Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

This case was an appeal of a district court order awarding attorney fees to Ascorp, Inc. d/b/a Debco Construction (Debco) against the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) in a declaratory judgment action filed by ITD to determine rights of the parties with respect to a contract for highway construction services on a project in Twin Falls. The district court dismissed the action upon Debco’s motion under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and awarded attorney fees to Debco under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). On appeal ITD argued that the district court erred in determining that the declaratory judgment action qualified as a dispute involving a commercial transaction required for the application of Idaho Code section 12-120(3). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Idaho Transportation v. Ascorp, Inc." on Justia Law

For many years, Idaho County had contracted for solid waste disposal services with Walco, Inc., and Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc., (Simmons Sanitation), with each entity covering a different portion of the county. In July 2012, the County entered into a contract with Simmons Sanitation for another ten-year term beginning on January 1, 2013. However, the County and Walco could not agree upon the terms of another ten-year contract commencing on January 1, 2013. Walco’s counsel informed the County that Walco would not accept the terms proposed by the County and suggested, “given the fact that this contract has not been bid for more than forty (40) years, that the contract should go out for bid.” The County decided not to solicit bids, but instead to solicit proposals for a contract to continue providing solid waste disposal services to that part of the county being served by Walco. The County Recorder received two envelopes containing responses to the request for proposals. One was from Walco and the other was from Simmons Sanitation. The proposals were opened at a public meeting of the county commissioners. Simmons Sanitation submitted a bid lower than that of Walco. A representative from Walco was at the meeting, but no representative of Simmons Sanitation attended. After the Commissioners reviewed the proposals, they had a short discussion with the representative from Walco. At the conclusion of the one meeting, the Commissioners voted to enter into contract negotiations with Simmons Sanitation. They did so, and on November 30, 2012, they entered into a contract for a ten-year term. Thereafter, Walco filed this action against the County and Simmons Sanitation, alleging a claim against the County for tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage and a claim against the County and Simmons Sanitation for misappropriation of Walco’s trade secrets. All of the parties filed motions for summary judgment. In response to the County’s motion, Walco conceded that its tortious interference claim should have been dismissed. The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on the claim that they had misappropriated Walco’s trade secrets, concluding that the dollar amount of Walco’s proposal did not constitute a trade secret because Walco had not taken reasonable steps under the circumstances to maintain the secrecy of that information. Walco filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied after briefing and argument. Walco then appealed. Walco contended that one of the provisions in the request for proposals could reasonably be construed as indicating that the dollar amounts of the proposals would not be announced at a public meeting. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in holding that the dollar amount of Walco’s proposal did not constitute a trade secret because Walco did not make efforts that were reasonable under the circumstances to maintain the secrecy of that information. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Walco’s complaint. View "Walco, Inc v. County of Idaho" on Justia Law

The State of Alabama, on behalf of Rick Allison, Probate Judge of Walker County, appealed a Walker Circuit Court judgment entered in favor of Jill Farris, the county administrator for Walker County. By statute, Judge Allison, as the chief elections officer for Walker County, must publish certain voter lists and election notices. Judge Allison argued on appeal, as he did in the circuit court, that he had the authority to determine in which newspaper of general circulation notices would be published and that he could also contract with that newspaper for the cost of publishing the notices. Farris argued Judge Allison did not follow established procedure by obtaining competitive bids for the pricing of such publishing. The Supreme Court As chief election officer for Walker County pursuant to statute, Judge Allison could contract to publish the notices he is required to publish. The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment insofar as it held otherwise. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including a determination of whether Judge Allison substantially complied with the competitive-bid law and, if so, whether Judge Allison's request for attorney fees was appropriate. View "State of Alabama ex rel. Allison, v. Farris" on Justia Law

In this case, San Diegans for Open Government (SanDOG) filed a Government Code section 1090 taxpayers' action on behalf of the Sweetwater Union High School District seeking to recover contract payments made to three building contractors, including appellant Har Construction, Inc. SanDOG alleged the District superintendent and several District board members were "financially interested" in the public works contracts and thus the contracts were void. About 16 months after SanDOG filed its first amended complaint, Har Construction moved to dismiss the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court denied the motion because it found SanDOG met its burden to show a probability of prevailing. Har Construction appealed the anti-SLAPP denial order. The Court of Appeal affirmed, but on different grounds. The Court determined Har Construction's motion was untimely and the anti-SLAPP statute was inapplicable because SanDOG's claims fell within the statute's public interest exemption. The Court did not reach the issue whether SanDOG's claims arose out of protected activity and, if so, whether SanDOG met its burden to show a probability of prevailing. View "San Diegans etc. v. Har Construction" on Justia Law

Astornet alleges that it is sole exclusive licensee and owner of all rights in the 844 patent, issued in 2009 to Haddad as the inventor and entitled “Airport vehicular gate entry access system” and asserted the patent against NCR, MorphoTrust USA, and BAE Astornet alleged that the three had contracts with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to supply boarding-pass scanning systems; that TSA’s use of the equipment infringed and would infringe the patent; and that NCR and MorphoTrust were bidding for another contract to supply modified equipment whose use by TSA would also infringe. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that Astornet’s exclusive remedy for the alleged infringement was a suit against the government in the Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. 1498. View "Astornet Techs., Inc. v. BAE Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

The trial court found that a general contractor, Jeff Tracy, Inc., doing business as Land Forms Construction, did not have a valid license while performing work on a project for City of Pico Rivera. Therefore, the court ordered Land Forms to disgorge all compensation paid to it by the City. Land Forms appealed, contending that the trial court improperly denied it a jury trial. The court concluded that Land Forms was entitled to a jury trial on these issues, and therefore reversed the judgment. However, the court found that Land Forms is not entitled to any apportionment where Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (b) does not allow apportionment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's judgment. View "Jeff Tracy, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera" on Justia Law

Relators filed suit under the California False Claims Act, Gov. Code, 12650 et seq., alleging that DHL overcharged and fraudulently billed the State for delivery services. The trial court concluded that the action was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1), and Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1). The trial court then granted judgment on the pleadings. After remand from the California Supreme Court, the court concluded that People ex rel. Harris v. PAC Anchor Transportation, Inc. does not apply in this case. The court held, as it had before, that the application of the State Act in this case would constitute an impermissible regulation of DHL’s prices, routes and services in conflict with federal law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order. View "Grupp v. DHL Express" on Justia Law

Beginning in 2008 Mullins served as Cook County’s Director of Public Affairs and Communications. At that time, contracts requiring the county to spend $25,000 or more had to be approved by its Board of Commissioners. Contracts that required the county to spend less than $25,000 only required the approval of the county’s purchasing agent. The government charged Mullins and co-defendants—vendors to whom the county awarded contracts—with manipulating the system. Mullins helped these vendors obtain payment under county service contracts, without the vendors having to complete any work, and in exchange they paid Mullins $34,748 in bribes. Jurors convicted him of four counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and four counts of bribery, section 666. The Seventh Circuit rejected Mullins’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and claim of prosecutorial misconduct. View "United States v. Mullins" on Justia Law

The Navy, Military Sealift Command (MSC), issued a contract solicitation, involving management and coordination of lodging and transportation for federal civil service mariners who were completing required training at the New Jersey MSC Center. MSC issued the solicitation as a total small business set-aside under North American Industrial Classification System code: “Hotels (except Casino Hotels)”. After bidders revised and resubmitted their initial proposals, MSC accepted the proposal of Mali. Losing bidder DMC filed a size protest with the Small Business Administration (SBA), which found that Mali was not a small business.. Because DMC had submitted the next lowest-priced, technically acceptable bid, it was then declared the successful bidder. Tinton Falls then filed a size protest, alleging that DMC intended to subcontract the lodging services portion of the contract to hotels that did not qualify as small businesses. The SBA concluded that the primary and vital requirements of the solicitation were a coordinated package of rooms, transportation, and other services; that DMC would be performing a significant portion of the contract’s primary and vital requirements; that DMC’s relationship with its subcontracted hotels did not violate the ostensible contractor rule; and that DMC could be considered a small business concern. The Federal Circuit affirmed final judgment for the government and DMC. View "Tinton Falls Lodging Realty, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

PegaStaff is a temporary staffing agency. A large part of PegaStaff’s business was providing staffing to PG&E) The California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) adopted General Order 156 (GO 156) to implement Public Utilities Code Article 5, the purpose of which is to encourage and develop the use of women-, minority-, and disabled veteran-owned business enterprises within the public utility sector. PegaStaff is not a minority enterprise, and after PG&E adopted a program to increase the utilization of minority enterprises, PegaStaff’s provision of labor to PG&E was substantially reduced. PegaStaff attributes this reduction to the implementation of a tier system preferential to minority enterprises and the transfer of many of its contingent workers to minority enterprises. PegaStaff filed suit, alleging constitutional challenges to Article 5 and GO 156. The trial court determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider PegaStaff’s constitutional challenges and granted the PUC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeal affirmed. Remaining defendants also sought and obtained judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the trial court erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider its claims against PG&E and another staffing agency. The suit will not interfere with PUC’s regulatory authority. View "Pegastaff v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co." on Justia Law