Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

Appellants Larry Savage, Richard Pellegrino, and Tucker Hobgood challenged a trial court’s validation of revenue bonds that will be used to help finance a new stadium in Cobb County for the Atlanta Braves major league baseball team. The bonds for the stadium project were to be issued pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement between Cobb County and the Cobb-Marietta Coliseum and Exhibit Hall Authority, under which the Authority agreed to issue bonds to cover much of the cost of constructing the stadium and the County agreed to pay amounts sufficient to cover the bond payments not covered by the licensing fees paid by the team. In consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court concluded that the intergovernmental contract was valid; that the issuance of the bonds would not violate the Georgia Constitution’s debt limitation clause, gratuities clause, or lending clause or Georgia’s revenue bond laws; and that the process used to validate the bonds was not deficient. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s judgment validating the stadium project bonds. View "Savage v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted a discretionary appeal of Elbert County, its Board of Commissioners, and the County Manager (collectively, “the County”) of a superior court order that, inter alia, granted a declaratory judgment to the effect that the Elbert County Solid Waste Disposal Ordinance was unconstitutional, denied the County’s motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of mandamus requiring the County to reasonably consider the site proposed by Sweet City Landfill, LLC and its members for a solid waste landfill. Taking each of the County's contentions of error in turn, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in its decision as to all. The case was remanded therefore for further proceedings. View "Elbert County v. Sweet City Landfill, LLC" on Justia Law

Greater Houston Partnership (GHP) is a nonprofit corporation providing economic development services to the City and other clients pursuant to quid pro quo contracts. A Houston area resident submitted to GHP a request seeking a copy of GHP’s check register. The resident claimed that GHP is an organization that spends or is supported in whole or in part by public funds, and therefore, GHP is subject to the Texas Public Information Act (TPIA) in the same manner as a governmental body. GHP did not disclose the requested information, claiming that it did not qualify as a “governmental body” under the TPIA because the public funds it received were compensation for services provided to the City of Houston pursuant to a contract. The Attorney General concluded that GHP was subject to the TPIA’s disclosure requirements. The trial court agreed, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that GHP is not a “governmental body” under the TPIA because it is not wholly or partially sustained by public funds. View "Greater Houston P’ship v. Paxton" on Justia Law

Relator filed a qui tam suit against AT&T and nineteen of its subsidiaries. At issue is whether an earlier and still pending qui tam lawsuit filed against a single AT&T subsidiary bars this suit under the False Claims Act’s first-to-file rule, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5), which prohibits qui tam actions that rely on the same material fraudulent actions alleged in another pending lawsuit. The court held that the first-to-file bar does not apply because the Wisconsin action alleges fraud based on affirmative pricing misrepresentations by seemingly rogue Wisconsin Bell employees. The present complaint, by contrast, alleges fraud and its concealment arising from a centralized and nationwide corporate policy of failing to enforce known statutory pricing requirements. In the alternative, the complaint does not fail to plead the alleged fraud with sufficient particularity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) where the complaint lays out in detail the nature of the fraudulent scheme, the specific governmental program at issue, the specific forms on which misrepresentations were submitted or implicitly conveyed, the particular falsity in the submission’s content, its materiality, the means by which the company concealed the fraud, and the timeframe in which the false submissions occurred. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "USA ex rel. Todd Heath v. AT&T, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved the County's approval of a no-bid contract for pharmacy administrator services under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), 42 U.S.C. 300gg et seq. On appeal, the County challenged the trial court's judgment against it. The court agreed with the County that the trial court failed to accord sufficient deference to the County’s evaluation of its needs for the services of a pharmacy administrator who could provide the necessary data management and provision of pharmaceuticals to address its needs in implementing provisions of the ACA. Accordingly, the court reversed with directions that the trial court enter judgment in favor of the County. View "Weinstein v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In 2010, the United States Department of the Navy entered into an agreement with Contracting Systems, Inc. II ("CSI"), per which CSI served as the general contractor for the construction of an addition to, and renovations of, the Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Training Center in the Lehigh Valley. CSI, in turn, subcontracted with Appellee, Clipper Pipe & Service, Inc. for the performance of mechanical and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning work. Clipper filed suit against CSI and its surety, the Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (collectively "Appellants"), in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, asserting that CSI had failed to pay approximately $150,000 to Clipper, per the terms of their agreement. Among other claims, Clipper advanced one under the Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act (CASPA). Appellants moved for summary judgment, arguing that CASPA did not apply to public works projects, because a governmental entity does not qualify as an "owner" under the statutory definition, as such an entity is neither a "person" nor an "other association." The federal district court denied relief on Appellants' motion. Among other aspects of its holding, the court followed "Scandale Associated Builders & Eng'rs, Ltd. v. Bell" which held that a governmental entity may be an "owner" under CASPA, since the statutory definition of "person" does not exclude the federal government, and the purpose of CASPA is to protect contracting parties. Clipper prevailed at the subsequent jury trial, and the district court awarded interest, penalties, and attorney fees. Appellants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted certification from the Third Circuit to determine whether a CASPA applied to the public works project in this case. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that CASPA did not apply to a construction project where the owner was a governmental entity. View "Clipper Pipe v. Ohio Casualty Ins." on Justia Law

