Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

Covenant Construction Services, LLC was the prime contractor on a federal construction project for a U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs facility in Iowa City, Iowa. Covenant subcontracted with Calacci Construction Company, Inc. to supply carpentry labor and materials. Calacci had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with two regional unions, requiring it to pay fringe-benefit contributions to the Five Rivers Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund and Education Trust Fund (the Funds). Despite multiple demands, Calacci failed to remit the required contributions.The Funds filed a lawsuit under the Miller Act to collect the unpaid contributions, liquidated damages, interest, costs, and attorneys' fees from Covenant and its surety, North American Specialty Insurance Company. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa granted summary judgment in favor of the Funds, concluding that the Funds had standing to sue and that the Miller Act notice was properly served and timely.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the Funds sufficiently complied with the Miller Act's notice requirements by sending the notice to Covenant's attorney, who confirmed receipt. The court also held that the notice was timely as it was filed within 90 days of the last day of labor on the project. Additionally, the court upheld the award of liquidated damages and attorneys' fees, finding that the CBA obligated Calacci to pay these amounts and that Covenant, as the prime contractor, was liable for the amounts due under the payment bond.The Eighth Circuit concluded that the Funds were entitled to recover the unpaid contributions, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees from Covenant and its surety, affirming the district court's judgment. View "Five Rivers Carpenters v. Covenant Construction Services" on Justia Law

Dakota Energy Power Cooperative, Inc., a member of East River Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., sought to withdraw from East River and to terminate the parties’ long-term power contract so that it could purchase electricity from another source. When East River resisted, Dakota Energy sued for anticipatory breach of contract and sought a declaratory judgment providing that it had a contractual right to withdraw from East River by way of a buyout. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of East River, and Dakota Energy appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under the UCC, the terms of a written contract “may be explained or supplemented” by certain extrinsic evidence, including “usage of trade.” Dakota Energy’s proffered trade usage evidence would effectively add an entirely new provision to the WPC. Moreover, under the UCC, “the express terms of an agreement and any applicable . . . usage of trade must be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other.” Here, the express terms of the WPC—which provide that the agreement will “remain in effect” until December 31, 2075, and which contain no provision allowing for an early buyout—are inconsistent with any trade usage evidence suggesting something to the contrary. Therefore, the court concluded that the WPC unambiguously requires Dakota Energy to purchase all of its electricity from East River until December 31, 2075, and that no provision in the WPC or East River’s Bylaws allows for an earlier termination of that obligation. View "Dakota Energy Coop, Inc. v. East River Electric Power Coop., Inc." on Justia Law

The Northwest Arkansas Conservation Authority is a public corporation created to handle wastewater treatment for municipalities in northwest Arkansas. After a series of pipeline failures, the Authority sued the pipeline contractor and its surety, alleging deficient construction. The Authority sued outside the time periods specified in the relevant statutes of limitations and repose, but asserted that the time did not run against its claims, because the Authority was suing as a public entity seeking to vindicate public rights. The district court concluded that the rights the Authority sought to enforce were merely proprietary and that its claims were therefore time-barred.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the relevant proprietary interests are not transformed into public rights just because the Authority spent public money to repair the pipeline. Every action by a public entity impacts the public fisc to some degree. But if financial implications alone were enough to invoke nullum tempus, then the public-rights exception would swallow the general rule that statutes of limitations and repose run against municipal entities. Here, the damages sought would replenish the public entity’s coffers, but the relief would not vindicate a distinct public right. The Authority therefore cannot invoke nullum tempus to avoid the statutes of limitations or repose. View "NW AR Conservation Authority v. Crossland Heavy Contractors" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employees of civilian and military contractors who used Combat Arms Version 2 earplugs, filed separate suits against 3M in Minnesota state court, asserting failure-to-warn claims under state law. After removal to federal court, the district court granted plaintiffs' motions to remand the cases to state court for lack of federal jurisdiction, concluding that 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) was not a basis for removal.Reviewing de novo, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the remand orders in the Graves and Hall actions, whose members acquired commercial earplugs. The court concluded that 3M failed to establish it was "acting under" a federal officer or agency in developing and disseminating warnings and instructions for its commercial earplugs. However, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the remand orders in the Copeland cases and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that 3M has a colorable federal contractor defense for claims made by Copeland plaintiffs who acquired earplugs through the military, and has satisfied the other elements required for section 1442(a)(1) removal as to these plaintiffs. Therefore, the district court's remand orders are reversed as to this group, whose members will need to be determined on remand. View "Graves v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging that Planned Parenthood violated Iowa law by dispensing extra cycles of oral contraceptives without a physician’s order and that Planned Parenthood illegally billed Iowa Medicaid Enterprise (IME) for post-abortion related procedures.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Planned Parenthood, concluding that plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead with particularity, pursuant to the heightened pleading standards of the FCA, her claim regarding the dispensing of oral contraceptives. Furthermore, even if plaintiff is right that Planned Parenthood submitted a false claim or statement as to Patients C, D, E and F, she fails to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact over whether those claims and statements were knowingly false. View "Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc." on Justia Law

AGRED filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment regarding its rights and obligations under a written agreement with the United States. The Corps, acting on behalf of the United States, moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that AGRED lacks standing.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of AGRED's declaratory judgment claim based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and agreed with the district court that AGRED's injury was not caused by the Corps. In this case, AGRED failed to establish a connection between its injury of being enjoined from charging fees for access a lake plaintiff owns and the Corps' conduct. The court explained that there are several kinks in AGRED's causal chain, including that AGRED's injury results directly from FOLEA's thus far successful lawsuit. In this case, there is no real contractual dispute between AGRED and the Corps. Therefore, AGRED fails to meet the causation requirement for standing because it cannot show that its injury is fairly traceable to the Corps. View "Agred Foundation v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

Dunbar, a Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business (SDVOSB), was awarded an Army Corps of Engineers ditch and tributary project in Arkansas. Dunbar then hired a subcontractor, Harding Enterprises, to work on the project. After Harding Enterprises defaulted, Dunbar made a demand on the bond guaranteed by Hanover, which Hanover denied. Hanover then filed suit seeking a declaration that it had no obligations under the bond and seeking to have the bond rescinded based on illegality of the subcontract.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Hanover, holding that the district court erroneously concluded that the subcontract was undisputedly in violation of 13 C.F.R. 125.6(b)(2) because the percentage that Dunbar spent on contract performance relative to the prime contract price could not be conclusively ascertained until conclusion of performance of the prime contract. The court also held that the potential that Hanover may have liability under the False Claims Act if it were to perform under the bond does not justify discharging Hanover from its obligations and rescinding the contract. View "Hanover Insurance Co. v. Dunbar Mechanical Contractors, LLC" on Justia Law

Relator filed a qui tam action against Trinity, alleging that Trinity violated the False Claims Act (FCA) by knowingly presenting a false or fraudulent claim to the government, making a false statement material to a false or fraudulent claim, and retaliating against him.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Trinity's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, holding that the complaint failed to allege with particularity that defendant presented a false or fraudulent claim to the government or that it had made, used or caused to be used a false record or statement. In this case, relator's general allegations that Trinity's compensation scheme most likely resulted in the presentment of claims for payment or approval are insufficient; while there is no "presentment" requirement for a 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(B) claim, the plaintiff must plead a connection between the alleged fraud and the actual claim made payable to the government; because relator failed to allege with particularity that Trinity submitted a claim for payment to the government, he cannot establish that Trinity's allegedly false statements were "material" to any claim that was actually submitted; and relator's allegations are insufficient to establish that Trinity knew he was engaged in a protected activity. View "United States ex rel. Benaissa v. Trinity Health" on Justia Law

Relators filed a quit am action against the Hospital for violations of the False Claims Act. Relators also filed suit against the Hospital and its CEO, alleging violation of the Act's anti-retaliation provision. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the Hospital's motion to dismiss all counts of the complaint and grant of summary judgment as to the retaliation claim. The court held that the complaint alleged a fraudulent scheme without representative examples with the required specificity. Furthermore, the complaint lacked the sufficient indicia of reliability leading to a strong inference that claims were actually submitted.The court also held that claims alleging that defendants made false records or statements were properly dismissed because they failed to connect the false records or statements to any claim made to the government; claims that the Hospital conspired to violate the Anti-Kickback Statute were properly dismissed because the complaint did not include any details about an agreement and relators failed to plead the conspiracy with particularity; claims against the CEO were properly dismissed because the Act did not impose individual liability; and the district court properly granted summary judgment for the Hospital on the remaining claims. View "United States ex rel. Strubbe v. Crawford County Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

As long as the relator had direct knowledge of the true state of the facts, she can be an original source even though her knowledge of the misrepresentation was not first-hand. In this case, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of relator's qui tam action under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733. The district court reasoned that information underlying relator's allegations had been previously disclosed. The court held that the district court misapplied circuit precedent on the meaning of "original source" because relator did not have to have direct and independent knowledge of Bayer's allegedly false communications to the Department of Defense. The district court did not reach other arguments raised by Bayer. Therefore, the court remanded for the district court to address these matters in the first instance. View "Simpson v. Bayer Healthcare" on Justia Law