Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from a written agreement between the City of Rutland and the Vermont Swim Association (VSA) that granted VSA the right to host its annual swim meet at a facility in a city park. VSA appealed the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the City. Because the plain language of the parties' contract did not require VSA to pay attorney's fees incurred by the City in pursuing either indemnity from VSA or other third-party actions, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Southwick v. City of Rutland" on Justia Law

In 2001, Plaintiff Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. and Defendants the Kootenai County Sheriff and Board of Commissioners entered into a settlement agreement setting forth procedures for how inmates at the county jail would be informed of and obtain bail bonds. Allied brought suit alleging several claims including breach of the settlement agreement. The district court dismissed Allied's claims. Principal among them was Allied's contention that the Sheriff wrongfully diverted Allied's potential customers away from Allied, toward credit card companies, with the intent to harm Allied's business. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Allied ran afoul of the technical pleading requirements of the legal authorities it used to support its claims. As such, the Court held that the district court properly dismissed Allied's claims against Defendants.View "Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County of Kootenai" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from an order granting summary judgment to defendant for the alleged breach of an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) entered into by the parties for the distribution of funds generated by a special sales tax instituted pursuant to the Homestead Option Sales and Use Tax Act (HOST), OCGA 48-8-100 et seq. At issue was whether the IGA was unconstitutional as violative of the Intergovernmental Contracts Clause of the Georgia Constitution, 1983 Ga. Const., Art. IX, Sec. III, Par. I(a). The court held that the IGA was not a valid intergovernmental contract where the IGA was neither a contract for services or one for the use of facilities, but a revenue-sharing contract. Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted to defendant.View "City of Decatur v. Dekalb County" on Justia Law

Twenty three former tribal employees sued the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma for breach of employment contracts. The contracts contained a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Tribal law requires that waiver of sovereign immunity must be consented to by the Business Committee of the Tribe by resolution. The trial judge, on motion for reconsideration, granted the Tribe's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. On appeal, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the Tribe expressly and unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity with respect to Plaintiffs' employment contracts. Upon review of the contracts and the applicable tribal resolutions and legal standards, the Supreme Court held that waiver of sovereign immunity was neither expressed nor consented to in the Business Committee's resolutions that authorized the Chief to sign the employment contracts. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.View "Dilliner v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma " on Justia Law

In a 1905 water exchange agreement, Big Ditch Irrigation Company conveyed its Big Cottonwood Creek water right to the Salt Lake City Corporation in exchange for the City's commitment to supply Big Ditch with a specified quantity of irrigation-quality water from City sources. Concerned that Big Ditch was infringing upon the City's water rights, the City initiated this case against Big Ditch and four Big Ditch shareholders in district court. The City sought declaratory judgment on several issues. Big Ditch and the shareholders counterclaimed. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on most major issues. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court properly dismissed the defendants' counterclaims and correctly concluded that the City holds title to the water rights conveyed in the agreement. The Court held, however, that the district court erred in (1) determining that Big Ditch did not have a right to file change applications; (2) determining that the parties had modified the agreement or, alternatively, that Big Ditch was estopped from enforcing its right to the amount of water specified in the agreement; and (3) refusing to dismiss the City's claims against the shareholders.View "Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co." on Justia Law

In 2003, the Division of Highways (DOH) let out a public highway construction contract to Nicewonder Contracting. The Affiliated Construction Trades Foundation (ACT) filed a declaratory judgment action against the DOH and Nicewonder, alleging that the construction contract violated state and federal law because the DOH did not seek public bids for the project and there was no prevailing wage clause in the contract. Upon remand from the district court, the circuit court granted Nicewonder's motion for summary judgment, finding ACT lacked standing. The Supreme court reversed, holding that the appropriate standard to determine if an organization has representative standing to sue on behalf of its members is when the organization proves that (1) at least one of its members would have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. The Court found that ACT met all three prongs and thus had representative standing to seek the declarations contained in its petition. View "Affiliated Constr. Trades v. W. Va. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

