Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Pennsylvania Steel Products Procurement Act,73 Pa. Cons. Stat. 1881-1887, prohibits the use of temporary bridges made out of foreignsteel on public works projects. The district court rejected a claim that the law was preempted by the Buy America Act, 23 U.S.C. 313, and that it violated the Commerce Clause, Contract Clause, and Equal Protection Clause. The Third Circuit affirmed. The federal Act contemplates more restrictive state laws. The state law was authorized by Congress, is rational, and did not, at its enactment, impair plaintiff's existing contracts. View "Mabey Bridge & Shore, Inc. v. Schoch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, certified by the city as a minority-owned business eligible for favored treatment, sells a variety of products. The city is virtually its only customer. Early in 2005 the city began to suspect that plaintiff was a broker rather than a wholesaler, which would make it ineligible to bid for contracts as an MBE. Plaintiff had only six employees, though it claimed to have a warehouse. The city never completed its investigation, so plaintiff retains its certification. The city also believed that the company had shorted it on a shipment of aluminum sign blanks, and ultimately debarred it from dealing with the city. The company sued immediately and obtained a temporary restraining order; debarment was in effect for only eight days. The city abandoned its attempt to debar the company. The district court then ruled in favor of defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Claims by the principals in the company were frivolous, given that they continued to be employed by the company. The temporary diminution in business did not amount to destruction of the company nor did it constitute retaliation. Plaintiff did not prove breach of contract. View "Chicago United Indus. v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Former New Mexico state treasurer Defendant-Appellee Robert Vigil and his former deputy, co-Defendant Ann Marie Gallegos allegedly hatched a plan to find work for his political rival's wife so that the rival couldn't challenge him in the next election. According to the complaint, Defendants solicited bids for a state contract and insisted that any interested contractor hire Samantha Sais (the wife) on any terms she wished. Plaintiff SECSYS agreed to the plan in principle, but ultimately could not come to terms with Ms. Sais. When negotiations broke down, Defendants allegedly chose another contractor who agreed to Ms. Sais' terms. Mr. Vigil was ultimately indicted, convicted, and sentenced to prison for his role in this scheme. Plaintiff sought damages from Mr. Vigil and Ms. Gallegos in their individual capacities for violating its Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection for discriminating against the company when it refused to acquiesce to Ms. Sais' demands: "So that leaves SECSYS with the remarkable argument that it was discriminated against in violation of the federal Constitution not because it was unwilling to pay, but because it was willing to pay only some of an allegedly extortionate demand." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no evidence that Defendants enforced Ms. Sais' demands with the purpose of discriminating against those who failed to meet them: "every indication in the record before [the Court] suggest[ed] the defendants would have been just as happy if SECSYS had met its full demand as it was when another bidder eventually did so." The Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants. View "SECSYS, LLC v. Vigil" on Justia Law

In 1983, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101–10270, to provide for government collection and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The NWPA authorized the Department of Energy to contract for disposal. In return for payment of fees into the Nuclear Waste Fund, the Standard Contract provided that the DOE would begin to dispose of SNF and HLW not later than January 31, 1998. Because collection and disposal did not begin, courts held that the DOE had breached the Standard Contract with the nuclear energy industry. The trial court found breach of plaintiff's contract, but granted summary judgment in favor of the government regarding the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and set damages for the breach at $10,014,114 plus the cost of borrowed funds for financing construction of a dry fuel storage project. On reconsideration, the trial court reduced damages to $9,735,634 and denied the cost of borrowed funds. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to borrowed fund, but and reversed denial of overhead costs. View "System Fuels, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Two laws were challenged under the Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. 8301, which requires that only materials mined, produced, or manufactured in the U.S. be employed for "public use" or used in construction, alteration, or repair of "any public building or public work. A 1985 Puerto Rican law required that local construction projects financed with federal or Commonwealth funds use only construction materials manufactured in Puerto Rico, with limited exceptions relating to price, quality, and available quantity, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, 927-927h (Law 109). Cement is deemed "manufactured in Puerto Rico" only if composed entirely of raw materials from Puerto Rico. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10, 167e (Law 132), enacted in 2001, imposes labeling requirements on cement and required that foreign-manufactured cement carry a special label warning against its use in government-financed construction projects unless one of the exceptions contained in the BAA and Law 109 applies. The district court held that the local laws were preempted. The First Circuit upheld Law 109 as a permissible action taken by Puerto Rico as a market participant, but invalidated provisions of Law 132 that discriminate against sellers of foreign cement, leaving the remainder of the law intact. View "Antilles Cement Corp. v. Fortuno" on Justia Law

