Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Randolph-Sheppard Act, 20 U.S.C. 107–107e, gives blind persons a priority in winning contracts to operate vending facilities on federal properties. Fort Campbell, Kentucky, operates a cafeteria for its soldiers. For about 20 years, Kentucky’s Office for the Blind (OFB) has helped blind vendors apply for and win the base’s contracts for various services. In 2012, the Army, the federal entity that operates Fort Campbell, published a solicitation, asking for bids to provide dining-facility-attendant services. Rather than doing so under the Act, as it had before, the Army issued this solicitation as a set aside for Small Business Administration Historically Underutilized Business Zones. OFB, representing its blind vendor, filed for arbitration under the Act, and, days later, filed suit, seeking to prevent the Army from awarding the contract. The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider a request for a preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit vacated. OFB’s failure to seek and complete arbitration does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction. View "Commonwealth of Kentucky v. United States" on Justia Law

Mitchell began working as a Social Security Administration lawyer in 1998. The Department of Justice appointed her as a Special Assistant United States Attorney in 2006, a one-year appointment during which she remained an employee of and was paid by, the SSA. The Department extended that appointment, so that she served more than two years in the Special Assistant position. Effective December 21, 2008, the Department hired Mitchell as an AUSA in the same office. The Department’s form 50-B cited 28 U.S.C. 542, which authorizes AUSA appointments generally. The form stated that the appointment was not to exceed 18 months, was “temporary” and “subject to” successful completion of a pending background investigation. The background check concluded in July 2009. In August 2009, the Department provided Mitchell another form 50-B, citing 28 U.S.C. 542, but stating that Mitchell was subject to a two-year trial period beginning August 2, 2009, during which she could be removed without cause or appeal. The Department fired Mitchell days before that period was to end, without notice or opportunity to respond. The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Mitchell was not an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. 7511(a). The Federal Circuit reversed, reasoning that Mitchell had “completed 2 years of current continuous service in the same or similar positions in an Executive agency under other than a temporary appointment limited to 2 years or less,” considering the time during which the background check was performed.View "Mitchell v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd." on Justia Law

Veridyne’s first contract to provide logistics services to the Maritime Administration (MARAD), was awarded pursuant to the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) 8(a) program for small, disadvantage businesses, 15 U.S.C. 637(a). To obtain extension of the contract without it being submitted to bidding, Veridyne estimated that the new contract would not exceed “$3,000,000 in the aggregate.” Veridyne and MARAD officials knew that the services to be provided under the extension would cost far more than $3,000,000. MARAD proposed that SBA approve the new contract without opening it to competition. MARAD, Veridyne, and the SBA executed the new contract. From 2001 to 2004, MARAD issued additional work orders to Veridyne and paid Veridyne $31,134,931.12. In part due to MARAD’s cost overruns, the Office of Inspector General investigated and concluded that Veridyne had obtained the extension through fraud. After a stop order issued, Veridyne continued to work for MARAD and submitted additional invoices. Veridyne sued to recover $2,267,163. The government entered a defense under the Fraudulent Claims statute, 28 U.S.C. 2514, and counterclaimed for penalties under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, and the Contracts Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 7103. The Claims Court held that Veridyne’s contract claim was forfeited under the Fraudulent Claims Act, but awarded Veridyne partial recovery under a quantum meruit theory, while awarding penalties to the government under the False Claims Act and the Contract Disputes Act. The Federal Circuit reversed the quantum meruit award, but affirmed the award of penalties.View "Veridyne Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Martin began working for California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in 2000, and Sphar began working for CDCR in 2002. They were dismissed in 2004 and challenged their dismissals. In October 2008, an administrative law judge found that the dismissals had been unjustified and revoked them. The ALJ’s decision provided that a hearing would be set if the parties were “unable to agree as to salary, benefits and interest due under Government Code section 19584.The two were reinstated to employment. CDCR sought a writ of mandate to overturn the decision to include merit salary adjustments and physical fitness incentive pay (PFIP), and claimed that the offset to backpay for money earned from other employers should have included overtime pay. The CDCR also challenged the Board’s decision that Sphar would be compensated at salary range “K,” for which he had not qualified at the time of his dismissal. The superior court ordered that the offset include overtime pay, but denied the remainder of the petition. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that section 19584 authorized the inclusion of merit salary adjustments and PFIP in the award, authorized Sphar to be compensated at salary range “K,” and required the inclusion of overtime pay in the offset. View "Dept. of Corrs. & Rehab. v. State Pers. Bd." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Bessemer Water Service (BWS) and Lake Cyrus Development Company, Inc. (LCDC) over a contract referred to as the "1998 water agreement." In "Bessemer I," the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had exceeded its discretion in holding that the 1998 water agreement was a valid binding contract and in awarding LCDC $224,979.83 because the agreement was entered into violation of section 39-2-2 and was therefore void. On appeal, the Attorney General intervened and filed a complain seeking to recover payments BWS made to LCDC under the 1988 water agreement. The trial court ultimately entered a judgment in favor of the Attorney General (for the benefit of BWS). LCDC thereafter filed a postjudgment motion requesting the trial court alter, amend or vacate its judgment, or in the alternative, order a new trial. The trial court denied LCDC's motion; that denial was brought before the Supreme Court in this case. After review, the Supreme Court held the trial court's denial of LCDC's motion should have been reversed. The case was then remanded for further proceedings. View "Lake Cyrus Development Company, Inc. v. Bessemer Water Service " on Justia Law

