Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Department of Energy hired Vander Boegh in 1992 as landfill manager at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. In 1998, DOE awarded the Plant’s contract to BJC, which subcontracted with WESKEM for waste management services. Vander Boegh’s employment continued; he engaged in protected activity as landfill manager, including reporting environmental violations. In 2005, after soliciting new bids, DOE awarded the Plant’s contract to PRS. EnergySolutions provided waste management services by subcontract. In 2006, Plant operations transitioned to PRS-EnergySolutions. Vander Boegh applied to be the new landfill manager, but EnergySolutions hired another candidate. Vander Boegh’s employment terminated. He filed an employment discrimination complaint, alleging retaliation for protected conduct in violation of: the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5851; the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h)(1)); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 300j-9(i); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1367; Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2622; and Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. 6971. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to EnergySolutions. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Vander Boegh lacked statutory standing because he was an applicant, not an employee. View "Vander Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Applying for federal grants between 2005 and 2008, Chicago represented that it had formulated an Equal Employment Opportunity Plan in accordance with 28 C.F.R. 42.301. This certification is required by regulations implementing the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, under which the grants were made. Hill claimed, in a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729–33, that the first certification was false because, although the city had a written plan, and implemented an equal opportunity and affirmative action program, the program differs from the plan. Hill did not contend that the city’s program falls short of federal requirements only that the program does not follow the written plan. The district court granted summary judgment to the city. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Any written plan sensibly can be understood to allow adaptations. No federal agency has parted with money under false pretenses and the record does not establish that the people in the Police Department and other bureaus who wrote grant applications and attached the city’s plan knew that the Department of Human Resources was implementing a program different from the plan, and without knowledge of falsity there cannot be a knowingly false claim. View "Hill v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Thulin was a Shopko pharmacist. During his tenure, Thulin observed what he believed to be a scheme in which Shopko submitted inflated claims for prescription drugs to the Medicaid program. Thulin filed a qui tam complaint, claiming violation of the federal False Claims Act by overbilling Medicaid, alleging that Shopko is a “sophisticated,” “multi-regional” business that developed and programmed the PDX system and should have been aware of federal law governing submission of claims, and bringing claims under the laws of eight states. The district court dismissed the federal claim under FRCP 9(b) and 12(b)(6). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. To be liable under the Act, Shopko must have acted with “actual knowledge,” or “deliberate ignorance” or “reckless disregard” of the possibility that its claims were false. Thulin’s allegations were not sufficient to satisfy that requirement even if Shopko’s practices were contrary to the Federal Assignment Law. Although malice, intent, and other conditions of the mind may be alleged generally, vague allegations that a corporation acted with reckless disregard or with reason to know of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that it was submitting false claims, simply because of its size or sophistication do not clear even this lower pleading threshold. View "Thulin v. Shopko Stores Operating Co., LLC" on Justia Law

The West Virginia Racing Commission promulgated two administrative rules, a rule establishing the burden of proof for ejections by a racing association and a rule allowing the Racing Commission to grant a stay of a permit holder’s ejection by a racing association pending review. The Racing Commission adopted the rules without legislative approval, concluding that the rules were merely procedural rather than legislative and thus did not require legislative approval. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC filed a petition seeking a writ of prohibition and declaratory judgment claiming that the rules had not been properly promulgated under the West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of the Racing Decision, concluding that the rules were properly adopted without the need for legislative approval and that the Racing Commission possessed inherent authority to issue a stay of a racetrack’s ejection decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the two rules were properly enacted procedural rules that were within the authority of the Racing Commission. View "PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC v. W. Va. Racing Comm’n" on Justia Law

Columbus Cheer Company ("CCC") entered into a rental contract for the use of school facilities. Subsequently, CCC was informed that Columbus Municipal School District ("CMSD") would not honor the contract with CCC. CCC filed a complaint against CMSD. The complaint read in part: "[p]laintiff Columbus Cheer Company is a profit corporation licensed to due [sic] business in the state of Mississippi . . . ." The prayer sought judgment for plaintiff (CCC). Defendants filed their motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, asserting that CCC was an administratively dissolved corporation; therefore, CCC could not have entered into a valid contract with CMSD, and CCC did not possess the requisite legal status to initiate suit. The trial court entered an order granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment. CCC appealed, and the issues on appeal were: (1) whether a dissolved corporation could pursue a legal action; and if not, (2) could the corporation's shareholders pursue the same action in their own name? The Supreme Court answered both questions "no." View "Columbus Cheer Company v. City of Columbus" on Justia Law

