Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

EMS appealed the district court's order denying its motion to remand its suit against the City to the state court from which it was removed. The court concluded that removal was improper because none of the claims in EMS's state court civil action satisfied either the federal question or diversity requirements of original jurisdiction; the district court's prior jurisdiction over the claims asserted in City v. CLECO, which were now dismissed, did not vest the district court with jurisdiction over EMS's claims; regardless of how factually intertwined with EMS's suit, the district court's retention of jurisdiction over the post-settlement matters could not substitute for original jurisdiction for the purpose of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1367 or removal under section 1441, given that EMS's claims were not asserted in the same proceeding as the claims in City v. CLECO; and, if Baccus v. Parrish retained any precedential value, it was distinguishable and inapposite in this instance. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.View "Energy Mgmt. Servs. v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law

Service Employees International Union, Local 1021, AFL-CIO (SEIU) alleged that the Sonoma County Community Development Commission lacked legal authority to contract with a private corporation to conduct housing inspection services that had formerly been performed by public employees. The Commission argued that Health and Safety Code sections 34144 and 341452 expressly authorized it to enter into a contract with a private entity for necessary services, such as housing inspection. Section 34145 authorizes it to “hire, employ, or contract for staff, contractors, and consultants.” The trial court dismissed SEIU’s lawsuit. The appeals court affirmed, noting that the Commission’s powers, duties and scope of authority are not delegated but are fixed and circumscribed by statute. The statute does not include the limitations argued by SEIU. View "Serv. Emps. Int'l Union v. Cnty. of Sonoma" on Justia Law

In 2006, the Federal Bureau of Prisons issued a Request for Proposals for the “design-build” construction of a federal correctional institution. The project involved a “cut-to-fill” site, meaning that the ground had to be leveled by excavating materials from one area of the site and using those materials to fill lower areas. Based on information in the solicitation documents and prior experience, BH believed the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Sciences would approve a permit for a one-step-cut-to-fill construction plan and calculated its bid price, $238,175,000, accordingly. The contract provided liquidated damages of $8,000 for each day completion was overdue. The NHDES rejected the application. BH advised the government of the implications of NHDES restrictions, but did not refuse to proceed or request that the government intervene with the NHDES. According to BH, the restrictions were contrary to generally accepted industry practice. Upon completion of cut-to-fill operations, BH submitted a Request for Equitable Adjustment, seeking $7,724,885 for excess costs. The Contracting Officer and the Claims Court rejected the request, finding that the Permits and Responsibilities clause placed the burden of obtaining and complying with state and local permits on BH “without additional expense to the Government;” that BH had not alleged violation of the implied duty of good faith; and that, because the government did not control the NHDES, there was no basis for imposing liability for constructive change. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Bell/Heery v. United States" on Justia Law

Salem, under contract, coordinated Marine Corps Community Services (MCCS) shipments around the country. Estes, a federal motor carrier, handled some shipments under its common carrier tariff, without a written contract. The Salem-MCCS contract provided that Salem would pay carriers directly and invoice MCCS. Salem agreed not to represent itself as a representative of MCCS. All bills of lading indicated that “third party freight charges” were to be billed to “Marine Corps Exchange C/O Salem Logistics.” Delivery receipts specified that charges should be billed to the “Marine Corps Exchange” and were signed by a representative of the MCCS or MCX delivery location. MCCS paid Salem for some of the shipments; Salem never paid Estes. After becoming aware that Salem was not paying carriers, MCCS began paying carriers directly, for shipments for which it had not yet paid Salem. Estes sued Salem and the government, seeking to recover $147,645.33. The Claims Court dismissed, finding that there was no privity of contract between Estes and the government and rejecting a claim under 49 U.S.C. 13706, which governs the liability of consignees for shipping charges incurred by a common carrier. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the bills of lading were sufficient to establish privity. View "Estes Express Lines v. United States" on Justia Law

