Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and a putative class, alleging claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 42 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), that Campbell-Ewald instructed or allowed a third-party vendor to send unsolicited text messages on behalf of the Navy, with whom Campbell-Ewald had a marketing contract. The district court granted summary judgment to Campbell-Ewald under the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity. The court rejected Campbell-Ewald's claim that the personal and putative class claims were mooted by petitioner's refusal to accept the settlement offer; Campbell-Ewald's constitutional claims were unavailing where the company relied upon a flawed application of First Amendment principles; the TCPA imposes vicarious liability where an agency relationship, as defined by federal common law, is established between the defendant and a third-party caller; and the application of the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity is inapplicable in this case. Because Campbell-Ewald failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co." on Justia Law

Los Alamitos Unified School District (the District) filed an action to validate its lease-leaseback agreement with a contractor performing improvements on the track and athletic field of the District's high school. Another contractor, Howard Contracting, Inc. (Howard), filed an answer, claiming the lease-leaseback agreement was unconstitutional, illegal, and invalid because the District did not obtain competitive bids for the project. The primary issue presented by this appeal was legal: did Education Code section 17406 exempt school districts from obtaining competitive bids when entering into what are known as "lease-leaseback" agreements to improve school property? After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the answer was yes. "More than 40 years ago, the California Attorney General concluded the language of the statute is plain, unambiguous, and explicit, and does not impose bid requirements on school districts. We agree, and nothing has occurred in the interim that would change our conclusion." View "Los Alamitos Unified etc. v. Howard Contracting" on Justia Law

SRA provided network infrastructure support to the FDIC under the General Services Administration (GSA) Government-Wide Acquisition Contract (GWAC). At the same time, Blue Canopy conducted security audits for the FDIC of SRA’s network security. GSA issued a Task Order Request for services to be provided to the FDIC and awarded a task order to CSC. SRA protested to the Government Accountability Office (GAO). GSA terminated the task order for convenience. GSA reissued the Task Order Request with amendments, and again awarded a task order to CSC for $365 million. SRA filed a second protest, alleging organizational conflicts of interest (OCIs) based on CSC’s intended use of Blue Canopy as a subcontractor: SRA alleged that Blue Canopy’s work with the FDIC gave it knowledge of how the FDIC evaluated SRA’s work. CSC dropped Blue Canopy as a subcontractor. SRA insisted that the GAO continue the protest as an “unequal access to information” OCI, claiming that CSC and Blue Canopy violated FDIC regulations by submitting false certifications, before the award, that no OCIs existed. GSA issued a waiver under Federal Acquisition Regulation 9.503, finding the possibility of an OCI “exceedingly remote and unsubstantiated.” GAO dismissed SRA’s protest. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed. The Federal Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, based on the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act bar on jurisdiction over protests “in connection with the issuance or proposed issuance of a task or delivery order,” 41 U.S.C. 4106(f)(1).View "SRA Int'l, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1997, the Village of Derby Center and the City of Newport entered into a contract whereby the Village would supply 10,000 gallons of water per day to the City. The City claimed that the contract did not authorize the Village to adopt a new rate schedule in 2006 that included a ready-to-serve fee on top of actual water usage charges. The Village counterclaimed, alleging that the City connected customers who were not authorized under the contract, and that the City’s water use was chronically underreported due to equipment malfunction. After a trial, the superior court ruled for the City on its contract claim, holding that the ready-to-serve fee was not authorized by either contract or statute. As to the Village’s counterclaims, the court found that there was insufficient evidence to support the unauthorized-connection claim, and referred the water-usage-reconstruction claim to mediation. The Village appealed on all counts. The Supreme Court found: the plain language of the agreement authorized the use of a ready-to-serve fee to support the Village’s maintenance of its facilities. "The court erred in concluding otherwise." With respect to the Village's counterclaims, the Supreme Court found that the trial court indicated that it was clear, based on the billing periods showing a reading of zero usage by the City, that there were some erroneous readings, but it referred the Village’s claims to mediation without further resolution. After the City brought suit, the Village filed a motion to allow its counterclaim as to the underreported usage, which the trial court granted. The trial court’s decision to refer the Village’s counterclaim to mediation in its order, after it had already granted the Village’s motion to allow the counterclaim at trial, served only to create greater delay and expense to the parties, thus undermining the purpose of the alternative dispute resolution clause. "Even if the trial court would ordinarily have discretion over whether to send a counterclaim to mediation, under these circumstances the trial court could not properly rescind its decision, relied on by the parties, to allow the counterclaim after the trial had already taken place. Therefore, we remand the Village’s counterclaim for resolution by the trial court." View "City of Newport v. Village of Derby Center" on Justia Law

