Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 2001 KBR agreed to provide the Army with logistics support services during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Individual task orders required KBR to install, operate and maintain dining services near Mosul, Iraq on a cost-plus-award-fee basis. KBR selected ABC, a subcontractor, to build a prefabricated metal dining facility and to provide dining services for a camp population of 2,573. In June 2004, the Army ordered KBR to stop construction of the metal facility and begin construction of a reinforced concrete facility for an estimated 2,573 to 6,200+ persons. Instead of requesting bids for the new work, KBR kept ABC as the subcontractor due to the urgency of the request. ABC submitted a new proposal with a total monthly cost about triple the monthly cost initially quoted. ABC attributed the increased costs to additional labor and equipment to serve a larger population and to a drastic increase in the cost of labor and a severe shortage of staff willing to work in Iraq. Due to a calculation error, it was determined that ABC’s proposal was reasonable. KBR’s management reviewed and approved a change order, embodying ABC’s proposal. In 2005 the subcontract ended and title to the dining facility passed to the Army. In 2007, the Defense Contract Auditing Agency suspended payment of certain costs paid by KBR to ABC pursuant to the change order. KBR prepared a new price justification for the concrete dining facility and ultimately filed suit, seeking recovery of the $12,529,504 in costs disapproved for reimbursement. The Claims Court awarded $6,779,762. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Kellogg Brown & Root Servs. v. United States" on Justia Law

Hosea O. Weaver & Sons, Inc. appealed a jury verdict in favor of Ira Balch, personal representative of the Estate of Danny Balch, and Melvin Balch, personal representative of the estates of Bernard Balch and Armie Balch. The matter stemmed from a road-resurfacing project conducted by the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT). ALDOT hired Weaver to complete the project. The Balches were traveling on the portion of the road resurfaced by Weaver when the vehicle they were riding in was hit head-on by a tractor-trailer. Their personal representatives filed wrongful-death actions against Weaver and others, alleging that Weaver negligently performed the resurfacing project, and that negligent performance caused the deaths of the Balches. The trial court denied Weaver's prejudgment motions, and the jury returned a verdict in the estates' favor. Weaver appealed the denial of its postjudgment motion, and alleged multiple errors at trial in its argument to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Weaver owed no duty to the decedents, and therefore was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court reversed the trial court and entered a judgment in favor of Weaver.View "Hosea O. Weaver & Sons, Inc. v. Balch" on Justia Law

The Town of Kearny hired Brandt-Kuybida Architects to design and plan the construction of a new public safety facility. Construction began in 1994. The general contractor, Belcor Construction, signed a "Certificate of Substantial Completion" in late 1995. Approximately ten days later, the architects signed the same Certificate. The Certificate defined the date of substantial completion in language similar to that of the construction contract. The signatories to the Certificate, however, left the "date of issuance" and the "date of completion" of the project blank. In Spring1996, the Town's Construction Official issued the first Temporary Certificate of Occupancy (TCO), limited to the police section of the building. Structural defects in the facility surfaced shortly after the Kearny Police Department took occupancy, including leaks, buckled tiles and cracks in the walls. By 2007, ceilings in the facility had fallen and pipes had separated and pulled, all of which were attributed to uneven settlement. The Town never issued a final certificate of occupancy and on February 8, 2007, had the building vacated. Belcor initiated arbitration proceedings against the Town because the Town withheld final payment under the contract. Belcor and the Town resolved their dispute by Stipulation of Settlement. Both the Stipulation of Settlement and the related Town of Kearny Resolution identified the date of substantial completion of the facility as February 1, 1996. The issues before the Supreme Court were: (1) when could a building be considered substantially complete for purposes of calculating the ten-year period of the statute of repose; and (2) whether the Comparative Negligence Act and the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law authorized the allocation of fault to defendants who obtained dismissals pursuant to the statute of repose. The Supreme Court concluded after review that (1) the ten year period of the statute of repose started when the first Temporary Certificate of Occupancy was issued for the facility; and (2) when the claims against a defendant are dismissed on statute of repose grounds, fault may be apportioned to the dismissed defendant under the Comparative Negligence Act and the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law.View "Townof Kearny v. Brandt" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the interplay between the Subcontractors' and Suppliers' Payment Protection Act (SPPA), the Tort Claims Act (TCA), and the Court's opinion in "Sloan Construction Co. v. Southco Grassing, Inc. (Sloan I)," (659 S.E.2d 158 (2008)). When subcontractors Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. and Tindall Corporation (collectively Respondents) did not receive full payment from the general contractor Gilbert Group, LLC for their work on a public construction project for the City of Union, they filed suit, asserting the City failed to comply with the statutory bond requirements pertaining to contractors working with subcontractors on public projects found in the SPPA. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals decision, and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Furthermore, the Court clarified "Sloan I" and held that a governmental entity may be liable to a subcontractor only for breach of contract for failing to comply with the SPPA bonding requirements.View "Shirley's Iron Works v. City of Union" on Justia Law