Relator filed a qui tam action on behalf of the United States alleging that defendant telecommunication companies violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729, while bidding for and being awarded contracts to install and operate communications networks for school districts and libraries throughout South Texas. Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal of the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under the FCA. This case decides when the Government "provides any portion of" requested money, as to trigger the protection of the False Claims Act, a statute that shadows every aspect of the administrative state. Because there are no federal funds involved in the program, and USAC is not itself a government entity, the court agreed that the Government does not provide any portion of the requested money under the FCA. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shupe v. Cisco Systems, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. 9.407-4(b), governs the acquisition of supplies and services by all federal agencies. At issue was whether a federal agency may suspend two affiliates of an indicted government contractor for the duration of the legal proceedings against the indicted contractor under the Regulation. Because the suspension of an affiliate was included as part of the suspension of the indicted government contractor, the court concluded that legal proceedings initiated against the indicted government contractor tolled the 18-month time limit for the suspension of the affiliates. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the affiliates and rendered a judgment in favor of defendants.View "Agility Defense & Gov't Svcs, et al. v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, et al." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a contract dispute between the State of Vermont and Corizon Health, Inc., formerly known as Prison Health Services, Inc. (PHS). The State appealed a declaratory judgment ruling that PHS was not contractually obligated to defend the State and its employees against certain claims brought by the estate of an inmate who died while in the custody of the Department of Corrections.  Upon review of the contract in question, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that PHS had a duty to defend.View "Vermont v. Prison Health Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Relators filed suit in district court asserting claims arising from a Direct Procurement Method (DPM) scheme. The DOD instituted the International Through Government Bill of Lading program to govern transoceanic moves, while relying on the DPM to contract for transport strictly on the European continent. These appeals and cross-appeals were taken from final judgments, entered in accordance with Rule 54(b), in two qui tam actions consolidated for litigation in district court. The court concluded that relator possessed standing to sue for civil penalties while bypassing the prospect of a damages award and, therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in his favor; the court reversed and remanded to the extent that the district court denied relator discovery of any penalties; and the court vacated the district court's ruling in favor of the United States so that it could conduct further proceedings on what remained of the government's FCA claim and reentered judgment as appropriate.View "United States ex rel. Kurt Bunk v. Gosselin World Wide Moving" on Justia Law

After a hearing, the Department of Children and Families substantiated allegations that Plaintiff, an elementary school teacher, emotionally abused one of his students and recommended that Plaintiff’s name be placed on the Department’s central registry of child abuse and neglect. The trial court affirmed, ruling that the ultimate finding of the administrative hearing officer was supported by substantial evidence. The Appellate Court reversed and ordered the Department to remove Plaintiff’s name from the central registry. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Appellate Court (1) failed properly to credit the factual findings and legal conclusions of the administrative hearing officer; and (2) improperly concluded that the definition of “abused” found in Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-120(3) was void for vagueness as applied to the facts of this case. View "Frank v. Dep’t of Children & Families" on Justia Law

American General Contractors, Inc. ("AGC"), appealed a judgment assessing liability and awarding damages and interest for the cost of delays in the construction of the Williams County Law Enforcement Center in Williston. C&C Plumbing and Heating, LLP ("C&C"), the successful bidder for the mechanical prime contract, filed suit when construction the center was delayed approximately two years after "substantial completion" was supposed to have happened. The district court concluded it was appropriate for the County and AGC to share responsibility for providing temporary shelter and heat on the project. The court apportioned 47 percent of the liability for the costs of the delay for the three and one-half months of active interference to the County and 53 percent to AGC, for the four months delay inherent to the industry. The court awarded C&C approximately $73,000 on its claim against the County. After offsetting amounts owed between the parties, the court awarded AGC approximately $424,000 on its claim against the County. The court awarded Davis Masonry approximately $96,000 from AGC for masonry work completed under its subcontract with AGC, and rejected AGC's claimed offsets to that amount. Davis had provided heat, cover and shelter for the project during cold weather and sought $649,000 from the County and AGC for that expense including prompt payment interest. Davis had settled with the County for $530,000, and the court ruled AGC was responsible for 53 percent of the remaining $119,000, or $63,070. AGC argues the district court erred in determining AGC was liable for any of the costs incurred from the delay under its contract with the County. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "C&C Plumbing and Heating, LLP v. Williams County" on Justia Law