted the government's motion to strike or for summary judgment on the ground of claimant's lack of Article III standing. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Twenty MilJam-350 IED Jammers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a non-profit, member-owned, water company serving rural areas of Ross County, Ohio. To finance its system, plaintiff borrowed nearly $10.6 million from the USDA. The disputed area of the county includes properties served by the city and properties served by plaintiff. Each has objected to the other's extension of new lines to the area. The district court granted plaintiff summary judgment, finding that the company is protected under the Agriculture Act, 7 U.S.C. 1926(b)(2), based on its obligations under the USDA contract, had a legal right to serve the area under a contract with the county, and did not have unclean hands. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Ross Cnty. Water Co., Inc v. City of Chillicothe" on Justia Law