Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

Taxpayer was awarded and received a net $5.25 million qui tam payment from the government as a "relator" in two lawsuits settled against a government contractor under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733. Taxpayer asserted that the award was not taxable. The court held that the Tax Court correctly concluded that the entire qui tam payment award to taxpayer under the FCA was includable in gross income and that taxpayer was liable for the I.R.C. 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty. View "Campbell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2000, the Army awarded SDC a $430,000 contract. A dispute arose regarding specifications. In 2001, SDC requested termination for convenience. In 2004, the CO terminated the contract and SDC submitted a settlement proposal for $789,058. The officer awarded $403,563 in 2005. Under the Contract Disputes Act, a contractor may appeal to a board of contract appeals within 90 days or to the Court of Federal Claims within 12 months, 31 U.S.C. 606, 609. SDC filed in court, seeking, $19,316 in costs, and, for the first time, seeking equitable adjustments of $1.7 million: $397,000 for defective specifications; $500,000 for alleged breach of covenants of fair dealing and cooperation; and $750,000 for alleged bad faith. After a stipulated dismissal, SDC took no further action. In 2008, SDC submitted new claims: $19,316 in termination costs, a category previously disallowed, and $7 million in equitable adjustments. The CO denied termination costs as already addressed in the 2005 decision. The Board dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The termination costs claim should have been presented to the Board within 90 days of receipt of the decision. Equitable adjustment claims were submitted outside the six-year statute of limitations, 41 U.S.C. 605(a). View "Systems Dev. Corp. c. McHugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, 72 Iraqis who were seized in Iraq by the U.S. military and detained at various locations throughout Iraq, commenced this action against L-3 Services, a military contractor, alleging that L-3 Services' employees and military personnel conspired among themselves and with others to torture and abuse them while they were detained and to cover up that conduct. L-3 Services filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on numerous grounds and the district court denied the motion. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss this case for the reasons given in Al-Shimari v. CACI International. The court held that plaintiffs' state law claims were preempted by federal law and displaced by it, as articulated in Saleh v. Titan Corp. View " Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Services, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four Iraqi citizens, who were seized by the U.S. military in the Iraq war zone and detained by the military in Abu Ghraib prison, near Baghdad, commenced this tort action against a civilian contractor retained by the military to assist it at the prison in conducting interrogations for the purpose of obtaining intelligence. Plaintiffs alleged that while they were detained, the contractor's employees and military personnel conspired among themselves and with others to torture and abuse them and to cover up that conduct. The contractor filed a motion to dismiss on numerous grounds and the district court denied the motion. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case. The court held that the plaintiffs' state law claims were preempted by federal law and displaced by it, as articulated in Saleh v. Titan Corp. View "Al Shimari, et al. v. CACI Int'l, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

This consolidated appeal arose from a contract dispute between Douglas Asphalt Company (Douglas) and the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) where GDOT had awarded Douglas two paving contracts to mill and resurface certain stretches of interstate highway. GDOT subsequently retained QORE, Inc., an engineering and materials testing company, to remove asphalt samples from the first project site and conduct tests to determine the samples' lime content. QORE retained, at GDOT's direction, Applied Technical Services, Inc. (ATS), to perform a test that GDOT developed, called an atomic absorption test. QORE and ATS sent the data that those tests produced to GDOT for its analysis and consideration and GDOT concluded from those data that the asphalt that Douglas had laid did not contain enough hydrated lime; GDOT then relied, in part, on those test results to justify its decision to place Douglas in default on both highway contracts. Douglas responded by filing this action against QORE, ATS, and several individual GDOT officials. On appeal, Douglas contended that the district court erred by dismissing its Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, claims and by granting summary judgment for QORE on its claims for defamation and negligence. ATS maintained that the district court erroneously failed to grant its motions for judgment as a matter of law on both the defamation and negligence claims. The court held that the district court did not err in dismissing Douglas's RICO claim and that QORE and ATS were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both the defamation and negligence claims. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated the judgment against ATS, and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of ATS. View "Douglas Asphalt Co., et al. v. QORE, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff foster children appeal the dismissal of their class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in which they alleged that the caseloads of the Sacramento County Dependency Court and court-appointed attorneys were so excessive as to violate federal and state constitutional and statutory provisions. The district court abstained from adjudicating plaintiff's claims. The court held that the district court properly abstained from consideration of the claims plaintiff raised here based on O'Shea v. Littleton. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. View "E.T., et al. v. Cantil-Sakauye, et al." on Justia Law

