Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

Relator filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, alleging that healthcare clinics provided, and the Humana defendants either knew of or promoted, a variety of free services for patients and health plan members. Relator alleged that the clinics offered such services without regard for medical purpose or financial need and that the value of the services is more than nominal. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the amended complaint with prejudice where, under the prior or amended version of section 3730 of the FCA, relator cannot overcome the public disclosure bar. View "Osheroff v. Humana Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Horn Lake contracted with Phillips Construction Company and its owner Michael Phillips to work on a sewer project. Two employees of Phillips, Bertram Hill and David Mooneyhan, were working near the bottom of a trench that was seventeen feet deep when the walls of the trench suddenly collapsed. Mooneyhan was killed, and Hill was injured. Mooneyhan's beneficiaries and Hill (collectively "Plaintiffs") sued the City for Phillips' negligence under respondeat superior and also alleged that the City had negligently hired Phillips. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. Plaintiffs appealed. Finding that the City only acted in a supervisory role over the project, the Supreme Court concluded that was not enough to trigger a master-servant relationship for the elements of respondeat superior. The Court found that the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City was proper, and therefore affirmed the judgment. View "Hill v. City of Horn Lake" on Justia Law

The Government appeals the dismissal of Counts I and II of its complaint under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(A) and 3729(a)(1)(B), against Triple Canopy. Triple Canopy contracted with the government to provide security services at the Al Asad Airbase in Iraq. The original relator also appeals the dismissal of his complaint. The court concluded that the Government has sufficiently alleged a false claim for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b) where the complaint sufficiently alleged that Triple Canopy made a material false statement with the requisite scienter that resulted in payment (Count I). The district court also erred in finding that the original relator lacked standing to remain as a party on Count I. Further, the district court erred in dismissing Count II, the false records claim, where the Government has properly pled materiality as to this count. However, the court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed Counts II-V of the original relator's complaint for failing to comply with Rule 9(b). Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States ex rel. Omar Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc." on Justia Law

The Arkansas DHS regulates child care facility licensing and administers the USDA Child Care Food Program. Sparkman day care facility provided disability services funded by DHS and participated in the Program through DHS. The Program prohibits placement of disqualified individuals in a position of authority, 7 C.F.R. 226.6(c)(3)(ii)(B). DHS Policy states that violations can result in exclusion of a provider from further funding. DHS alleged that Sparkman placed a disqualified individual, Whitaker, in a position of authority. Sparkman believed that racial animus motivated DHS to place Whitaker on the disqualification list, but did not raise an equal protection claim at the hearing. Before the hearing was complete, the ALJ resigned, stating "as an African American male I cannot continue to work in a[n] office where racism and harassment continue to exist." Another ALJ, a Caucasian present as an observer, upheld DHS's termination of funding. With state appeals pending, Sparkman filed a federal complaint. The district court stayed proceedings. Following state court remand, DHS appointed a private attorney to serve as hearing officer; Sparkman agreed to the selection. Sparkman again made no equal protection or due process claims. The hearing officer decided in DHS's favor. Sparkman’s state court appeal alleged ex parte communications between DHS and the hearing officer. The state courts upheld the decision. The federal court concluded that claim preclusion barred Sparkman's due process and equal protection claims. The Eight Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims could have been brought during the state administrative proceeding and judicial review. View "Sparkman Learning Ctr. v. Ark. Dep't. Human Servs." on Justia Law

Bailey was convicted of federal prostitution charges in 2004. Minneapolis police officers took trial exhibits to a locked police storage facility, including $2,036 in cash, a wallet, and a cell phone. Years later Bailey moved for return of the property, but the government could not locate it. Bailey sought damages. The government agreed to pay Bailey $2,500 "by a check . . . made payable to Robert Bailey" to be mailed to the address of his lawyer. The Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services notified Bailey that he owed past due support of $45,956.48 and announced the state's "intent to collect this amount through the federal administrative offset process and by withholding . . . [tax refunds] or other federal or state payment(s)." The notice cited 31 U.S.C. 3716, indicating that "certain federal payments which might otherwise be paid to you will be intercepted for payment of current and past due support." It advised Bailey of his rights, such as having the debt redetermined. Bailey unsuccessfully moved to vacate his settlement agreement. He was advised that the $2,500 had been administratively offset against his child support obligation. The Eighth Circuit affirmed; the government did not breach Bailey's settlement agreement View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

The United States filed suit under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., alleging that Bollinger knowingly submitted false statements and false claims for payment to the government in relation to a government contract under which Bollinger was to modify eight vessels owned by the Coast Guard. The district court granted Bollinger's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and the United States appealed. The court concluded that the United States alleged sufficient facts in its complaint to allow a factfinder to infer that Bollinger either knew that their statements were false or had a reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc." on Justia Law