In 2013, the Town of Narragansett invited competitive bidding for a five-year concession contract to operate a paddle sports business on town-owned property. Plaintiff submitted a bid to the Town. During a meeting of the Town council, the council voted to reject all bids and commence the bidding process again. Thereafter, Plaintiff initiated this action requesting declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing, inter alia, that the Town violated R.I. Gen. Stat. 45-55-5, entitled “Competitive sealed bidding.” The trial justice denied relief, concluding that the provisions of section 45-55-5 were inapplicable to this bidding process and that the Court’s standard on competitive bidding, as set forth in Gilbane Building Co. v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in refusing to apply section 45-55-5 to the Town’s action; but (2) the trial justice erred in its determination as to the applicability of the Gilbane standard. View "Kayak Centre at Wickford Cove, LLC v. Town of Narragansett" on Justia Law

When Colonel Antoon (U.S. Air Force, retired) learned that he needed prostate surgery, he researched options and specialists, which led him to the Cleveland Clinic and Dr. Kaouk. Antoon interviewed Kaouk and arranged for him to perform the operation. When Antoon experienced complications following the surgery, his further investigation caused him to suspect that Kaouk did not actually perform the surgery, but passed off major duties to a surgical resident. Antoon lodged several complaints and filed a medical malpractice action in state court, which was dismissed voluntarily. Antoon then filed suit as a relator under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act (FCA), premised on the theory that Kaouk billed the government for work he did not perform, and promoted the robotic surgical device he recommended in violation of the anti-kickback statute, 42 U.S.C. 1302a-7b(b)(2). The United States declined to intervene. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, based on a jurisdictional bar. Antoon does not have any direct and independent knowledge of the information upon which his fraud allegations are based; therefore he cannot qualify as an original source of that information, and cannot establish standing as a qui tam plaintiff under the FCA, 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4)(B). View "Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found." on Justia Law

The Government Printing Office (GPO) received nine bids for a printing order. Colonial was the lowest bidder ($2,418,443.54); Fry was the second lowest ($2,502,545.05). Colonial was a small business. Under its Printing Procurement Regulation, GPO can award contracts only to “responsible” bidders. The contracting officer found Colonial non-responsible, considering previous late deliveries, and recommended an award to Fry. A purchase order issued to Fry. Colonial filed a protest with the Government Accountability Office, arguing that the responsibility determination should have been referred to the Small Business Administration (SBA) Certificate of Competency Program, 15 U.S.C. 637(b)(7), under which a “Government procurement officer” may not preclude a small business from being awarded a government contract due to non-responsibility without referring the matter to the SBA, which responded that “requirements of the COC program could, arguably, apply to GPO and other nonexecutive agencies.” The GAO found that GPO was not subject to the program and that the contracting officer had a reasonable basis for her determination of non-responsibility. The Claims Court held that GPO did not violate the referral requirements and that the GPO’s responsibility determination was not arbitrary. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that GPO is not required to refer responsibility determinations to the SBA. View "Colonial Press Int'l, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Nelson spent six months as the Director of Education at Sanford‐Brown College, a for‐profit educational institution in Milwaukee. After he resigned, Nelson initiated suit under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729. Based on its receipt of federal subsidies from the U.S. Department of Education, Nelson alleges that the college’s recruiting and retention practices resulted in the transmission of thousands of false claims to the government, potentially subjecting the college and its corporate parent to hundreds of millions of dollars in liability. After the United States declined to intervene, the district court ultimately entered summary judgment in favor of Sanford‐Brown. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err by holding that its subject matter jurisdiction was limited to the period of time when Nelson was employed by SBC (2008-2009). FCA liability is not triggered by an institution’s failure to comply with Title IV Restrictions after its entry into a Program Participation Agreement, unless the relator proves that the institution’s application to establish initial Title IV eligibility was fraudulent. Sanford-Brown entered into its PPA in 2005. View "United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd." on Justia Law