Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

AFSCME represents approximately 40,000 state employees working in executive agencies. In 2008, AFSCME and the state negotiated a collective bargaining agreement effective through June 2012, providing for a general wage increase on January 1, 2009, and thereafter on every July 1 and January 1. Individual increases varied, but totaled 15.25%. A 4% increase was scheduled for July 1, 2011. In 2010, facing declining state revenues and the potential layoff of 2,500 state employees, AFSCME and the state agreed to $300 million in cost savings, including deferring the July 2011 increase; a 2% increase would be implemented on July 1, 2011, with the remaining 2% to be implemented on February 1, 2012. After adoption of the fiscal 2012 budget, the Department of Central Management Services notified agencies and labor relations administrators that, due to insufficient appropriations, the wage increase could not be implemented in 14 agencies. In arbitration, the state argued that the Public Labor Relations Act mandates that executive branch expenditures under a CBA are contingent on corresponding appropriations by the General Assembly, that this provision restates the mandate of the Illinois Constitution appropriations clause, and that it was incorporated into the CBA by the statement that “the provisions of this contract cannot supersede law.” The arbitrator issued an award in favor of AFSCME. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and vacated the award, holding that the arbitration award violates Illinois public policy, as reflected in the appropriations clause and the Public Labor Relations Act. View "Illinois v. Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, Council 31" on Justia Law

Agent Parkinson, of the FBI’s Sacramento field office, was the leader of a special operations group, tasked with relocating a previously compromised undercover facility. In 2006, the FBI leased a facility from Rodda, who agreed to contribute $70,000 to “construction, construction documents, permits and fees. Parkinson negotiated the lease on behalf of the FBI, and managed the tenant improvement funds. In 2008, during the work, Parkinson made whistleblower-eligible disclosures, implicating two pilots involved with the group in misconduct. Parkinson’s supervisor issued Parkinson a low-performance rating, removed him as group leader, and reassigned him. Believing this to be retaliation, Parkinson sent a letter to Senator Grassley, who forwarded Parkinson’s allegations to the Department of Justice’s Office of the Investigator General (OIG) for investigation. The OIG sent the FBI its report. Ultimately, the Merit Systems Protection Board upheld Parkinson’s termination for lack of candor under oath and obstruction of process of the Office of Professional Responsibility. The Federal Circuit reversed in part and remanded. The court sustained the obstruction charge and dismissal of Parkinson’s affirmative defense of violations of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, but found the lack of candor charge unsupported by substantial evidence and that the Board improperly precluded Parkinson from raising an affirmative defense of whistleblower retaliation. View "Parkinson v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

Reddick was employed as an FDIC “Investigation Specialist” by an initial two-year term appointment, set to expire in September 2012. In April 2012, the FDIC offered him an extension of the initial term for an additional two years. The offer stated that the “extended employment” would be “effective [September], 2012” and that the “extended appointment is subject to the conditions of employment [included in the initial appointment offer] and subject to your continued successful performance.” Reddick accepted the offer days after receipt. The FDIC revoked the extension offer in August 2012. Reddick filed a grievance on the theory that the revocation of the offer was an adverse action under 5 U.S.C. 7512 and that he was entitled to procedural protections that the FDIC did not provide him. The matter was referred to arbitration under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator found the extension offer to be conditioned on Reddick’s “satisfactory work performance” and that the revocation was supported by sufficient justification. The Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal. The extension offer was still revocable by the FDIC even after acceptance by Reddick; it never matured into an effective extension, so Reddick was not “removed.” View "Reddick v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Woodward employees, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, alleging that Woodward falsely certified helicopter engine parts that it sold to the government. Plaintiffs had complained that the sensors at issue did not meet quality standards and had refused to work on the order. Following an investigation, a Defense Contract Management Agency Technical Specialist concluded that there was “nothing either incorrect or wrong with the procedures, assembly, or testing of the sensors.” The government continues to order, pay for, and use Woodward’s sensor The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Woodward, agreeing that even if Woodward made false statements to the government, no reasonable jury could find that it made the statements knowingly or that the statements were material. View "Marshall v. Woodward, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a putative class of electrical workers, claimed that their respective employers, in collusion with Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority (MPEA, which used electricians supplied by the employers) wrongfully terminated them, in violation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and federal labor law and circumvented the CBA-mandated hiring process and that their union, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, failed to adequately represent them in the CBA-mandated grievance process. The district court denied motions to dismiss four counts, but dismissed a declaratory judgment motion against MPEA and two employers, and the claim of state law tortious interference with contracts against MPEA. The district court held that, as a political subdivision, MPEA is not an “employer” under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 185. Plaintiffs appealed only the dismissal of the tortious interference claim against MPEA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that jurisdiction was created by the need to interpret the CBA. With respect to political subdivisions, section 301 preempts not only claims “founded directly” on the collective bargaining agreement, but also state law claims that indirectly implicate a collective bargaining agreement. View "Healy v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth." on Justia Law