The FAA may “delegate to a qualified private person . . . the examination, testing, and inspection necessary to issue a certificate … and … issuing the certificate,” 49 U.S.C. 44702(d)(1), and may rescind delegation “at any time for any reason.” Airworthiness Representative-Maintenance (DAR-T) authorization to conduct aircraft inspections and issue airworthiness certificates has no expiration. Burdue was appointed as a DAR-T in 2001. In 2013, Burdue’s supervisors were informed of issues related to Burdue’s export certifications. The FAA’s Special Emphasis Investigations Team (SEIT) concluded that Burdue performed multiple aircraft inspections out of his assigned geographic area without authorization and had issued export certificates to aircraft owned by his wife, a conflict of interest. After review of Burdue’s response, Burdue’s certificate was revoked, both “for cause,” 14 C.F.R. 183.15(b)(4) and under the discretionary-revocation provision, 14 C.F.R. 183.15(b)(6). An Appeal Panel affirmed. Burdue brought a Bivens action, claiming due process violations and wrongful termination, then filed statutory claims in the Sixth Circuit. The district court stayed the Bivens proceedings. The Sixth Circuit declined to review the statutory claims because the FAA’s decision is committed to agency discretion and declined to review the constitutional claims that belong in the district court View "Burdue v. Fed. Aviation Admin." on Justia Law

The School District entered into a construction contract with Amoroso. Pursuant to Public Contract Code 22300, Amoroso elected to have the retention held in an escrow account in the form of securities. The escrow agreement stated that “District shall have the right to draw upon the securities and/or withdraw amounts from the Escrow Account in event of default by Contractor as determined solely by District.” The District gave written notice of material breach on March 30, 2011, based on Amoroso’s failure to complete, timely or at all, any of the three project phases and requested that Amoroso cure by April 4. Amoroso contested the assertions of material breach by letter dated April 1. The District sent notice of termination on April 18 and filed suit. On April 28, the parties entered into an “Exit and Demobilization Agreement,” “in lieu of any final termination or statement of default under the Contract.” The District sent a letter requesting withdrawal of $3.5 million from the escrow account, attaching its attorney’s memorandum as to why withdrawal was permissible. Amoroso unsuccessfully sought an injunction. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Amoroso’s claim that a public project owner must await judicial resolution of the underlying contract dispute before it can withdraw retention funds. View "Pittsburg Unified Sch. Dist. v. S.J. Amoroso Constr. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Vermont Spay/Neuter Incentive Program (VSNIP) was created in 2006 to subsidize dog, cat, and wolf-hybrid sterilization procedures for low-income Vermonters. Sue Skaskiw and the organization she directed, Vermont Volunteer Services for Animals Humane Society (VVSA), administered the VSNIP program from its inception in 2006 until the expiration of Skaskiw's contract in October 2012. Defendant Vermont Agency of Agriculture initially managed the program but responsibility was transferred to defendant Department for Children and Families (DCF), a department within the Agency of Human Services, in 2011. Defendant Kristin Haas was an employee of the Agency of Agriculture; defendants Kathleen Smith and Carol Maloney were employees of DCF. Sometime after the program's inception, the Agency of Agriculture contracted with Skaskiw to run VSNIP. She still held the contract when responsibility shifted to DCF in 2011, but at that time DCF put the contract out for a competitive bid. Two bidders, Skaskiw and VT-CAN!, submitted proposals, and VT-CAN! won the contract. Skaskiw subsequently filed this lawsuit. Skaskiw appealed the trial court's decision to grant the motion to dismiss of defendants Vermont Agency of Agriculture, Department for Children and Families, Haas, Smith, and Maloney on Skaskiw's claims of defamation, violation of due process, economic interference, and failure to discharge a mandatory duty. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Skaskiw v. Vermont Agency of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Townsend worked as an Arkansas pharmaceutical sales representative for Bayer, selling Mirena, a contraceptive device. Townsend visited physicians, including Dr. Shrum. Townsend learned Shrum was importing from Canada a version of Mirena that was not FDA-approved, at half the cost of the approved version. Shrum had submitted Medicaid claims at the same rate as the approved version and bragged about $50,000 in extra profit. Townsend sought guidance from his superiors. Bayer told Townsend not get involved. Townsend called the Medicaid Fraud Hotline, although he feared losing his job. Shrum was charged with Medicaid fraud. Meanwhile, Bayer changed its method of reimbursing sales expenses. Not understanding the change, Townsend’s wife spent funds intended for those expenses, causing Townsend’s account to be closed temporarily. Although Townsend's account had been reactivated, Bayer fired him, claiming his closed account prevented him doing his job. Townsend sued, citing anti-retaliation provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h).). A jury awarded Townsend back pay, doubled to $642,746, and $568,000 in emotional distress damages. The court denied front pay and ordered Bayer to reinstate Townsend. The Eighth Circuit affirmed on all issues except the emotional distress damage award and remanded to allow Townsend the option of accepting a remittitur of $300,000, or a new trial on emotional distress damages. View "Townsend v. Bayer HealthCare Pharm. Inc." on Justia Law