Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
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The Supreme Judicial Court held that the Massachusetts Legislature, through the provisions of St. 2009, ch. 61, 12(a), 12(c), 15, or Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, 3, taken separately or together, authorize the Bristol County Sheriff's Office to raise revenues for the Office of the Sheriff through inmate calling service contracts.At issue was whether St. 2009 ch. 61 section 12(a), an act transferring county sheriffs to the Commonwealth, granted authority to the Bristol County Sheriff's Office to raise revenues for his office through an inmate calling service contract with a third-party vendor. The Supreme Judicial Court answered the certified question in the positive, holding that the act, independently and buttressed by sections 12(c) and 15, authorized the Bristol County sheriff's office to collect and retain revenue from inmate calling service contracts in the unmodified special act. View "Pearson v. Sheriff of Bristol County" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the superior court denying this action in the nature of mandamus as well as certiorari review of the decision of the city of Salem to reject Mederi, Inc.'s application to enter into a host community (HCA) agreement, holding that there was no error.When Mederi applied for an HCA with the city to open a retail marijuana establishment in Salem it was one of eight applications vying for four available spots. The city of Salem denied Merderi's application. Merderi then filed a complaint seeking relief in the nature of mandamus as well as certiorari review of the city's decision, claiming that by rejecting it as an HCA partner, the city effectively precluded Mederi from being considered for a license to sell marijuana. A superior court judge dismissed the mandamus claim and granted judgment on the pleadings on the remaining certiorari claim. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the city made a rational choice to reject Mederi's application in favor of other prospective retail marijuana establishments; and (2) the city's application process was not contrary to law. View "Mederi, Inc. v. Salem" on Justia Law

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In this appeal arising from a construction contract dispute, the Supreme Court held (1) complete and strict performance is required for all construction contract terms relating to the design and construction itself, but ordinary contract principles, including the traditional Massachusetts materiality rule, apply to breaches of other provisions, such as the one at issue in this case governing payment certifications; and (2) as recovery sought under a theory of quantum meruit, good faith applies to the contract as a whole, and the intentional commission of breaches of individual contract provisions must be considered in the overall context.A superior court judge in this case concluded that Plaintiff was barred from seeking recovery on the contract or under quantum meruit because it intentionally filed false certifications of timely payments to subcontractors. It also concluded that Defendant could not maintain a fraud action against Plaintiff, in which it sought damages in addition to a payment Defendant had already withheld, because any recovery would be duplicative. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) Plaintiff’s false certifications and intentional subcontractor payment delays constitute a material breach of the contract and precluded recovery for breach of contract; (2) disputed material facts precluded summary judgment on the quantum meruit claim; and (3) the dismissal of Defendant’s fraud claim against Plaintiff was error. View "G4S Technology LLC v. Massachusetts Technology Park Corp." on Justia Law

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The Department of Mental Health (DMH) submitted a proposal to the Auditor of the Commonwealth that would privatize certain of its state-run mental health services. The Auditor issued a written decision approving the proposed privatization contract, concluding that the privatization proposal met the requirements of the Pacheco Law. The Pacheco Law establishes procedures that agencies must follow when beginning the bidding process for an entering into a privatization contract. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Auditor’s decision, holding that the Auditor did not abuse her discretion in determining that DMH’s privatization proposal met the requirements of the Pacheco Law. View "Service Employees International Union, Local 509 v. Auditor of the Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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Service Employees International Union, Local 509 (Union) brought a declaratory judgment action against the Department of Mental Health (DMH) maintaining that certain contracts DMH made with private vendors were “privatization contracts” subject to the requirements of the Pacheco Law. The Union sought a declaration invalidating the contracts because DMH did not comply with the statutory prerequisites of the Pacheco Law. The case was dismissed. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case. On remand, DMH again successfully moved to dismiss the Union’s declaratory judgment action on the basis that it was moot because the initial contracts had expired and the remaining extant renewal contracts were immune from challenge by virtue of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 7, 53. The Union appealed, asserting that because the non-compliant initial contracts were invalid under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 7, 54, so too were any renewal contracts made pursuant to them. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of dismissal, holding that the protection afforded renewal contracts by section 53 is not extended to those renewal contracts made pursuant to timely challenged and subsequently invalidated privatization contracts under section 54. View "Service Employees International Union, Local 509 v. Department of Mental Health" on Justia Law