Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

Relators filed suit under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, alleging that Academi knowingly submitted false claims to the United States in connection with a government contract to provide security services in Iraq and Afghanistan. The district court dismissed the complaint pursuant to the FCA's public-disclosure bar. The court concluded that the determination of when a plaintiff’s claims arise for purposes of the public-disclosure bar is governed by the date of the first pleading to particularly allege the relevant fraud and not by the timing of any subsequent pleading. The district court thus erred in holding the second-amended complaint was the relevant pleading by which to measure the public-disclosure bar. The court further concluded that the public-disclosure bar was inapplicable in this case where the article at issue on Wired.com was not a qualifying public disclosure that triggered the bar. Relators sufficiently pled the weapons qualifications scheme in their first-amended complaint that came well before the Wired.com article. Accordingly, the court vacated the portion of the district court’s order dismissing Relators’ weapons qualification claims under the public-disclosure bar and remanded for further proceedings. View "US ex rel. Beauchamp v. Academi Training Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sweetwater Union High School District filed this action against defendants Gilbane Building Company, The Seville Group, Inc. (SGI), and Gilbane/SGI, a joint venture (the Joint Venture), seeking to void management contracts with all three entities, and to require that they disgorge all sums that Sweetwater paid them under the contracts. Sweetwater alleges that certain representatives of the defendant entities engaged in a "pay to play" scheme with several Sweetwater officials that involved paying for expensive dinners, tickets to entertainment and sporting events, and travel expenses, and making contributions to political campaigns and charities, in an effort to influence the officials to award defendants certain construction contracts. Gilbane and the Joint Venture brought a special motion to strike (or "anti-SLAPP motion"). The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the conduct underlying the complaint was illegal as a matter of law, and therefore, was not protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and petition. Defendants argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying their anti-SLAPP motion. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the evidence proffered by Sweetwater, including signed plea forms and transcripts from grand jury testimony in criminal cases against many of the individuals involved in the alleged "pay to play" contracting scheme. "Such evidence is, in all material respects, indistinguishable from evidence presented by way of a declaration. Based on the proffered evidence, we conclude that Sweetwater has sufficiently demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the merits. We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of defendants' anti-SLAPP motion." View "Sweetwater Union School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co." on Justia Law

A trade association of California unions, contractors’ associations and contractors filed suit. Following discovery and a contested hearing, the court ruled that defendant Ross Valley Sanitary District lacked authority under Public Contract Code 20803 to engage its own workforce to complete a sewer system improvement project costing more than $15,000 without putting the project out for competitive bid and contract. The trial court ordered the District to cease and desist from taking further action with respect to about 139 miles of its small diameter sewer pipe with in-house workers, and to conduct all future replacement of this pipe through competitive bid and contract. The court of appeal reversed. Section 20803 applies when a district contracts with a third party for public work, and not when a district relies on force account (in-house) work. View "Constr. Indus. Force Acct. Council, Inc. v. Ross Valley Sanitation Dist." on Justia Law

Over the course of seven years, Circle C, a contractor that built 42 warehouses at Fort Campbell Army base, paid some electricians about $9,900 less than the Davis-Bacon (40 U.S.C. 3142) wages specified in its contract with the Army. The government obtained a damages award of $763,000 under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, arguing that all of the electrical work was “tainted” by the $9,900 underpayment and, therefore, worthless. The Sixth Circuit, reversed the damage award and remanded for entry of an award of $14,748. Actual damages are the difference in value between what the government bargained for and what the government received. The government bargained for the buildings and payment of Davis-Bacon wages. It got the buildings but not quite all of the wages. The shortfall was $9,916--the government’s actual damages. That amount tripled is $29,748 (31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(G)). Minus a $15,000 settlement payment, Circle C is liable for a total of $14,748. View "Wall v. Circle C Constr., LLC" on Justia Law

Under the South Pacific Tuna Treaty (SPTT), a limited number of licenses to fish the waters of the Pacific Island nations are available to vessels under the control and command of U.S. citizens. Moore, a law firm, filed suit under the False Claims Act against Korean nationals and LLCs, alleging that the LLCs acquired two SPTT licenses by fraudulently certifying to the U.S. government that they were controlled by U.S. citizens and that their fishing vessels were commanded by U.S. captains. Moore first learned of this alleged fraud through discovery in a wrongful death action that it litigated in federal court against two of the defendants. The district court dismissed, citing the FCA’s public disclosure bar and its “original source” exception, particularly the 2010 amendments to those provisions. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the alleged fraud was disclosed through any of the qualifying public disclosure sources, but that Moore has materially added to those public disclosures by contributing details of the alleged fraud that it independently uncovered through discovery in the wrongful death action in federal court. The court noted that the public disclosure bar is no longer jurisdictional. View "Moore & Co., P A v. Majestic Blue Fisheries LLC" on Justia Law

The Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin contracted with the Indian Health Service (IHS) to operate what would otherwise have been a federal program, pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), 25 U.S.C. 450f, 450j–1(a). After other tribes successfully litigated complaints against the government for failing to honor its obligation to pay contract support costs, the Menominee Tribe presented its own claims to the IHS under the Contract Disputes Act. The contracting officer denied some claims as not presented within the CDA’s 6-year limitations period. The Tribe argued that the limitations period should be tolled for the two years in which a putative class action, brought by tribes with parallel complaints, was pending. The district court denied the equitable-tolling claim. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no extraordinary circumstances caused the delay. To be entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations, a litigant must establish both that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstances prevented timely filing. The Court rejected the Tribe’s argument that diligence and extraordinary circumstances should be considered together as factors in a unitary test. The “extraordinary circumstances” prong is met only where the circumstances that caused the delay are both extraordinary and beyond the litigant’s control. The Tribe had unilateral authority to present its claims in a timely manner. Any significant risk and expense associated with litigating its claims were far from extraordinary. View "Menominee Tribe of Wis. v. United States" on Justia Law

In the 1970s, the Department of the Interior’s Fish and WildlifeService began entering into cooperative farming agreements with farmers to manage public lands in the National Wildlife Refuge System for the conservation of migratory birds and wildlife, including at the Umatilla and McNary Refuges in the Pacific Northwest. Most CFAs share identical terms; the Service permits a “cooperator” to farm public land with specific crops that benefit wildlife. There is no payment. Cooperators typically retain 75 percent of the crop yield for their efforts. Hymas sought a cooperator contract. The Service selected other cooperators, but did not use formal procurement procedures or solicit full and open competition. It relied upon its system that gave preference to previous cooperators with a successful record of farming designated areas within the refuge. Hymas did not live adjacent to the refuges and had not previously farmed refuge lands. The Claims Court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(b)(1), to resolve his bid protest and held that the Service violated various federal procurement laws and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Federal Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss, holding that the CFAs are not subject to Tucker Act review. View "Hymas v. United States" on Justia Law

GA entered into a blanket purchase agreement (BPA 218), with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in June 2011, to furnish trained service dogs for disabled veterans. A year later, the contracting officer sent an email questioning GA's performance. On August 31, 2012, the officer sent notice terminating BPA 218 for default and suspending open orders, informing GA that it had the right to appeal under the disputes clause of the contract. On December 21, 2012, GA sent a letter to the VA’s Rehabilitation Research & Development Service, arguing that it had fulfilled its duties and that the default termination should be converted to a termination for the convenience of the government. On February 28, 2013, GA sent the contracting officer a “formal demand.” On March 21, the officer sent a letter stating that she had received the claim but needed supporting documentation. GA began compiling documentation, but on May 3, the officer sent another letter, stating that she would not reconsider her decision, but that GA could appeal under 41 U.S.C. 7104(b). On January 7, 2014, GA filed suit. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed, finding the claim time-barred because, while the February 2013 letter qualified as a request for reconsideration, the officer did not reconsider, so the statute of limitations never tolled. The Federal Circuit reversed. The 12-month statutory appeal period did not begin to run until the officer rejected the request for reconsideration on May 3. View "Guardian Angels Med. Serv. Dogs, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Reddick was employed as an FDIC “Investigation Specialist” by an initial two-year term appointment, set to expire in September 2012. In April 2012, the FDIC offered him an extension of the initial term for an additional two years. The offer stated that the “extended employment” would be “effective [September], 2012” and that the “extended appointment is subject to the conditions of employment [included in the initial appointment offer] and subject to your continued successful performance.” Reddick accepted the offer days after receipt. The FDIC revoked the extension offer in August 2012. Reddick filed a grievance on the theory that the revocation of the offer was an adverse action under 5 U.S.C. 7512 and that he was entitled to procedural protections that the FDIC did not provide him. The matter was referred to arbitration under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator found the extension offer to be conditioned on Reddick’s “satisfactory work performance” and that the revocation was supported by sufficient justification. The Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal. The extension offer was still revocable by the FDIC even after acceptance by Reddick; it never matured into an effective extension, so Reddick was not “removed.” View "Reddick v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

In 2011, Bogina sued under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, seeking compensation for exposing fraud allegedly perpetrated against the federal government and several state governments. Defendants included a major supplier of medical equipment to institutions reimbursed by Medicare and other federal programs and its customer, a chain of nursing homes. The district judge dismissed the federal claims as being too similar to those in a prior suit and relinquished jurisdiction over the state claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding differences between this suit and an earlier suit “unimpressive” and stating that it did not matter that the alleged fraud continued. View "Bogina v. Medline Indus., Inc." on Justia Law