Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Michael Maestas, Thomas May, Juanito Marquez and Jahmaal Gregory were all officers in a private security force that protects Los Alamos National Laboratory. They contended that their employer, Day & Zimmerman, LLC and SOC, LLC, (collectively, SOC) improperly classified them as exempt employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA). The district court found that Plaintiffs were exempt executive employees and granted summary judgment to SOC. The parties disagreed over which of Plaintiffs' job duties was "primary." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that such a dispute presented a question of fact rather than an issue of law. Furthermore, the Court held that an employee who supervises subordinates while also conducting front-line law enforcement work performs a non-managerial task. Because there remained a genuine dispute as to whether three of the Plaintiffs had this task as their primary duty, summary judgment was proper only against Plaintiff Thomas May and improper as to the others. Accordingly, the Court partly reversed, partly affirmed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Maestas v. Day & Zimmerman, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010 the Department of Defense began the process of procuring digital planetariums for use in teaching astronomy. Before posting its intention to sole-source the contract, the Department communicated with its existing vendor to inquire about terms. The Department posted notice of intent to award a sole-source contract to that vendor, stating that if any party challenged the award, it should file a statement, detailing its capability to fulfill the order. The Department approved a Justification and Authorization as required for a sole-source procurement, indicating that curriculum standards and lessons for the vendor's components are already in place. In response to a statement by another bidder, the Department had its existing vendor provide additional specifications to add to the notice. After the contract was awarded to the existing vendor, plaintiff complained to a congressman, then filed suit. The Court of Federal Claims held that plaintiff could not demonstrate prejudice, a prerequisite for standing, because it did not have a substantial chance of winning the contract, having failed to submit a statement of capability. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff was not an interested party. View "Digitalis Educ. Solutions, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2000 the Tribe received funding under the Hazardous Fuels Reduction program, created by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to gradually reintroduce the beneficial aspects of fire into ecosystems such as densely-wooded forests. After obtaining BIA approval, the Tribe began HFR work in December 2000, and began invoicing BIA in 2001. Reports of diversions of funds prompted an inspection. Inspectors concluded that the invoices overstated the work done and that some of the work actually increased the risk of fire. A second inspection led to the conclusion that the defendants were submitting false invoices. After further investigation and failed settlement negotiations, the government filed a False Claims Act suit, 31 U.S.C. 3729-33, in 2007. After a nine-day trial, the defendants prevailed; they moved for attorney's fees under Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A), or sanctions under Rule 37(c)(2). The district court denied both motions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging its discomfort with apparent "government overreaching." The government’s position throughout trial was substantially justified, so the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the EAJA motion. View "United States v. Pecore" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the DoD for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the DoD violated various in-sourcing procedures adopted pursuant to federal law. The district court dismissed, concluding exclusive jurisdiction lay in the Court of Federal Claims. Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of its complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiff's complaint constituted an action by an interested party alleging a violation of a statute or regulation in connection with a procurement. Accordingly, the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(b), conferred exclusive jurisdiction over this action with the Court of Federal Claims and the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., did not waive sovereign immunity as to plaintiff's claims. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint and the judgment was affirmed. View "Rothe Development, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, et al." on Justia Law

In a national emergency, the Department of Defense can augment its own capabilities with aircraft drawn from the "Civil Reserve Air Fleet," composed of aircraft owned by commercial carriers but committed voluntarily for use during emergencies. The Fleet is divided into teams of airlines. The Department awards mobilization value points; the more points a member has, the more non-emergency Department air transportation the member can bid on. Points are transferrable within teams. Members of defendant's team have a contract with a one-year term and a separate three-year agreement concerning distribution of business among members. Plaintiff's suit is based on a 2006 three-year agreement in the form of a letter. A change from what members of the team had been doing ultimately led to plaintiff's withdrawal from the team. Plaintiff subsequently went into bankruptcy. Plaintiff won a jury verdict of almost $66 million. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the "agreement" did not include crucial terms and was so indefinite as to be unenforceable. The court also criticized the regression analysis on which the award was calculated. A promissory estoppel claim, while not preempted, failed on the facts. View "ATA Airlines, Inc. v. FedEx Corp." on Justia Law

Claimant appealed from a judgment of the district court ordering the forfeiture to plaintiff United States, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 401(a), of certain communication-jamming devices, to wit, the defendant-in-rem Jammers, owned by claimant and a company of which he was the majority shareholder and CEO. On appeal, claimant contended that the district court erred in dismissing his claim, arguing principally that the stipulation he signed was void on the grounds that it was signed under duress and without consideration. The court held that, as a matter of New York law, no consideration for claimant's agreement to the release was needed; and thus, if consideration was absent, its absence did not make the stipulation invalid. The court also held that claimant's assertions did not meet any part of the test of duress. The court further held that the district court correctly granted the government's motion to strike or for summary judgment on the ground of claimant's lack of Article III standing. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Twenty MilJam-350 IED Jammers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a non-profit, member-owned, water company serving rural areas of Ross County, Ohio. To finance its system, plaintiff borrowed nearly $10.6 million from the USDA. The disputed area of the county includes properties served by the city and properties served by plaintiff. Each has objected to the other's extension of new lines to the area. The district court granted plaintiff summary judgment, finding that the company is protected under the Agriculture Act, 7 U.S.C. 1926(b)(2), based on its obligations under the USDA contract, had a legal right to serve the area under a contract with the county, and did not have unclean hands. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Ross Cnty. Water Co., Inc v. City of Chillicothe" on Justia Law

Defendant, former commissioner in charge of the Environmental Services Department of Jefferson County, was convicted of charges related to federal-funds bribery for accepting cash from an engineering firm that contracted with the county for a sewer reconstruction project. Defendant subsequently appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the reasonableness of his prison term. The court held that the same evidence that supported defendant's federal-funds bribery convictions supported his conspiracy conviction. The court also held that defendant's sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

Incentives under the National Housing Act, to encourage private developers to meet the needs of moderate income families, included below-market 40-year mortgages, with an option to prepay after 20 years. Restrictions, for example, on rent increases, were in effect until the mortgage was paid off. The prepayment option gave developers an opportunity to convert to market rate housing. To avoid a shortage of affordable housing, Congress enacted Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act, 101 Stat. 1877 (1988), and Low-Income Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act, 104 Stat. 4249 (1990) under which an owner needed HUD approval to prepay or to go through regulatory hoops. In 1996 Congress restored prepayment rights. Plaintiff was prohibited from prepayment for five years, 10 days. The Court of Federal Claims held that the restriction of prepayment rights constituted a taking but did not constitute a breach of contract, because there was no privity between HUD and plaintiff. The Federal Circuit affirmed on the contract claim, but reversed with respect to temporary taking. The evidence did not demonstrate that plaintiff's investment backed expectations were objectively reasonable in light of industry practice,View "CCA Assocs. v. United States" on Justia Law

A child was seriously injured when she was hit in the head by an object thrown by a lawnmower being operated at the federal building adjoining her childcare center. Separate entities provided child care and lawn maintenance, under contract with the federal government. The district court dismissed a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-2680. The First Circuit affirmed. While noting that the landscaping and child care operators were independent contractors, the court applied the discretionary function exception to federal liability. The agreements and their actual execution show that the government did not carve out responsibility for safety measures from its otherwise comprehensive delegation of day-to-day authority to the companies. Federal law allows the government discretion to hire independent contractors and to adopt, or not adopt, safety measures suggested by the plaintiffs. View "Carroll v. United States" on Justia Law