The Defense Contract Management Agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) employed Vassallo as a computer engineer in 2012. That summer, it announced a vacancy for the position of Lead Interdisciplinary Engineer, stating that only certain individuals could apply: “[c]urrent [DCMA]” employees or “[c]urrent [DOD] [e]mployee[s] with the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics . . . [w]orkforce who are outside of the Military Components.” Vassallo, a veteran, applied, but DCMA rejected his application. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) determined that DOD was not required to afford him veterans employment preferences under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA), 112 Stat. 3182. OPM defines the word “agency” in 5 U.S.C. 3304(f)(1) to mean “Executive agency” as defined in 5 U.S.C. 105 and concluded that DCMA was not required to give Vassallo an opportunity to compete under 5 U.S.C. 3304(f)(1) because the DOD— the agency making the announcement—did not accept applications from outside its own workforce. Vassallo sought corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board, which concluded that OPM’s regulation permissibly fills a gap in the governing statute. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the OPM regulation contradicts the plain terms of the statute and unreasonably undermines the purpose of the VEOA. View "Vassallo v. Dept. of Defense" on Justia Law

Former employees filed a qui tam False Claims suit against Heritage College, a for-profit school, alleging it fraudulently induced the Department of Education (DOE) to provide funds by falsely promising to keep accurate student records as required by 20 U.S.C. 1094(a)(3). They claimed that Heritage altered grade and attendance records from 2006 to 2012 to ensure students made satisfactory progress and to avoid refunds, thereby maximizing Title IV funds. Around 97% of Heritage students receive Title IV aid, accounting for about 90% of gross tuition. From 2009 to 2012, the DOE disbursed $32,817,727 to Heritage. Each relator also alleged retaliation under the FCA and wrongful discharge under state law. For purposes of summary judgment, Heritage did not dispute that it altered records. The district court granted summary judgment to Heritage, finding that any false statements were not material to government funding decisions. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the FCA claim, but affirmed the employment claims. Heritage could not have executed the participation agreement without stating it would maintain adequate records and without the agreement Heritage could not have received any Title IV funds. Heritage's actions with respect to the plaintiffs were not retaliatory. View "Miller v. Weston Educ., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security issued a final decision removing Garcia from the U.S. Border Patrol for misconduct. Garcia received notice the same day. Under 5 U.S.C. 7121(e)(1), Garcia had the option to appeal his removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) or to invoke arbitration, under his union’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Article 34 of the CBA states that in cases involving adverse actions, such as removal, requests for arbitration “must be filed . . . not later than thirty (30) calendar days after the effective date of the action.” His union mailed a letter to the Agency requesting arbitration 28 days after the effective date of Garcia’s removal. The Agency did not receive this request until seven days later. After an arbitrator was appointed, the Agency moved to dismiss. The Arbitrator found the plain meaning of “filed” in the CBA requires actual receipt of the request for arbitration, relying on the definition of “file” used in federal court proceedings. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the request for arbitration need only be mailed within the 30-day time period. View "Garcia v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

In 2010, while Kerner was an Evidence Custodian, GS-05, with the Department’s Fish and Wildlife Service, he applied for two vacancies: Wildlife Inspector, GS-09/11, and Wildlife Inspector, GS-11/11. Both positions were merit-promotion vacancies. Each required federal employee applicants to meet a time-in-grade requirement. A federal civil service applicant must have completed at least 52 weeks of experience equivalent to GS-07 to be qualified for the GS- 09 position, and at least 52 weeks of experience equivalent to GS-09 to be qualified for the GS-11 position. The vacancies also required one year of specialized experience in the federal civil service equivalent to GS-07 or GS-09, respectively. Kerner had no federal civil service experience at the GS-07 or GS-09 level and, therefore, did not meet the time-in-grade requirements. The Department determined that he did not qualify for either vacancy. Kerner then filed a Veterans Employment Opportunity Act claim with the Department of Labor, alleging that the Department violated his VEOA rights. The Department of Labor and Merit Systems Protection Board rejected the claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The provisions cited by Kerner only apply to preference-eligible veterans not already employed in federal civil service, not to current federal employees seeking merit promotions. View "Kerner v. Dep't of the Interior" on Justia Law

O’Gorman worked for Chicago from 1996-2007, as a carpenter and later as a General Foreman, placing city orders with Arrow Lumber, owned by Beal. After an investigation following reports from an Arrow employee, O’Gorman was arrested and charged with theft of city property and violations of City Personnel Rules. The city also pursued a civil case under the Illinois Whistleblower Act and the Chicago False Claims Act, which remains pending. The city issued a press release announcing the charges that he had diverted $50,000 in goods for his own use and tried to cover the theft. Beal pled guilty. O’Gorman’s complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that the investigation improperly focused on O’Gorman and protected Arrow and Beal for political reasons and that Beal covered up Arrow’s fraud; that the Human Resources Director informed a union representative that if O’Gorman did not resign he would be fired and that any hearing would be a sham; and that supervisors told him that if he resigned, he would be reinstated once he was acquitted. O’Gorman resigned, was acquitted of all criminal charges, and unsuccessfully requested reinstatement. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the termination claims untimely and that there is no property interest in rehiring. View "O'Gorman v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law