Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

Papp alleged that his late wife suffered secondary “take home” asbestos exposure while washing the work clothes of her first husband, Keck. Keck had several jobs that exposed him to asbestos. Papp sued multiple companies in New Jersey. In a deposition, he indicated that the landing gear Keck sandblasted was for a C-47 military cargo plane, built by Boeing’s predecessor. Boeing removed the case, citing the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Boeing asserted that it was entitled to government contractor immunity because the C-47 was produced for, and under the specific supervision of, the U.S. military and that the supervision extended to labels and warnings for all parts of the aircraft, including those parts laden with the asbestos to which Keck would later be exposed. The district court remanded, reasoning that Boeing, as a contractor and not a federal officer, had a “special burden” to demonstrate “that a federal officer or agency directly prohibited Boeing from issuing, or otherwise providing, warnings as to the risks associated with exposure to asbestos contained in products on which third-parties … worked or otherwise provided services.” The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the statute extends to contractors who possess a colorable federal defense and that Boeing made a sufficient showing of such a defense. View "Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales Co Inc" on Justia Law

Hosea O. Weaver & Sons, Inc. appealed a jury verdict in favor of Ira Balch, personal representative of the Estate of Danny Balch, and Melvin Balch, personal representative of the estates of Bernard Balch and Armie Balch. The matter stemmed from a road-resurfacing project conducted by the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT). ALDOT hired Weaver to complete the project. The Balches were traveling on the portion of the road resurfaced by Weaver when the vehicle they were riding in was hit head-on by a tractor-trailer. Their personal representatives filed wrongful-death actions against Weaver and others, alleging that Weaver negligently performed the resurfacing project, and that negligent performance caused the deaths of the Balches. The trial court denied Weaver's prejudgment motions, and the jury returned a verdict in the estates' favor. Weaver appealed the denial of its postjudgment motion, and alleged multiple errors at trial in its argument to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Weaver owed no duty to the decedents, and therefore was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court reversed the trial court and entered a judgment in favor of Weaver.View "Hosea O. Weaver & Sons, Inc. v. Balch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Cedroni Associates, Inc. was the lowest bidder on a public contract. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Plaintiff had a valid business expectancy for the purpose of sustaining a claim of tortious interference with business expectancy. The trial court held that Plaintiff did not have such an expectancy, but a divided appellate court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed in that regard. Because the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and the Court of Appeals dissent that Plaintiff did not have a valid business expectancy, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the trial court's order granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment.View "Cedroni Associates, Inc. v. Tomblinson, Harburn Associates, Architects & Planners, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a claim for damages relating to a drilling contract Petitioner Elcon Construction and Respondent Eastern Washington University. Elcon alleged tort and contract claims. The contract claims were resolved by arbitration. In dismissing the tort claims, the trial court applied the independent duty rule formerly known as the "economic loss rule," which the Court of Appeals similarly applied in affirming. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court and Court of Appeals misapplied the independent duty doctrine to bar Elcon's tort claims in this case. The Court found Elcon's claims failed factually. Viewing the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Elcon, no genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to Elcon's fraud in the inducement or tortious interference claims. The Court affirmed on different grounds reached by the trial and appeals courts.View "Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ." on Justia Law

In this appeal the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the parties' indemnity agreement clearly and unequivocally indemnified the Snohomish County Public Transportation Benefit Area Corporation (doing business as Community Transit) for losses resulting from its own negligence. Upon review, the Court concluded that the language of the agreement, and in particular language providing that indemnity would not be triggered if losses resulted from the sole negligence of Community Transit, clearly and unequivocally evidenced the parties' intent that the indemnitor, FirstGroup America, Inc. (doing business as First Transit) indemnify Community Transit for losses that resulted from Community Transit's own negligence. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to the contrary and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.View "Snohomish County Pub. Transp. Benefit Area Corp. v. FirstGroup Am., Inc." on Justia Law

LTTS Charter School ("LTTS") was an open-enrollment school that retained C2 Construction, Inc. ("C2") to build school facilities at a site Universal Academy had leased. C2 filed a breach of contract suit and Universal Academy filed a plea to the jurisdiction claiming immunity from suit. The trial court denied the plea and Universal Academy brought an interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)(8) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. In the court of appeals, C2 moved to dismiss the interlocutory appeal, arguing that Universal Academy was note entitled to one because it was not a governmental unit under the Torts Claims Act ("Act"), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 101.001(3)(D). At issue was whether an open-enrollment charter school was a governmental unit as defined by Section 101.001(3)(D) and thus, able to take an interlocutory appeal from a trial court's denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. The court held that open-enrollment charter schools were governmental units for the Act purposes because the Act defined government unit broadly to include any other institution, agency, or organ of government derived from state law; the Education Code defined open-enrollment charters schools as part of the public school system, which were created in accordance with the laws of the state, subject to state laws and rules governing public schools and, together with governmental traditional public schools, have the primary responsibility for implementing the state's system of public education; and the Legislature considered open-enrollment charter schools to be governmental entities under a host of other laws outside the Education Code. Accordingly, because Universal Academy was a governmental unit under the Act, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear its interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)(8).View "LTTS Charter School, Inc. v. C2 Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Richard Loweke was an employee of an electrical subcontractor. Defendant Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Company was also a subcontractor. Both parties were hired for work on a construction project at the Detroit Metro Airport. Plaintiff was injured at the site when several cement boards fell on him. Defendant's employees placed the boards against the wall. Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligence. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that it owed Plaintiff no duty that was "separate and distinct" from the contractual duties it owed to the general contractor. The trial court granted Defendant's motion, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued that Defendant had a common-law duty to avoid physical harm to others from its own actions. Upon consideration of the parties' briefs and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Court found that the trial and appeals courts misinterpreted Michigan law with respect to "duty." The Court held that the assumption of contractual obligations does not limit the common law tort duties owed to others in the performance of the contract. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Loweke v. Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition, Co., LLC" on Justia Law