Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 2001, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement awarded Northrop a contract for lease and support of Oakley network monitoring software for one base year and three option years at about $900,000 per year. To obtain Oakley’s software, Northrop was required to pay $2,899,710, so Northrup assigned its payment rights to ESCgov for $3,296,093. ESCgov assigned its rights to Citizens, but the government was not notified. In 2005, ICE decided not to exercise the first option. Northrop sent the contracting officer a “Contract Disputes Act Claim for not Exercising Option,” citing the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 601. The letter did not mention the two assignments. The CO denied Northrop’s claim. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed, holding that Northrop had not supplied the CO “adequate notice” because it failed to reference potential application of the Anti-Assignment Act and Severin doctrine. While the matter was pending, Northrop filed a second claim, including documents on the financing arrangements. The CO determined that Northrop’s second claim was the same claim and declined to issue a final decision. The Claims Court again held that it lacked jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed, finding that the first letter constituted a valid claim. View "Northrop Grumman Computing Sys., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

This case involved an alleged bid-rigging scheme that sought to defraud various New York State and City government agencies in connection with the purchase by those agencies of a particular brand of mobile radio. Gatt, an admitted past participant in the purported scheme, sought to recover damages from alleged co-conspirators for losses arising from the termination of Gatt's at-will distribution contract for those radios. Gatt raised federal and state antitrust claims arising under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1; the Donnelly Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 340; and New York common law. The court concluded that Gatt lacked antitrust standing to pursue its antitrust claims and that its common law claims were properly dismissed as a matter of law. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Gatt's complaint. View "Gatt Communications, Inc. v. PMC Associates, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Starting in 2002, Smith sought a place on Beloit’s “tow list,” to be called when police required towing services. Chief Wilson denied these requests. Smith, who is African-American, attributed his exclusion to racial bias. In 2008, Wilson’s subordinates made allegations that, in everyday conversation, Wilson referred to “niggers,” “towel heads,” and “spics.” Several officers specifically recalled that Wilson used such slurs about Smith. Smith filed claims under Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, 42 U.S.C.1981, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury returned a verdict finding that race was a “motivating factor” in Wilson’s decision not to include Smith on the list, but that Wilson would not have added Smith to the list even if race had played no part in Wilson’s thinking. The district court concluded that the mixed verdict precluded relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the jury’s second finding (that his company would have been left off the tow list regardless of race) was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; that Smith was entitled to some relief because he succeeded in demonstrating that improper racial considerations at least partially motivated Wilson; and that instruction on the allocation of the burden of persuasion was incorrect. View "Smith v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Reimbursement providers for inpatient services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries is adjusted upward for hospitals that serve disproportionate numbers of patients who are eligible for Supplemental Security Income. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services annually submit the SSI fraction for eligible hospitals to a “fiscal intermediary,” a Health and Human Services contractor, which computes the reimbursement amount and sends the hospitals notice. A provider may appeal to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board within 180 days, 42 U. S. C. 1395oo(a)(3). The PRRB may extend the period, for good cause, up to three years, 42 CFR 405.1841(b). A hospital timely appealed its SSI fraction calculations for 1993 through 1996. The PRRB found that errors in CMS’s methodology resulted in a systematic under-calculation. When the decision was made public, hospitals challenged their adjustments for 1987 through 1994. The PRRB held that it lacked jurisdiction, reasoning that it had no equitable powers save those granted by legislation or regulation. The district court dismissed the claims. The D. C. Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court reversed. While the 180-day limitation is not “jurisdictional” and does not preclude regulatory extension, the regulation is a permissible interpretation of 1395oo(a)(3). Applying deferential review, the Court noted the Secretary’s practical experience in superintending the huge program and the PRRB. Rejecting an argument for equitable tolling, the Court noted that for nearly 40 years the Secretary has prohibited extensions, except as provided by regulation, and Congress not amended the 180-day provision or the rule-making authority. The statutory scheme, which applies to sophisticated institutional providers, is not designed to be “unusually protective” of claimants. Giving intermediaries more time to discover over-payments than providers have to discover underpayments may be justified by the “administrative realities” of the system: a few dozen intermediaries issue tens of thousands of NPRs, while each provider can concentrate on its own NPR. View "Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

In 2011, the Wisconsin Legislature passed Act 10, a budget repair bill proposed by recently-elected Governor Walker. Act 10 significantly altered state public employee labor laws, creating two classes of public employees: “public safety employees” and all others, “general employees.” The Act prohibited general employees from collectively bargaining on issues other than “base wages,” imposed rigorous recertification requirements on them, and prohibited their employers from deducting union dues from paychecks. The Act did not subject public safety employees or their unions to the same requirements. The enactment was controversial and received nationwide publicity. Unions filed suit, challenging the limitations on collective bargaining, the recertification requirements, and a prohibition on payroll deduction of dues, under the Equal Protection Clause. They also challenged the payroll deduction provision under the First Amendment. The district court invalidated Act 10’s recertification and payroll deduction provisions, but upheld the limitation on collective bargaining. The Seventh Circuit held that the Act is valid in its entirety. Act 10 is viewpoint-neutral and, while “publicly administered payroll deductions for political purposes can enhance the unions’ exercise of First Amendment rights, [states are] under no obligation to aid the unions in their political activities.” The classifications and recertification requirement survive rational basis review. View "WI Educ. Ass'n v. Walker" on Justia Law

