Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

Four mobile home park owners appealed the dismissal of their suit under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA), 42 U.S.C. 3604, 3617, challenging a city zoning ordinance prohibiting any mobilehome park currently operating as senior housing from converting to all-age housing. The court held that because the FHAA was silent on whether such senior housing zones were permissible and because federal regulations allow for them, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Putnam Family P'ship, et al. v. City of Yucaipa" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute that arose after a 20 year lease program ended in which Polar Star owned 300 units of family housing located on Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska. Polar Star leased the units back to the Air Force but the parties could not agree on the purchase price or the amount of rent payable for an additional year on the lease. The United States first sent notice of a one-year renewal of the lease, then filed a protective eminent domain action to condemn a five-month leasehold in the houses. Polar Star subsequently appealed a number of the district court's rulings. The court held that the district court correctly decided that the government's notice of renewal successfully renewed the Project Lease for one year; the district court's finding that the expiration date of the Ground Lease was the error, and therefore the lease ran for 23 years, was not clearly erroneous; the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the amount of rent due from the Government to Polar Star on the renewal; Polar Star did not file an action in district court, so the only matter before the court was the Government's condemnation action; the district court correctly determined that the condemnation action should be dismissed; Polar Star's entitlement to rent beyond what the Government paid was not asserted on a claim or counterclaim in the district court; and plaintiffs may be entitled to pursue a claim in the Court of Federal Claims. Accordingly, the district court's judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "United States v. Polar Star Alaska Housing Corp, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a concessionaire for a recreation facility at Lake Berryessa, made improvements for a resort, boat ramps, roads, sewage system, retaining walls, water purification plant, and parking. Before its agreement expired, plaintiff and others sued, under the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. 1491(b)(1)-(4)) challenging a plan for soliciting new concessionaire bids, claiming that the federal agency had to require new concessionaires to compensate for facilities. The Court of Federal Claims held that outgoing concessionaires had to remove or abandon the facilities, unless the government required that they remain, in which case concessionaires would receive compensation for selected facilities. The Federal Circuit affirmed. When plaintiff's agreement expired in 2008, it left intact facilities behind, although the government did not request that it do so. Two years later, the government contracted with a new company. Plaintiff claims that the company or the government have used the facilities and filed a complaint, claiming that the government should be found to have retrospectively required their retention. The claims court dismissed based on issue preclusion and that plaintiff had no property interest in the facilities after expiration of the lease. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the government did not "require" that the facilities be left. View "Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2010, the court of claims awarded owners $3,043,051, plus interest, for the temporary taking of a blanket easement over five parcels in the Otay Mesa area of San Diego County, California, limiting the government's liability to the period April, 1999 to October, 2008. The taking was the result of Border Patrol activities outside the boundaries of an easement that had been purchased by the government for those purposes, and included creating new roads, constructing a permanent tented structure, and installing under-ground motion-detecting sensors. The Federal Circuit affirmed the limitation of liability to five parcels and the stated time period, but reversed the calculation of damages. The claims court erred in concluding that the taking was temporary rather than a permanent physical taking. The government stipulated that its easement was "perpetual" and has not removed its equipment. View "Otay Mesa Prop. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a non-profit, member-owned, water company serving rural areas of Ross County, Ohio. To finance its system, plaintiff borrowed nearly $10.6 million from the USDA. The disputed area of the county includes properties served by the city and properties served by plaintiff. Each has objected to the other's extension of new lines to the area. The district court granted plaintiff summary judgment, finding that the company is protected under the Agriculture Act, 7 U.S.C. 1926(b)(2), based on its obligations under the USDA contract, had a legal right to serve the area under a contract with the county, and did not have unclean hands. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Ross Cnty. Water Co., Inc v. City of Chillicothe" on Justia Law

Incentives under the National Housing Act, to encourage private developers to meet the needs of moderate income families, included below-market 40-year mortgages, with an option to prepay after 20 years. Restrictions, for example, on rent increases, were in effect until the mortgage was paid off. The prepayment option gave developers an opportunity to convert to market rate housing. To avoid a shortage of affordable housing, Congress enacted Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act, 101 Stat. 1877 (1988), and Low-Income Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act, 104 Stat. 4249 (1990) under which an owner needed HUD approval to prepay or to go through regulatory hoops. In 1996 Congress restored prepayment rights. Plaintiff was prohibited from prepayment for five years, 10 days. The Court of Federal Claims held that the restriction of prepayment rights constituted a taking but did not constitute a breach of contract, because there was no privity between HUD and plaintiff. The Federal Circuit affirmed on the contract claim, but reversed with respect to temporary taking. The evidence did not demonstrate that plaintiff's investment backed expectations were objectively reasonable in light of industry practice,View "CCA Assocs. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Missoula City Counsel, the City of Missoula, and the Mayor, (collectively "City") and Muth-Hilberry, LLC ("developer") appealed a district court determination that found that the City was arbitrary and capricious in approving a zoning and preliminary plat for a subdivision known as Sonata Park located in Rattlesnake Valley, Montana. At issue was whether neighbors, several parties opposed to the subdivision, and the North Duncan Drive Neighborhood Association, Inc. ("Association") had standing. Also at issue was whether the district court erred in striking affidavits filed by the developer and the City in connection with their motions for summary judgment. Further at issue was whether the 1989 Sunshine Agreement between the City and the developer's predecessor in interest superseded the City's growth policy. Finally at issue was whether the City's decision in Sonata Park was arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful. The court held that the neighbors had standing to sue in their own right and that the Association had associational standing to proceed on behalf of its members. The court also held that any error made by the district court in granting the neighbor's motion to strike the developer's affidavit was harmless. The court further held that the Sunlight Agreement did not supersede the City's growth policy where the Sunlight Agreement could be void ab initio and did not appear to guarantee certain density. The court finally held that substantial compliance was still valid and that a government body must substantially comply with its growth policy in making zoning decisions and that the City's decision to approve Sonata Park was arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful.