Justia Government Contracts Opinion Summaries

Relators brought a qui tam action against HP alleging that HP engaged in unlawful kickback and defective pricing schemes in its sale of computer equipment to the federal government. The United States intervened and reached a settlement with HP and the district court awarded relators a share of the kickback settlement and a share of the defective pricing settlement pursuant to the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(d)(1). The court concluded that the case turned on fact findings the district court made regarding the relationship between relators' action and HP's subsequent disclosure of defective pricing in Contract 35F. The government failed to reveal any clear error in the district court's factual findings regarding that relationship. Moreover, at least with respect to those qui tam actions in which the government elected to intervene, a relator's initial allegations need not satisfy Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements in order to accomplish the purpose they were meant to serve. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Roberts, et al v. United States" on Justia Law

Casitas Water District operates the Ventura River Project, which is owned by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and provides water to Ventura County, California, using dams, reservoirs, a canal, pump stations, and many miles of pipeline. In 1997, the National Marine Fisheries Service listed the West Coast steelhead trout as an endangered species and determined that the primary cause of its decline was loss of habitat due to water development, including impassable dams. Casitas faced liability if continued operation of the Project resulted in harm to the steelhead, 16 U.S.C. 1538(a)(1), 1540(a)–(b). In 2003, NMFS issued a biological opinion concerning operation of a fish ladder to relieve Casitas of liability. Casitas opened the Robles fish ladder, then filed suit, asserting that the biological opinion operating criteria breached its 1956 Contract with the government or amounted to uncompensated taking of Casitas’s property. The Claims Court dismissed, citing the sovereign acts doctrine. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of the contract claim, but reversed dismissal of Casitas’s takings claim. The court again dismissed, holding that Casitas had failed to show that the operating criteria had thus far resulted in any reduction of water deliveries, so a takings claim was not yet ripe. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States" on Justia Law

Sharp, a federal supply contractor, submitted a termination compensation claim to the Department of the Army contracting officer, and later brought a Contracts Dispute Act claim before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, claiming that, because the Army failed to exercise the entirety of the last option year under a delivery order, Sharp was entitled to premature discontinuance fees under its General Services Administration schedule contract. The ASBCA dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the Federal Acquisition Regulation, does not permit ordering agency contracting officers to decide disputes pertaining to schedule contracts. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Under FAR 8.406-6, only the GSA contracting office may resolve disputes that, in whole or in part, involve interpretation of disputed schedule contract provisions. View "Sharp Elec. Corp. v. McHugh" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a government contract to dredge a portion of the Houston-Galveston navigation channel. At issue was the scope of a corporate officer's personal liability under 31 U.S.C. 3713 (the Priority Statute). The court concluded that the decision of a corporate officer rendered pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), 41 U.S.C. 7101 et seq., was a "claim" within the meaning of the Priority Statute; a debtor's representative had "notice" of that claim, necessary to trigger personal liability under the Priority Statute, when he had actual knowledge of its existence, whether or not he consulted counsel as to its validity; no genuine issue of material fact remained, and the government was entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking the affirmative defenses and denying the motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Renda" on Justia Law

McGuire leased farmland in Arizona from the Colorado River Indian Tribes with approval of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. After the BIA removed a bridge that he used to access portions of the leased property, McGuire filed a Fifth Amendment claim. McGuire does not claim that removal of the bridge was itself a taking, but rather that the BIA’s alleged refusal to authorize replacement of the bridge was a taking of his property rights. The Court of Federal Claims rejected the claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the regulatory takings claim never ripened because McGuire failed to pursue administrative remedies. Even if McGuire’s claim had ripened, he had no cognizable property interest in the bridge, which he neither possessed nor controlled because it was in a BIA right-of-way. No federal regulation gave him a property interest and he was not entitled to an easement by necessity. View "McGuire v. United States" on Justia Law

After a 2008 Indiana flood, the President authorized the Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide disaster relief under the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121–5207. Columbus Regional Hospital was awarded approximately $70 million, but suit under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 1349, claiming that it was entitled to about $20 million more. The district judge granted FEMA summary judgment. In response to the Seventh Circuit’s questioning of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Hospital argued that the Court of Federal Claims was the right forum and requested transfer. FEMA argued that the district court had jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit agreed with FEMA, holding that the suit was not for “money damages.” The Hospital wants money, but not as compensation for FEMA’s failure to perform some other obligation, but as “the very thing to which [it] was entitled” under the disaster-relief program. The court noted that only the district court can serve as a forum for all of the Hospital’s legal theories, then rejected all of those theories. View "Columbus Reg'l Hosp. v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency" on Justia Law