After the National Indian Gaming Commission decided that a 1994 consent decree involving the City of Duluth and the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa was incompatible with federal law, the Band moved for dissolution of the consent decree. The City opposed the motion and the district court granted it in part and denied it in part. Both parties appealed. The Commission's change in the law governing Indian gaming made illegal what the earlier consent decree was designed to enforce. The 2011 decision by the Commission, the agency authorized by Congress to interpret and enforce the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., ruled that the 1994 arrangement between the City and the Band violated the Act. That determination provided ample support for the district court's decision to grant prospective relief from continued enforcement of the 1994 consent decree into the 2011 to 2036 period since continued execution of the agreement would be "no longer equitable." It was unclear what conclusion the district court would have reached without its mistaken belief that Rule 60(b)(6) was not available for consideration of potential retrospective relief. The district court abused its discretion by not examining all the relevant factors and therefore the court reversed the district court's decision denying retrospective relief to the Band for its obligations to pay rent withheld from 2009 to 2011 and remanded that question for further consideration. View "City of Duluth v. Fond Du Lac Band of Chippewa" on Justia Law

The Army issued a solicitation, noting that it intended to award contracts without discussions and that noncompliance with proposal requirements “may result in elimination of the proposal from further consideration. . . Failure to meet a requirement may result in an offeror being ineligible for an award.” The submission was required to include a cost/price proposal that was “fully complete and error free,” with supporting information, including subcontractor information. Orion submitted a proposal on the last possible date, wthout proprietary cost information for five of its eight subcontractors. Eight days later, the Army received packages allegedly containing the missing subcontractor information. The packages were returned unopened. The contracting officer rejected Orion’s proposal and denied a protest. The Army subsequently issued an amendment, notifying offerors in the competitive range that discussions were going to be held and seeking new cost/price proposals. Orion unsuccessfully attempted to resubmit. A second protest was dismissed and the Government Accountability Office affirmed. The Claims Court dismissed, holding that Orion lacked standing to bring a bid protest under 28 U.S.C. 1491(b)(1), and that, on the merits, it was a rational decision to exclude Orion from competition due to the missing information. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Orion Tech., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Indian Harbor sought reimbursement under the National Defense Authorization Act of 1993, 106 Stat. 2315, 2371; 107 Stat. 1547, 1745 for environmental cleanup costs associated with the development of the former Marine Corps Air Station Tustin military base in southern California. The Court of Federal Claims determined that Indian Harbor failed to identify a “claim for personal injury or property” that triggered the government’s duty to indemnify and dismissed. The Federal Circuit reversed, relying on the purposes of the Act, to encourage cleanup and redevelopment of former military installations. View "Indian Harbor Ins. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2004 Taylor, an employee of the IRS, began applying for promotions and transfers, and was rejected until she received a promotion in 2006. In 2004, after being denied a promotion, Taylor filed her first discrimination complaint and was assigned to work in a unit supervised by Shields. While working in this unit, Taylor alleges that Shields took several retaliatory actions against Taylor, including written reprimands, a three-day suspension without pay, and providing negative references for Taylor to prospective employers. Based on these alleged actions, Taylor filed additional complaints for retaliation. In 2005, the IRS and Taylor entered into a settlement agreement. Taylor subsequently alleged noncompliance by the IRS. In 2006 and 2008, the agency issued decisions concluding that although the IRS had breached the agreement, it was currently in compliance. Taylor did not appeal either decision, but filed a complaint alleging retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a) and breach-of-settlement-agreement. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the breach claim, holding that Congress has not waived sovereign immunity with respect to such claims, but reversed with respect to retaliation.View "Taylor v. Geithner" on Justia Law

Erie County filed a purported class action on behalf of itself and other counties in northern Ohio, claiming that Morton and Cargill conspired to fix the price of rock salt in northern Ohio by geographically dividing the market and excluding competition, in violation of Ohio’s Valentine Act (Ohio Rev. Code 1331.01-1331.15), analogous to federal antitrust statutes, including the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1-7). The district court dismissed, finding that the alleged facts were just as consistent with lawful parallel conduct as with a conspiracy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The alleged “failure to compete” indicates no more than a natural and independent desire to avoid a turf war and preserve profits guaranteed by regional dominance. Erie County’s concession that it was not bound by the “Buy Ohio” law defeated its claim of conspiracy evidenced by submission of sham bids. View "Erie Cnty. v. Morton Salt Co." on Justia Law