Darlene Devlin had been married for more than 40 years when her husband died, then a civilian federal employee for nearly six years, entitling Darlene to Basic Employee Death Benefits (BEDB), 5 U.S.C. 8442(b)(1)(A), 8466(b). However, Darlene died before she could sign or file an application for BEDB. Her son, Devlin, completed, signed, and filed an application for BEDB on her behalf. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) denied the application, concluding that Darlene was not entitled to BEDB because she failed to submit an application for those benefits before her death. Devlin argued that his appointment as a co-administrator of his mother’s estate permitted him to sign and file the application for BEDB on her behalf. The e Merit Systems Protection Board and Federal Circuit affirmed the denial. View "Devlin v. Office of Pers. Mgmt." on Justia Law

The Tribe filed claims in 2005 against the Department for unpaid contract support costs that accrued from 1996 through 1998. At issue was whether the Tribe may sue under the doctrine of equitable tolling even though the statute of limitations has lapsed. The court concluded that the Tribe's claims were barred by the statute of limitations because the legal misunderstandings and tactical mistakes the Tribe identified did not amount to extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Menominee Indian Tribe v. United States" on Justia Law

Relator filed suit under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, alleging that the HP products Govplace sold to the federal government originated from non-designated countries, in violation of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA), 19 U.S.C. 2501-2581. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Govplace, concluding that the district court properly exercised its discretion in managing discovery and that Govplace reasonably relied on Ingram Micro's certification. The court concluded that a contractor like Govplace is ordinarily entitled to rely on a supplier's certification that the product meets TAA requirements. In this case, Govplace has informed the GSA during multiple Contractor Administrator Visits that it relies on Ingram Micro's Program in representing that the country of origin information for the items listed in its GSA schedule is accurate, and GSA's Administrative Report Cards evaluating Govplace have all concluded that Govplace has complied with the TAA. View "Folliard v. Government Acquisitions, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner Wayne Kassotis appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his complaint, arising from the nonrenewal of his employment contract to remain as the Town of Fitzwilliam's Chief of Police. Petitioner filed a complaint against the Town seeking, among other things, reinstatement as Chief of Police, damages, costs, and attorney’s fees, for the Town’s alleged failure to comply with RSA 105:2-a, which provided procedural protections to appointed chiefs of police who are "dismiss[ed]." The Town moved to dismiss, arguing that, "[b]ecause the Petitioner was not dismissed, RSA 105:2-a does not apply, and he fails to state a claim for relief." The trial court granted the Town’s motion on the basis that "the provisions of RSA 105:2-a are inapplicable to the [Town’s] decision not to renew the employment contract." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kassotis v. Town of Fitzwilliam" on Justia Law

A contractor entered into a public works contract to modernize a building at a Santa Clara County community college. Will was the subcontractor for the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) work. The subcontract provided that the project was to be built according to the specifications of the prime contract. The subcontract and general contract did not specify whether Will was required to fabricate any material necessary to complete the HVAC work. The subcontract required Will to “pay not less than the [applicable prevailing wage] to all laborers, workmen, and mechanics employed by him at the project site.” California’s prevailing wage law generally requires that workers employed on public works be paid the local prevailing wage for work of a similar character. (Lab. Code,1771.) Since 1991, Will has fabricated materials at a permanent, offsite facility it operates in Hayward. An employee of Will complained to the Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement alleging he should have been paid prevailing wages for work related to the project, involving the fabrication of sheet metal at the Hayward facility. DLSE issued a civil wage and penalty assessment. The Department of Industrial Relations reversed, in favor of Will. The trial court reversed. The court of appeal held that offsite fabrication is not covered by the prevailing wage law if it takes place at a permanent, offsite manufacturing facility and the location and existence of that facility is determined wholly without regard to the particular public works project. View "Sheet Metal Workers’ Int'l. Ass'n v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Appellant, the President and CEO of a tobacco company called Medallion, filed a qui tam action against Philip Morris, alleging that Philip Morris violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, for failing to provide the government with "Most Favored Customer" pricing. The district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the FCA's public disclosure bar. The court concluded, however, that neither the contract term obligating Philip Morris to provide the government with Most Favored Customer pricing nor Philip Morris's fraudulent certifications that it complied was publicly disclosed. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc." on Justia Law