In 2001, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement awarded Northrop a contract for lease and support of Oakley network monitoring software for one base year and three option years at about $900,000 per year. To obtain Oakley’s software, Northrop was required to pay $2,899,710, so Northrup assigned its payment rights to ESCgov for $3,296,093. ESCgov assigned its rights to Citizens, but the government was not notified. In 2005, ICE decided not to exercise the first option. Northrop sent the contracting officer a “Contract Disputes Act Claim for not Exercising Option,” citing the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 601. The letter did not mention the two assignments. The CO denied Northrop’s claim. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed, holding that Northrop had not supplied the CO “adequate notice” because it failed to reference potential application of the Anti-Assignment Act and Severin doctrine. While the matter was pending, Northrop filed a second claim, including documents on the financing arrangements. The CO determined that Northrop’s second claim was the same claim and declined to issue a final decision. The Claims Court again held that it lacked jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed, finding that the first letter constituted a valid claim. View "Northrop Grumman Computing Sys., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

This case involved an alleged bid-rigging scheme that sought to defraud various New York State and City government agencies in connection with the purchase by those agencies of a particular brand of mobile radio. Gatt, an admitted past participant in the purported scheme, sought to recover damages from alleged co-conspirators for losses arising from the termination of Gatt's at-will distribution contract for those radios. Gatt raised federal and state antitrust claims arising under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1; the Donnelly Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 340; and New York common law. The court concluded that Gatt lacked antitrust standing to pursue its antitrust claims and that its common law claims were properly dismissed as a matter of law. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Gatt's complaint. View "Gatt Communications, Inc. v. PMC Associates, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Starting in 2002, Smith sought a place on Beloit’s “tow list,” to be called when police required towing services. Chief Wilson denied these requests. Smith, who is African-American, attributed his exclusion to racial bias. In 2008, Wilson’s subordinates made allegations that, in everyday conversation, Wilson referred to “niggers,” “towel heads,” and “spics.” Several officers specifically recalled that Wilson used such slurs about Smith. Smith filed claims under Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, 42 U.S.C.1981, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury returned a verdict finding that race was a “motivating factor” in Wilson’s decision not to include Smith on the list, but that Wilson would not have added Smith to the list even if race had played no part in Wilson’s thinking. The district court concluded that the mixed verdict precluded relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the jury’s second finding (that his company would have been left off the tow list regardless of race) was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; that Smith was entitled to some relief because he succeeded in demonstrating that improper racial considerations at least partially motivated Wilson; and that instruction on the allocation of the burden of persuasion was incorrect. View "Smith v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Reimbursement providers for inpatient services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries is adjusted upward for hospitals that serve disproportionate numbers of patients who are eligible for Supplemental Security Income. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services annually submit the SSI fraction for eligible hospitals to a “fiscal intermediary,” a Health and Human Services contractor, which computes the reimbursement amount and sends the hospitals notice. A provider may appeal to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board within 180 days, 42 U. S. C. 1395oo(a)(3). The PRRB may extend the period, for good cause, up to three years, 42 CFR 405.1841(b). A hospital timely appealed its SSI fraction calculations for 1993 through 1996. The PRRB found that errors in CMS’s methodology resulted in a systematic under-calculation. When the decision was made public, hospitals challenged their adjustments for 1987 through 1994. The PRRB held that it lacked jurisdiction, reasoning that it had no equitable powers save those granted by legislation or regulation. The district court dismissed the claims. The D. C. Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court reversed. While the 180-day limitation is not “jurisdictional” and does not preclude regulatory extension, the regulation is a permissible interpretation of 1395oo(a)(3). Applying deferential review, the Court noted the Secretary’s practical experience in superintending the huge program and the PRRB. Rejecting an argument for equitable tolling, the Court noted that for nearly 40 years the Secretary has prohibited extensions, except as provided by regulation, and Congress not amended the 180-day provision or the rule-making authority. The statutory scheme, which applies to sophisticated institutional providers, is not designed to be “unusually protective” of claimants. Giving intermediaries more time to discover over-payments than providers have to discover underpayments may be justified by the “administrative realities” of the system: a few dozen intermediaries issue tens of thousands of NPRs, while each provider can concentrate on its own NPR. View "Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr." on Justia Law