Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Michael Maestas, Thomas May, Juanito Marquez and Jahmaal Gregory were all officers in a private security force that protects Los Alamos National Laboratory. They contended that their employer, Day & Zimmerman, LLC and SOC, LLC, (collectively, SOC) improperly classified them as exempt employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA). The district court found that Plaintiffs were exempt executive employees and granted summary judgment to SOC. The parties disagreed over which of Plaintiffs' job duties was "primary." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that such a dispute presented a question of fact rather than an issue of law. Furthermore, the Court held that an employee who supervises subordinates while also conducting front-line law enforcement work performs a non-managerial task. Because there remained a genuine dispute as to whether three of the Plaintiffs had this task as their primary duty, summary judgment was proper only against Plaintiff Thomas May and improper as to the others. Accordingly, the Court partly reversed, partly affirmed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Maestas v. Day & Zimmerman, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Dawn Bunch brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that Defendant Independent School District No. I-050 of Osage County (Prue Public Schools) violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. She appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the District in which the court concluded Plaintiff had no protected property interest in her employment and failed to show her speech was a motivating factor for her termination. An internal investigation found that Plaintiff “either [. . .] wasn’t properly trained or she was not doing her job as required.” The School Board in an open session, but without holding a due-process hearing, terminated Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff's complaint claimed a property interest in her employment contract entitled her to a hearing before her employment was terminated. She also alleged the termination was in retaliation for her exercise of free speech rights because, earlier that fall, she had signed a state-court petition calling for a grand jury investigation into the activities of Board members, and she had complained to friends and family about the Board. Upon review of the trial court's record and the applicable authority, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff's proffered evidence of discrimination did not amount to the requisite proof that her civil and constitutional rights were violated. The Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgement in favor of the District. View "Bunch v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. I-050 of Osage Cty." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Louanne Cypert brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and several anti-discrimination statutes alleging that Defendant Independent School District No. I-050 of Osage County's (Prue Public Schools) failure to renew her employment contract violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed the District discriminated against her because of her age. The district court granted the District summary judgment, finding that Plaintiff's non-renewal hearing satisfied her Fourteenth Amendment claim to due process, and that she failed to show her speech was the motivating factor that led to the District's non-renewal, and that she failed to show the District's non-renewal resulted from discrimination. In the fall of 2008, the local School Board became concerned about the District’s finances. It initiated an investigation and began terminating employment contracts. Plaintiff's contract was one of the terminated contracts. On appeal, Plaintiff proffered evidence of the Board's keeping younger, lesser-qualified personnel on staff at the time of her termination. Upon review of the trial court's record and the applicable authority, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff's proffered evidence of discrimination did not amount to the requisite proof that her civil and constitutional rights were violated. The Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgement in favor of the District. View "Cypert v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. I-050 of Osage Cty." on Justia Law

In 1993, the FAA decided to privatize all Level I air traffic control towers. About 1500 controllers were forced to leave the field, be trained to operate higher level towers, or secure employment with the private contractors. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 prohibits the federal government from performing an activity that could be performed for less cost by the private sector. Before privatizing a function, an agency must determine whether that function is inherently governmental or commercial. A governmental function must be performed by government employees. The district court first dismissed, but, on remand, instructed the FAA to undergo Circular A-76 analysis. The FAA continued to privatize towers and controllers again brought suit. The district court again remanded to the FAA for analysis, but refused to terminate private contracts already in place. The court later granted the FAA partial summary judgment, based on a 2003 amendment to 49 U.S.C. 47124, indicating that work in Level I towers is not an inherently governmental function, then dismissed remaining claims for lack of standing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Every tower privatized in the 1993 program fit within the section 47124(b)(3) mandate. View "Nat'l Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n v. Sec'y of the Dep't. of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, employed by a company contracted to do grounds maintenance, was injured while mowing grass at an Army base. A deteriorating steam pipe fell, striking him in the head. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States, reasoning that under the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Law, the United States was an up-the-ladder contractor, or statutory employer, so that plaintiff's only remedy was the workers' compensation benefits he received from his direct employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the U.S. government is a "person" entitled to the up-the-ladder defense and that the waiver of immunity under the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, provides for claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual. The government "secured the payment of compensation" by hiring a contractor and, therefore, cannot be treated as an employer that did not secure benefits. The work performed by plaintiff was a "regular and recurrent" part of work at the facility and the government was entitled to contractor immunity. View "Himes v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was employed as the City of McDonough's ("city") chief building inspector, brought suit against the city when the city refused to pay him severance under an employment agreement contract. At issue was whether the contract was binding to a successor municipal council in violation of OCGA 36-30-3(a). The court held that the contract was ultra vires and void because the contract was renewed automatically and the severance package required the city to pay plaintiff his salary and benefits for an entire year after the year in which the contract was terminated.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's refusal to enforce a settlement agreement between plaintiff and his former employer, a government contractor, after plaintiff brought an action against his employer under the False Claims Act. At issue was whether the district court erred by not enforcing the settlement agreement, whether the district court made various errors during trial entitling plaintiff to a new trial, and whether the district court erred by awarding attorneys' fees to the employer. The court held that the district court properly denied plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement agreement where the agreement died when the government rejected it and was not revived by a subsequent agreement between plaintiff and the government. The court also held that plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial where the district court committed no reversible error during trial The court further held that the district court erred in awarding attorneys' fees to the employer where plaintiff's claims were not clearly frivolous.