Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from a lawsuit filed in 2007 by the Retired Employees Association of Orange County, Inc. against the County of Orange contesting the validity of certain changes the county had made to health benefits for retired employees. At the request of the Ninth Circuit, the court addressed the following question: "Whether, as a matter of California law, a California county and its employees can form an implied contract that confers vested rights to health benefits on retired county employees." In response, the court concluded that, under California law, a vested right to health benefits for retired county employees could be implied under certain circumstances from a county ordinance or resolution. Whether those circumstances existed in this case was beyond the scope of the question posed to the court by the Ninth Circuit.View "Retired Employees Assoc. v. Co. of Orange" on Justia Law

Two unions filed grievances against the Sioux Falls School District, alleging that that the District violated the parties' labor agreements when the District provided 2.5 percent wage increases for the 2008-2009 school year. The District and the Department of Labor denied both grievances as untimely. The circuit court judge concluded that the grievances were timely, and reversed and remanded the matter to the Department to determine the correct percentage wage increase. On remand, the Department concluded that the union members were entitled to a three percent wage increase. The circuit court affirmed. The District appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the union's grievances were timely; and (2) the union members were entitled to a three percent salary increase, and the District violated the terms of the agreements by implementing a percentage wage increase other than the percentage change in the per student allocation referenced in S.D. Codified Laws 13-13-10.1(4). View "AFSCME Local 1025 v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was the City of Lewiston's rejection of a bid for a public works project on the grounds that the lowest bidder lacked sufficient experience for the project. In 2009, the City of Lewiston (City) advertised for bids to replace the irrigation system at the City golf course. Hillside Landscape Construction, Inc. (Hillside) desired to bid on the project, but prior to doing so it sent a letter to City stating that if City insisted upon having qualifications other than a current Idaho public works license to bid on the project, the City must follow the Category B procedures set forth in the Idaho Code and pre-qualify the bidders. Hillside asked that the qualification of prior experience be removed. City’s attorney denied the request, stating that City’s specifications and bidding process complied with state law. Hillside and four others submitted bids for the project. City notified the bidders that Hillside Landscape Construction submitted the lowest bid but that the company lacked the required experience specified within the bid documents. City awarded the contract to Landscapes Unlimited, the next lowest bidder. Hillside filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages. The district court held that City complied with the bidding statutes, vacated a temporary restraining order, denied the motion for an injunction then dismissed Hillside’s complaint. In its review, the Supreme Court found that because the City chose to follow the "Category A" procedures set forth in the Idaho Code rather than the Category B procedures, the district court erred in holding that City could reject the bid on that ground. The Court therefore vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hillside Landscape Construction, Inc. v. City of Lewiston " on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendant David Egan, a business manager for Defendant Foxhollow Construction and Trucking, Inc. (Foxhollow), met with Wayne Johnson of Defendant L.N. Johnson Paving, LLC (Johnson) to discuss a bid for excavation and paving work for a new public high school. Foxhollow wanted to bid on the project but lacked the requisite public works license. Johnson thought its license could cover Foxhollow if the two companies submitted a bid in Johnson's name. Egan submitted a subcontract bid in Johnson’s name to Plaintiff Harris, the general contractor for the school project, and was the successful bidder. Over the course of the business relationship, a contract dispute arose. Harris brought this action, alleging that (1) Foxhollow, Johnson, and another subcontractor breached their subcontracts with Harris. Egan filed a counterclaim for indemnification from Harris. The district court dismissed Foxhollow as a party for lack of proof of notice because there was no indication that Foxhollow was ever served. After a bench trial, the court granted Harris’ motion for "directed verdict" as to Egan’s counterclaim. The court concluded however that Harris failed to prove any of its remaining claims against any of the defendants and therefore was not entitled to relief. The court also awarded fees and costs to Johnson. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Harris argued that the district court: (1) erred in concluding Harris failed to prove contract damages; (2) erred in concluding that no defendant was unjustly enriched; (3) erred in concluding that no defendant is liable for fraud; (4) erred in concluding that Harris was not entitled to indemnity; (5) abused its discretion in denying Harris’ motion to amend findings and conclusion; (6) abused its discretion in granting fees and costs to Johnson; and (7) abused its discretion in denying Harris’ motion for a new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment except for its attorney fee awards, which were vacated.View "Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Construction & Trucking, Inc. " on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a written agreement between the City of Rutland and the Vermont Swim Association (VSA) that granted VSA the right to host its annual swim meet at a facility in a city park. VSA appealed the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the City. Because the plain language of the parties' contract did not require VSA to pay attorney's fees incurred by the City in pursuing either indemnity from VSA or other third-party actions, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Southwick v. City of Rutland" on Justia Law