Woodard & Curran, Inc. ("W&C") sued the City of Baldwin seeking damages on claims of breach of contract and quantum meruit. After a trial, a jury awarded W&C $203,000 in a general verdict that did not specify the basis for the damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that quantum meruit was an available remedy against a municipality when the claim is based on a municipal contract that is ultra vires; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the jury was properly allowed to consider the breach of contract claim based on an agreement the parties entered in May 2009. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in both respects, and therefore reversed its judgment. View "City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a protracted contract dispute arising out of the construction of Meridian’s new City Hall. The City brought suit against the project’s construction manager, Petra, Inc., alleging that Petra breached the parties’ agreement in a number of ways. The City further claimed that Petra was not entitled to any additional fees for its work. Petra counterclaimed, seeking an equitable adjustment of its construction manager fee. After trial, the district court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, ruling against the City on all but one of its claims and awarding Petra an additional fee for its services. The court awarded Petra $595,896.17 in costs and $1,275,416.50 in attorney fees, but stayed enforcement of the judgment pending appeal. The City appealed. Finding no error in the district court's judgment in favor of Petra, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Meridian v. PETRA Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, the legislature enacted legislation to establish the Idaho Education Network (IEN), which was to be a high-bandwidth telecommunications distribution system for distance learning in every public school in the state. Syringa Networks, LLC (Syringa), an Idaho telecommunications company, entered into a “teaming agreement” with ENA Services, LLC (ENA). Pursuant to their agreement, ENA submitted a proposal in response to a request-for-proposals (RFP) with the Department of Administration, although the cover letter stated that both ENA and Syringa were responding jointly to the proposal. Qwest Communications Company, LLC, and Verizon Business Network Services, Inc., also submitted responsive proposals. The proposals were then scored based upon specific criteria; the ENA and Qwest proposals received the highest scores. The Department issued a letter of intent to award contracts to Qwest and ENA. One month later, it issued amendments to the two purchase orders to alter the scope of work that each would perform. Qwest became "the general contractor for all IEN technical network services" (providing the “backbone”) and ENA became "the Service Provider." The effect of these amendments was to make Qwest the exclusive provider of the backbone, which was what Syringa intended to provide as a subcontractor of ENA. Syringa filed this lawsuit against the Department, its director, the chief technology officer, ENA and Qwest. The district court ultimately dismissed Syringa’s lawsuit against all of the Defendants on their respective motions for summary judgment. Syringa then appealed the grants of summary judgment, and the State Defendants cross-appealed the refusal to award them attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment dismissing all counts of the complaint except count three seeking to set aside the State's contract with Qwest on the ground that it was awarded in violation of the applicable statutes. Furthermore, the Court reversed Qwest’s award of attorney fees against Syringa. We remand to the trial court the determination of whether any of the State Defendants were entitled to an award of attorney fees against Syringa for proceedings in the district court. The Court awarded costs and attorney fees on appeal to ENA. Because the State Defendants and Syringa both prevailed only in part on appeal, the Court did not award them either costs or attorney fees on appeal.View "Syringa Networks v. Idaho Dept of Admin" on Justia Law