EMS appealed the district court's order denying its motion to remand its suit against the City to the state court from which it was removed. The court concluded that removal was improper because none of the claims in EMS's state court civil action satisfied either the federal question or diversity requirements of original jurisdiction; the district court's prior jurisdiction over the claims asserted in City v. CLECO, which were now dismissed, did not vest the district court with jurisdiction over EMS's claims; regardless of how factually intertwined with EMS's suit, the district court's retention of jurisdiction over the post-settlement matters could not substitute for original jurisdiction for the purpose of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1367 or removal under section 1441, given that EMS's claims were not asserted in the same proceeding as the claims in City v. CLECO; and, if Baccus v. Parrish retained any precedential value, it was distinguishable and inapposite in this instance. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.View "Energy Mgmt. Servs. v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law

Service Employees International Union, Local 1021, AFL-CIO (SEIU) alleged that the Sonoma County Community Development Commission lacked legal authority to contract with a private corporation to conduct housing inspection services that had formerly been performed by public employees. The Commission argued that Health and Safety Code sections 34144 and 341452 expressly authorized it to enter into a contract with a private entity for necessary services, such as housing inspection. Section 34145 authorizes it to “hire, employ, or contract for staff, contractors, and consultants.” The trial court dismissed SEIU’s lawsuit. The appeals court affirmed, noting that the Commission’s powers, duties and scope of authority are not delegated but are fixed and circumscribed by statute. The statute does not include the limitations argued by SEIU. View "Serv. Emps. Int'l Union v. Cnty. of Sonoma" on Justia Law

In 2006, the Federal Bureau of Prisons issued a Request for Proposals for the “design-build” construction of a federal correctional institution. The project involved a “cut-to-fill” site, meaning that the ground had to be leveled by excavating materials from one area of the site and using those materials to fill lower areas. Based on information in the solicitation documents and prior experience, BH believed the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Sciences would approve a permit for a one-step-cut-to-fill construction plan and calculated its bid price, $238,175,000, accordingly. The contract provided liquidated damages of $8,000 for each day completion was overdue. The NHDES rejected the application. BH advised the government of the implications of NHDES restrictions, but did not refuse to proceed or request that the government intervene with the NHDES. According to BH, the restrictions were contrary to generally accepted industry practice. Upon completion of cut-to-fill operations, BH submitted a Request for Equitable Adjustment, seeking $7,724,885 for excess costs. The Contracting Officer and the Claims Court rejected the request, finding that the Permits and Responsibilities clause placed the burden of obtaining and complying with state and local permits on BH “without additional expense to the Government;” that BH had not alleged violation of the implied duty of good faith; and that, because the government did not control the NHDES, there was no basis for imposing liability for constructive change. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Bell/Heery v. United States" on Justia Law

Salem, under contract, coordinated Marine Corps Community Services (MCCS) shipments around the country. Estes, a federal motor carrier, handled some shipments under its common carrier tariff, without a written contract. The Salem-MCCS contract provided that Salem would pay carriers directly and invoice MCCS. Salem agreed not to represent itself as a representative of MCCS. All bills of lading indicated that “third party freight charges” were to be billed to “Marine Corps Exchange C/O Salem Logistics.” Delivery receipts specified that charges should be billed to the “Marine Corps Exchange” and were signed by a representative of the MCCS or MCX delivery location. MCCS paid Salem for some of the shipments; Salem never paid Estes. After becoming aware that Salem was not paying carriers, MCCS began paying carriers directly, for shipments for which it had not yet paid Salem. Estes sued Salem and the government, seeking to recover $147,645.33. The Claims Court dismissed, finding that there was no privity of contract between Estes and the government and rejecting a claim under 49 U.S.C. 13706, which governs the liability of consignees for shipping charges incurred by a common carrier. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the bills of lading were sufficient to establish privity. View "Estes Express Lines v. United States" on Justia Law

Relator filed a qui tam action on behalf of the United States alleging that defendant telecommunication companies violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729, while bidding for and being awarded contracts to install and operate communications networks for school districts and libraries throughout South Texas. Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal of the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under the FCA. This case decides when the Government "provides any portion of" requested money, as to trigger the protection of the False Claims Act, a statute that shadows every aspect of the administrative state. Because there are no federal funds involved in the program, and USAC is not itself a government entity, the court agreed that the Government does not provide any portion of the requested money under the FCA. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shupe v. Cisco Systems, Inc., et al." on Justia Law