In 2001, Plaintiff Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. and Defendants the Kootenai County Sheriff and Board of Commissioners entered into a settlement agreement setting forth procedures for how inmates at the county jail would be informed of and obtain bail bonds. Allied brought suit alleging several claims including breach of the settlement agreement. The district court dismissed Allied's claims. Principal among them was Allied's contention that the Sheriff wrongfully diverted Allied's potential customers away from Allied, toward credit card companies, with the intent to harm Allied's business. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Allied ran afoul of the technical pleading requirements of the legal authorities it used to support its claims. As such, the Court held that the district court properly dismissed Allied's claims against Defendants.View "Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County of Kootenai" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from an order granting summary judgment to defendant for the alleged breach of an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) entered into by the parties for the distribution of funds generated by a special sales tax instituted pursuant to the Homestead Option Sales and Use Tax Act (HOST), OCGA 48-8-100 et seq. At issue was whether the IGA was unconstitutional as violative of the Intergovernmental Contracts Clause of the Georgia Constitution, 1983 Ga. Const., Art. IX, Sec. III, Par. I(a). The court held that the IGA was not a valid intergovernmental contract where the IGA was neither a contract for services or one for the use of facilities, but a revenue-sharing contract. Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted to defendant.View "City of Decatur v. Dekalb County" on Justia Law

Twenty three former tribal employees sued the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma for breach of employment contracts. The contracts contained a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Tribal law requires that waiver of sovereign immunity must be consented to by the Business Committee of the Tribe by resolution. The trial judge, on motion for reconsideration, granted the Tribe's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. On appeal, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the Tribe expressly and unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity with respect to Plaintiffs' employment contracts. Upon review of the contracts and the applicable tribal resolutions and legal standards, the Supreme Court held that waiver of sovereign immunity was neither expressed nor consented to in the Business Committee's resolutions that authorized the Chief to sign the employment contracts. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.View "Dilliner v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma " on Justia Law

In a 1905 water exchange agreement, Big Ditch Irrigation Company conveyed its Big Cottonwood Creek water right to the Salt Lake City Corporation in exchange for the City's commitment to supply Big Ditch with a specified quantity of irrigation-quality water from City sources. Concerned that Big Ditch was infringing upon the City's water rights, the City initiated this case against Big Ditch and four Big Ditch shareholders in district court. The City sought declaratory judgment on several issues. Big Ditch and the shareholders counterclaimed. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on most major issues. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court properly dismissed the defendants' counterclaims and correctly concluded that the City holds title to the water rights conveyed in the agreement. The Court held, however, that the district court erred in (1) determining that Big Ditch did not have a right to file change applications; (2) determining that the parties had modified the agreement or, alternatively, that Big Ditch was estopped from enforcing its right to the amount of water specified in the agreement; and (3) refusing to dismiss the City's claims against the shareholders.View "Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co." on Justia Law

In 2003, the Division of Highways (DOH) let out a public highway construction contract to Nicewonder Contracting. The Affiliated Construction Trades Foundation (ACT) filed a declaratory judgment action against the DOH and Nicewonder, alleging that the construction contract violated state and federal law because the DOH did not seek public bids for the project and there was no prevailing wage clause in the contract. Upon remand from the district court, the circuit court granted Nicewonder's motion for summary judgment, finding ACT lacked standing. The Supreme court reversed, holding that the appropriate standard to determine if an organization has representative standing to sue on behalf of its members is when the organization proves that (1) at least one of its members would have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. The Court found that ACT met all three prongs and thus had representative standing to seek the declarations contained in its petition. View "Affiliated Constr. Trades v. W. Va. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law