In 1969, the Cities of Atlanta and College Park entered into an agreement for purposes of expanding Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. One of the provisions of the granted Atlanta the exclusive right to collect and levy occupation taxes from businesses located at the Airport that were within the city limits of College Park. In 2007, after commissioning a study for the purpose of reassessing this relationship, College Park informed Atlanta and Airport businesses that it would no longer honor the 1969 Agreement and that it would seek to collect occupation taxes from the Airport businesses including Atlanta's proprietary business operations. Atlanta filed a declaratory action in seeking a judgment that the 1969 Agreement controlled the collection of occupation taxes from businesses operating at the Airport within College Park. Both Atlanta and College Park moved for partial summary judgment, and, in ruling on the cross motions, the trial court found that Atlanta and College Park's 1969 Agreement was unenforceable. The trial court further ruled that OCGA 48-13-13 (5), which prohibited local governments from levying an occupation tax on any "local authority," precluded College Park from levying an occupation tax on Atlanta's proprietary operations because Atlanta met the definition of a "local authority" under the statute. Both parties appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment invalidating the 1969 Agreement, but reversed the trial court's finding that the term "local authority" as used in OCGA 48-13-13 (5) included smunicipalities. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals was correct in its determination that the City of Atlanta was not a "local authority" as that term is used in the statute.View "City of Atlanta v. City of College Park" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the "contours" of the Board of Claims' exclusive jurisdiction pertaining to procurement litigation against state agencies. Specifically, the Court was asked to determine whether such jurisdiction foreclosed original-jurisdiction proceedings in Commonwealth Court, challenging an Department of General Services' (DGS) cancellation of a request for proposals and request for declaratory and injunctive relief. The matter arose from a 2010 DGS request for proposals for the design, development, implementation, and maintenance of a computer control system to monitor slot machines at gaming venues across the Commonwealth. The plan was to replace an existing system which had been provided by Intervenor-Appellant, GTECH Corporation. GTECH and Appellee Scientific Games International, Inc. (SGI), each submitted proposals, and DGS selected SGI for the award and proceeded with contract negotiations. GTECH was informed that the contract had been awarded to SGI and submitted a protest. Two months later, DGS’s Deputy Secretary for Administration issued a final determination denying GTECH’s protest in material part, with prejudice. GTECH appealed the determination and requested, among other things, that the request for proposals be cancelled. Subsequently, DGS announced that it was canceling the request for proposals and sent a letter to SGI indicating "with little elaboration" that the cancelation was in the best interests of the Commonwealth. Subsequently, SGI commenced an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Departments of Revenue and General Services in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction and petitioned for a preliminary injunction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that contractors, bidders, and offerors have limited recourse and remedies: "[r]elative to controversies in matters arising from procurement contracts with Commonwealth agencies, the Board of Claims retains exclusive jurisdiction (subject to all jurisdictional prerequisites), which is not to be supplanted by a court of law through an exercise of original jurisdiction. As to challenges to cancellations of solicitations asserted under Section 521 of the Procurement Code, the Legislature did not implement any waiver of sovereign immunity and afforded no remedy to aggrieved bidders and offerors which have not yet entered into an executed contract with a Commonwealth agency."View "Scientific Games Int'l v. GTech Corp." on Justia Law

The Searcy County Counsel for Ethical Government (SCCEG) filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Johnny Hinchey, a Searcy County Judge, neglected his duties of office when he failed to sell and convey a county-owned gravel crusher pursuant to the terms of Ark. Code Ann. 14-16-105. Judge Hinchey answered by asserting that the crusher had been determined to have no value to the County and was sold in accordance with the procedures of Ark. Code Ann. 14-16-106(c). The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Judge Hinchey. SCCEG appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in finding that section 14-16-106(c) was the relevant and applicable section to the sale of the crusher because, it contended, the crusher was not determined to be junk or scrap such that the statute would apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the gravel crusher was properly determined to be junk under section 14-16-106(c); and (2) the provisions of section 14-16-105 for sales of county property do not also apply to sales or disposal of surplus property under section 14-16-106.View "Searcy County Counsel for Ethical Gov't v. Hinchey" on Justia Law