Kolbusz owns and operates the Illinois Center for Dermatology and Skin Cancer and was a participating Medicare provider from 1993 until December 2012, receiving payment directly from Medicare. In October 2012 he was indicted for Medicare fraud. As a consequence, the Department of Health and Human Services imposed fraud prevention procedures on the practice, including payment suspension, resulting in his ultimate withdrawal from the Medicare program. In 2013, Kolbusz filed suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services and her contractors, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 (federal question); the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395; and 28 U.S.C. 1361 (mandamus) to compel review of reimbursement claims he had submitted. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Kolbusz’s failure to exhaust Medicare’s administrative appeals process precludes subject-matter jurisdiction of his mandamus action. View "Ctr for Dermatology & Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Schumann, as a qui tam relator under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729, and corresponding state laws, alleged that the drug company defendants improperly induced Medco Health, his employer, to offer certain of defendants’ drugs in its mail-order pharmacies and in health plans it managed; did not include those inducements when calculating the best price for their drugs, and thus submitted inaccurate best price reports to the government; overcharged the government based on those inaccurate best prices; and underpaid rebates owed based on those inaccurate best prices. The district court dismissed, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Schumann’s claims because he did not have the requisite direct and independent knowledge to satisfy the original source exception to the FCA’s public disclosure bar. The Third Circuit affirmed. Schumann’s knowledge was not direct because it came from reviewing documents and discussing them with colleagues who participated in the underlying events. View "Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharm., L.P." on Justia Law

The Jackson County Board of Education petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to enter an order dismissing the complaint of D.C. Pruett Contracting Company, Inc. on the ground of sovereign immunity. Pruett Contracting submitted a proposal for renovations to the Pisgah High School gymnasium. The Jackson County superintendent of education executed a purchase order authorizing Pruett Contracting to make certain renovations to the gymnasium, totaling $231,309. Pruett Contracting then began renovating the gymnasium. The Superintendent later received a letter from the State of Alabama Building Commission stating that "all work on the renovation of the Pisgah High School gymnasium [was] to stop immediately" because the project had not been submitted to or approved by the Building Commission. The Board instructed Pruett Contracting to cease all work on the gymnasium. Pruett Contracting submitted an invoice to the Board for the work that had been performed prior to the letter. Months later, because it had not received payment for its work, Pruett Contracting sued the Board, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment and seeking recovery of damages on theories of quantum meruit, work and labor done, open account, and account stated. The Board moved the court to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it was entitled to sovereign immunity as to the claims alleged by Pruett Contracting and that the court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. Pruett Contracting responded, arguing that this case involved a protected property interest, that immunity was thus precluded, and that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. The Supreme Court concluded the Board established that it was entitled to sovereign immunity and that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this action; therefore, the action had to be dismissed. Because the Board demonstrated a clear legal right to an order directing the Circuit Court to dismiss Pruett Contracting's complaint, the Supreme Court granted the Board's petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the Circuit Court to dismiss Pruett Contracting's complaint. View "D.C. Pruett Contracting Company, Inc. v. Jackson County Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC) entered into a construction contract with Lewis Walker Roofing (Walker Roofing) to re-roof several buildings at Valdosta State Prison. The Contract contained two “no assignment” clauses, and as a prerequisite to contracting with GDOC, Walker Roofing was required to obtain payment and performance bonds. It obtained such payment and performance bonds from Developers Surety and Indemnity Company. Walker Roofing did not complete its work within the time frame required by the Contract, and GDOC declared Walker Roofing in default. Developers Surety did not notify GDOC within 25 days of receipt of GDOC's notice of default regarding whether it would remedy the default or perform the contract. However, approximately three months after the declaration of default, Developers Surety gave GDOC the option of entering into a contract with another company for the completion of the work. GDOC then contracted with that company to finish the project. Under the payment and performance bonds and prior to Walker Roofing's default, Developers Surety had provided financial assistance to Walker Roofing. Developers Surety filed suit against GDOC for breach of contract and for a declaratory judgment that it had no obligation under the payment and performance bond it issued to Walker Roofing on behalf of GDOC. GDOC filed a counterclaim for breach of contract. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court determined that Developers Surety's claims were not barred by sovereign immunity and that GDOC had breached the construction contract as a matter of law. It concluded that GDOC waived its sovereign immunity by entering into the contract with Walker Roofing, and that the doctrine of equitable subrogation gave Developers Surety the ability to file suit against GDOC once it incurred liability and paid the obligations of its principal under the bond. Consequently, the trial court granted summary judgment to Developers Surety and denied it to GDOC; in the same order, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Developers Surety in the amount equal to the "financial assistance" Developers Surety provided to Walker Roofing. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the State’s sovereign immunity was waived for the claim Developers Surety made on its contract with the State. The Supreme Court found that immunity was indeed waived in this instance, and accordingly, it affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Georgia Dept. of Corrections v. Developers Surety & Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from complaints filed by appellants Advanced Disposal Services Middle Georgia, LLC and Lowndes County, seeking injunctions prohibiting appellee Deep South Sanitation, LLC from providing solid waste collection and disposal services in the unincorporated areas of Lowndes County in violation of a newly enacted Lowndes County ordinance. The trial court denied appellants' requests for injunctive relief, and they appealed. The trial court determined that injunctive relief could not be granted in favor of appellants because enforcement of the Ordinance would violate Deep South's due process rights by interfering with its right to conduct business in the same manner as before enactment of the Ordinance. Because Deep South's substantive due process defense involved neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right, the Supreme Court applied a rational relationship test to determine whether enforcement of the Ordinance against Deep South would violate due process. Applying this test, the Court concluded the trial court erred by holding that enforcement of the Ordinance against Deep South would violate its due process rights. Furthermore, the Court found the trial court erred that the County's enforcement of the Ordinance through an injunction would have violated Deep South's substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Advanced Disposal Services Middle Georgia, LLC v. Deep South Sanitation, LLC" on Justia Law