A veteran was employed by the Navy. Terminated in 1994, he filed an EEOC complaint. In a 1995 settlement agreement, the Navy agreed to remove from the Official Personnel Folder adverse performance evaluations; to remove records of disciplinary action; and to document that he had resigned for personal reasons. In 1996, plaintiff discovered that the Navy had not complied and filed another complaint. In a 1996 agreement, the Navy agreed to employ plaintiff and to document that he had resigned in 1994. In 1998 plaintiff was accused of stealing and suspended. He filed a third EEOC complaint, then was accused of threatening a crew member. After being notified of his proposed removal, plaintiff resigned. Under a 2001 settlement, the Navy agreed to pay plaintiff $1,000, to expunge the suspension, and to provide a neutral reference. Records obtained in 2006 indicated that the Navy had not documented that he resigned for personal reasons. In 2008, he filed suit. The district court dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, breach of contract claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1). The Federal Circuit reversed. The agreements can fairly be interpreted as mandating payment of money damages for breach by the government, subject to Tucker Act jurisdiction. The claims were not time-barred because plaintiff was entitled to benefit of the accrual suspension rule. View "Holmes v. United States" on Justia Law

The City of Hugo, Oklahoma, and the Hugo Municipal Authority, a public water trust, (collectively "Hugo") contracted with the City of Irving, Texas, ("Irving") for the sale of water Hugo has been allocated or sought to be allocated under permits issued by the Oklahoma Water Resources Board ("Board"). Hugo and Irving brought suit against the nine members of the Board for a declaration that certain Oklahoma laws governing the Board’s water allocation decisions were unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause and an injunction prohibiting their enforcement. The district court granted summary judgment for the Board, and Hugo and Irving appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Hugo, as a political subdivision of Oklahoma, lacked standing to sue the Board under the dormant Commerce Clause. Irving, whose injury was solely premised on a contract it entered into with Hugo, likewise could not demonstrate standing because any injury to Irving cannot be redressed. Concluding no plaintiff had the necessary standing, the Court vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case back the district court to dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction. View "City of Hugo v. Nichols " on Justia Law

Tarrant Regional Water District ("Tarrant"), a Texas state agency, applied to the Oklahoma Water Resources Board ("the OWRB") for permits to appropriate water at three locations in Oklahoma for use in Texas. Just before filing its applications, Tarrant sued the nine members of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board in the district court for the Western District of Oklahoma and sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate certain Oklahoma statutes that govern the appropriation and use of water and an injunction preventing OWRB from enforcing them. Tarrant alleged that the Oklahoma statutes restricted interstate commerce in water and thereby violated the dormant Commerce Clause as discriminatory or unduly burdensome. Tarrant further alleged that Congress did not authorize Oklahoma through the Red River Compact ("Compact") to enact such laws. OWRB responded that Congress did authorize Oklahoma to adopt these statutes by consenting to the Compact. Tarrant also claimed that the Compact preempted the Oklahoma statutes insofar as the Compact applied to Tarrant’s application to appropriate water located in the Red River Basin. The district court granted summary judgment for OWRB on both the dormant Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause claims. After that decision, Tarrant took steps to export to Texas Oklahoma water that was not subject to the Compact. Tarrant negotiated a contract with property owners in Stephens County, Oklahoma to export groundwater to Texas and also entered a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Apache Tribe concerning the Tribe’s potential water rights. In court Tarrant then reasserted its dormant Commerce Clause challenge based on these transactions. The district court dismissed the Stephens County matter for lack of standing and the Apache Tribe matter as not ripe. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grants of summary judgment on the dormant Commerce Clause and preemption issues, and the dismissals based on standing and ripeness: [w]e hold that the Red River Compact insulates Oklahoma water statutes from dormant Commerce Clause challenge insofar as they apply to surface water subject to the Compact." View "Tarrant Regional Water Dist. v. Herrmann" on Justia Law

A newborn suffered severe brain damage because doctors failed to promptly diagnose and treat an infection contracted at his 2003 birth. He was born prematurely and certain tests, normally done during pregnancy, were not performed by the federally-subsidized clinic where the mother received care. The clinic and its doctors are deemed federal employees under the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(g)-(n), and shielded from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In 2005 the parents filed suit in state court and, in 2006, HHS denied an administrative claim for damages. Within six months of the denial the case was removed to federal court. In 2010, the district court held that the claim was filed within the two year statute of limitations under the FTCA (28 U.S.C. 2401(b)) and awarded more than $29 million in damages against the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A claim only accrues when a plaintiff obtains sufficient knowledge of the government-related cause of his injury; the plaintiffs were reasonably diligent. View "Arroyo v. United States" on Justia Law