This case concerned a contract between the parties where defendant was hired to dredge a portion of the Houston Ship Channel and to construct containment levees and other structures at a disposal facility for dredge material. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of its motion for partial dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and motion for partial summary judgment. Defendant also appealed the district court's grant of the government's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court held that the government's suit to collect the money owed by defendant was timely because it was filed within six years of the contracting officer's decision; because defendant had failed to show its set-off claim "beyond peradventure," the court affirmed the district court's denial of its motion for partial summary judgment on this claim; and the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the government's claim for repayment it had overpaid defendant and the district court properly granted judgment in the government's favor on that claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Renda Marine, Incorporated" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Michael Maestas, Thomas May, Juanito Marquez and Jahmaal Gregory were all officers in a private security force that protects Los Alamos National Laboratory. They contended that their employer, Day & Zimmerman, LLC and SOC, LLC, (collectively, SOC) improperly classified them as exempt employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA). The district court found that Plaintiffs were exempt executive employees and granted summary judgment to SOC. The parties disagreed over which of Plaintiffs' job duties was "primary." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that such a dispute presented a question of fact rather than an issue of law. Furthermore, the Court held that an employee who supervises subordinates while also conducting front-line law enforcement work performs a non-managerial task. Because there remained a genuine dispute as to whether three of the Plaintiffs had this task as their primary duty, summary judgment was proper only against Plaintiff Thomas May and improper as to the others. Accordingly, the Court partly reversed, partly affirmed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Maestas v. Day & Zimmerman, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010 the Department of Defense began the process of procuring digital planetariums for use in teaching astronomy. Before posting its intention to sole-source the contract, the Department communicated with its existing vendor to inquire about terms. The Department posted notice of intent to award a sole-source contract to that vendor, stating that if any party challenged the award, it should file a statement, detailing its capability to fulfill the order. The Department approved a Justification and Authorization as required for a sole-source procurement, indicating that curriculum standards and lessons for the vendor's components are already in place. In response to a statement by another bidder, the Department had its existing vendor provide additional specifications to add to the notice. After the contract was awarded to the existing vendor, plaintiff complained to a congressman, then filed suit. The Court of Federal Claims held that plaintiff could not demonstrate prejudice, a prerequisite for standing, because it did not have a substantial chance of winning the contract, having failed to submit a statement of capability. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff was not an interested party. View "Digitalis Educ. Solutions, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2000 the Tribe received funding under the Hazardous Fuels Reduction program, created by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to gradually reintroduce the beneficial aspects of fire into ecosystems such as densely-wooded forests. After obtaining BIA approval, the Tribe began HFR work in December 2000, and began invoicing BIA in 2001. Reports of diversions of funds prompted an inspection. Inspectors concluded that the invoices overstated the work done and that some of the work actually increased the risk of fire. A second inspection led to the conclusion that the defendants were submitting false invoices. After further investigation and failed settlement negotiations, the government filed a False Claims Act suit, 31 U.S.C. 3729-33, in 2007. After a nine-day trial, the defendants prevailed; they moved for attorney's fees under Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A), or sanctions under Rule 37(c)(2). The district court denied both motions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging its discomfort with apparent "government overreaching." The government’s position throughout trial was substantially justified, so the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the EAJA motion. View "United States v. Pecore" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the DoD for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the DoD violated various in-sourcing procedures adopted pursuant to federal law. The district court dismissed, concluding exclusive jurisdiction lay in the Court of Federal Claims. Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of its complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiff's complaint constituted an action by an interested party alleging a violation of a statute or regulation in connection with a procurement. Accordingly, the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(b), conferred exclusive jurisdiction over this action with the Court of Federal Claims and the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., did not waive sovereign immunity as to plaintiff's claims. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint and the judgment was affirmed. View "Rothe Development, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, et al." on Justia Law