The State Ethics Commission (Commission) appealed from an order of the Commonwealth Court that reversed the Commission's findings that Appellee Kenneth Kistler had violated two provisions of the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act (Act). Appellee was a member of the Carbon-Lehigh Intermediate Unit's (CLIU) board of directors from 1998 to 2002. As chairman of the building committee, Appellee was charged with pursuing the board's interests in various construction projects. Appellee also owned two building supply businesses. In late 1999, the board explored the possibility of constructing a garage in which to house its buses. The project's architect contacted Appellee as possible supplier for the project. Subsequently, Appellee resigned from his position with CLIU as a possible conflict-of-interest. At a board meeting, the solicitor for the CLIU opined that Appellee could "properly participate" in construction of the garage, but that he should abstain from any votes relating to that project. More projects were planned, and Appellee's businesses were again considered as suppliers. By this time, Appellee had withdrawn completely from participation with the CLIU's building committee. In 2004, the Commission notified Appellee that he was being investigated for possible violations of the Ethics Act. The Commission thereafter concluded that Appellee unintentionally violated the Act three times. The Commonwealth Court reversed the Commission’s decision. In its interpretation of the Ethics Act, the court found no evidence that Appellee's participation in the building committee's discussions lead to the committee's choosing his private businesses for its building projects. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court correctly interpreted the Ethics Act and affirmed its decision.View "Kistler v. State Ethics Comm'n" on Justia Law

LTTS Charter School ("LTTS") was an open-enrollment school that retained C2 Construction, Inc. ("C2") to build school facilities at a site Universal Academy had leased. C2 filed a breach of contract suit and Universal Academy filed a plea to the jurisdiction claiming immunity from suit. The trial court denied the plea and Universal Academy brought an interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)(8) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. In the court of appeals, C2 moved to dismiss the interlocutory appeal, arguing that Universal Academy was note entitled to one because it was not a governmental unit under the Torts Claims Act ("Act"), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 101.001(3)(D). At issue was whether an open-enrollment charter school was a governmental unit as defined by Section 101.001(3)(D) and thus, able to take an interlocutory appeal from a trial court's denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. The court held that open-enrollment charter schools were governmental units for the Act purposes because the Act defined government unit broadly to include any other institution, agency, or organ of government derived from state law; the Education Code defined open-enrollment charters schools as part of the public school system, which were created in accordance with the laws of the state, subject to state laws and rules governing public schools and, together with governmental traditional public schools, have the primary responsibility for implementing the state's system of public education; and the Legislature considered open-enrollment charter schools to be governmental entities under a host of other laws outside the Education Code. Accordingly, because Universal Academy was a governmental unit under the Act, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear its interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)(8).View "LTTS Charter School, Inc. v. C2 Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant filed a petition, pursuant to CPLR article 78, to set aside the award of a contract to a third party and to direct the Town of Southeast to award the contract to appellant. At issue was whether the Town Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously and in violation of law in awarding the public bidding contract to a bidder other than the lowest responsible bidder. The court held that General Municipal Law 103 and Town Law 122 precluded a town, in an open bidding process, from choosing a higher bid merely because it subjectively believed that a higher bid was preferable and more responsible than a lower bidder based on criteria not set forth in the bidding proposal. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the matter remitted for further proceedings.View "In the Matter of AAA Carting and Rubbish Removal, Inc. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Richard Loweke was an employee of an electrical subcontractor. Defendant Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Company was also a subcontractor. Both parties were hired for work on a construction project at the Detroit Metro Airport. Plaintiff was injured at the site when several cement boards fell on him. Defendant's employees placed the boards against the wall. Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligence. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that it owed Plaintiff no duty that was "separate and distinct" from the contractual duties it owed to the general contractor. The trial court granted Defendant's motion, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued that Defendant had a common-law duty to avoid physical harm to others from its own actions. Upon consideration of the parties' briefs and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Court found that the trial and appeals courts misinterpreted Michigan law with respect to "duty." The Court held that the assumption of contractual obligations does not limit the common law tort duties owed to others in the performance of the contract. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Loweke v. Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition, Co., LLC" on Justia Law